

# ACHARYA DHRUVA SMARAKA GRANTHA

[ Acharya Dhruva Commemoration Volume ]

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PART II

(in English)

11206

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## PREFACE

We offer our apologies to the contributors and subscribers of the Dhruva Commemoration Volume whose patience we have sorely tried.

Our only plea is that we, who were as eager as they to offer our homage to the late Acharya through this Commemoration Volume, have not spared ourselves in our attempts to get the volume published earlier. The delay has been due entirely to the circumstances beyond our control. The disturbance in economic equilibrium caused by the war conditions in Ahmedabad made it impossible for our major printing presses to undertake this whole work and finish it in specified time. We tried at other places also but with no encouraging response. This made us almost despair of being able to publish all the learned matter that we had got from the admirers of the late Acharya. But as we have, at long, last been able to publish this volume we console ourselves with the adage 'better than never.'

This uncertainty made us follow the plan of publishing the volume in three parts, the first containing non-English articles of personal reminiscences and learned subjects, the second containing articles in English of personal reminiscences and general subjects and the third containing articles in English on Indology. We hope that this arrangement will be found convenient by the reading public also.

A glance at the names of the writers will show in what high respect Acharya Dhruva was held by the learned scholars of the different parts of India.

We offer our sincere thanks to all these writers and others who have co-operated with us in paying this tribute to the sacred memory of Acharya Anandashankar Dhruva who will always live in the hearts of those who value profound learning vitalized by a fine sense of discrimination and catholicity of outlook. "His wisdom and calmness," in the words of Mahatma Gandhiji, indeed "were great assets which adorned his learning."

Ahmedabad,

Editors,

26th December, 1946

Acharya Dhruva Commemoration Volume

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A LIFE-SKETCH  
OF  
ĀCHĀRYA ĀNANDSHANKAR BĀPUBHĀI DHRUVA

RATILAL MOHANLAL TRIVEDI

आत्मन्येवात्मना तुष्टः स्थितप्रज्ञस्तदोच्यते । भ. गी.

“That content surpassing wealth  
The sage in meditation found  
And walk'd with inward glory crown'd”

—Shelley

ANY attempt at telling the true story of the life of Āchārya Dhruva is endeavouring not merely “to read the Times but to read the Eternities.” If life is regarded as consciousness, the present writer though privileged to be one of his most intimate disciples cannot claim exact knowledge of that great life except some occasional glimpses into its inner working. Āchārya Dhruva was an outstanding religious genius and his entire life was a ceaseless attempt at self-realization. He was a sage whose sole content was meditation and in whom as a consequence, the idea of God had gradually grown. Nothing was more sacred to him than knowledge which he acquired throughout his life with exceptional devotion and self-discipline. He was a part of all that he had thought; and past, present, future, all united in harmony in his personality. His soul was ‘like a Star and dwelt apart’, though he always walked on life’s common way and performed its lowliest duties with grace and cheer. Even in the midst of his most efficient activities—and almost all his activities were efficient—he could evince a sort of indefinable detachment which made one feel that he really belonged to the spiritual world rather than to the terrestrial world of ordinary mortals. His spiritual eminence was the result of his profound learning and his religious meditations. Having drunk deep from the ambrosial springs

of Saraswati and having assimilated the Elemental Religion in his life, he discovered the bedrock of Truth on which he could stand with poise, survey the vast Universe and unfold its manifold mysteries. Religion being the centre of his life, he had reached conclusions on the knottiest points and problems which have occupied the minds of the greatest thinkers throughout the ages. His religious life imparted to him in particular, the wholeness of vision, a synthetic vision which was his fundamental point of approach to all the questions under the sun and even beyond it. In fact, he himself lived the life of the whole man, both personal and superpersonal and more accurately the latter and therefore difficult to analyse by either a writer of a life-sketch or a biographer. The writer confesses his limitation before he proceeds to relate the story proper.

Āchārya Ānandshankar Bāpubhai Dhruva belonged to the Vadnagarā Nāgar Grihastha community which is well-known in Gujarat for learning, refinement and administrative ability. Though not derived from a long succession of distinguished ancestors, Āchārya Dhruva had inherited the best traits inherent in the community. His grandfather Dayāshankar Dhruva was a pious gentleman of moderate means. His many forefathers and he were all residents of Ahmedabad. Once while talking with Ācharya Dhruva about the opium-eating habit of the past generation, the writer was told by him that his grandfather was a man of artistic taste and was fond of pictures drawn on the outer wall of the house which even included one elegant outline drawing of an assembly of opium eaters.

Dayāshankar Dhruva had an only son named Bāpubhāi Dhruva who was the Ācharya's father. Bāpubhāi Dhruva had neither wealth nor standing and the only thing that he possessed in abundance was hereditary culture coupled with sincere devotion to family deities. His education was mainly confined to reading, writing and arithmetic which was just the education of the common man of his time. At a tender age he started service as a clerk in the Government Agency



Department on a monthly emolument of rupees five but ere long by sheer ability, honesty and tact rose to an eminent post of the Political Agent's Daftardar in Rajkot. He was regarded as a reliable officer by his immediate superiors and had earned a rare prestige not only in the entire Nāgar community of Kathiawad and Gujarat but also among the public at large. Being a liberal-minded gentleman of great refinement and culture, Rao Saheb Bāpubhāi maintained the most cordial relations with the members of his community and his hospitality became almost a household word in the communal circle. Even in the midst of his numerous political activities, he never forgot to worship his family gods whom he adored and loved more than anything else in the world. His personal charities played a great part in the building of the Hātkeshwar Temple, the family God of the Nagars, in Rajkot.

Rao Sāheb Bāpubhāi had four daughters by his first marriage but had no son. Consequently after the death of his first wife, he married his second wife Maniba, the daughter of Mahipatrai Himatlal Saiyadh, a Mamalatdar in the Daskroi Taluka of the Ahmedabad District, at a fairly advanced age of forty or thereabouts. This marriage was blessed with the birth of two daughters and one son. The son who was born on the 22nd day of January 1869, was named Ānandshankar "the joy of the blessed self"—which he literally realised in his life.

Being the only son of prosperous parents and the solitary brother of six sisters, Ānandshankarbhāi was brought up with scrupulous care and exuberant fondling. A part of his childhood was spent at Rajkot and a part at Baroda where his father was posted as a Naib Dewan after his retirement from Government Service. Rao Saheb Bāpubhāi did not long stick to his post at Baroda. He left the state service and settled permanently in Ahmedabad in his ancestral house in Ākā Sheth Kuva Pole in which he had made some suitable additions and alterations.

Ānandshankarbhāi lived a life of splendour both in his childhood and youth. From his early boyhood he moved in a carriage and was frequently attended by a servant when he went out to school or temple or elsewhere. He put on a rich dress when young. He was fond of riding in his early years and occasionally rode on horseback on the Dasharā Festival from the house to the Kānkaria Lake. His personal appearance was highly attractive. His features were broad and brilliant. There was a sparkle in his eyes and a spring in his feet. It was remarked by some eminent men even in his declining years that his eyes were 'bewitching.' A special sort of grace characterized all his movements. His manners were sweet and his entire person was extremely handsome. He was evolving a singular personality which was full of light and charm when he had hardly crossed his teens.

The secret of this charm chiefly lay in the acquisition of knowledge, and his power of thought. He was a brilliant student who was almost always a top boy of his class throughout his High school career. He stood second at the Matriculation Examination and fell short of first by two marks only. Among the High school teachers whose names he frequently mentioned with immense gratitude were Shriyut Bhaskar Sāstri and Shriyut Ranchhodlal Khambhati. The former laid the solid foundation of Sanskrit learning and the latter created a taste for the study of history.

But the super-structure of the edifice of his Sanskrit learning was the work of Maithil Pandits—especially Bachha Jha (Dharmadatta) one of the ablest exponents of Navya Nyaya after Jagdish and Gadadhar and the author of 'Gadadhar Dipika' a commentary on the commentary of the Bhagvadgita by Madhusudan Saraswati. They taught him original works in Sanskrit published till then right from the beginning of first B. A. up to the end of M. A. These learned Pandits had introduced him to the sea of Sanskrit literature and lent him powers to swim it. Once he pointed out to the writer in Ahmedabad the exact place where those Pandits dwelt

and told him with great interest how he had worked his way to study Nyāya ( Sanskrit Logic ) by sitting under the roof of tinned iron sheets during hot summer season for eight or nine hours a day while he was in first B. A. He did not mind telling the writer that his unique position in the world of Sanskrit scholarship was mainly due to the labours undergone in his early years in studying the wide and original range of Sanskrit literature under the guidance of the learned Pandits. Being deeply absorbed in Sanskrit studies to the exclusion of the prescribed texts, he got ploughed in first B. A. but was allowed as a special case to sit simultaneously in the first and second B. A. Examinations and succeeded in both. He passed his M. A. in 1892. and his Exmamination in law a few years later.

Soon after his M. A., Abaji Vishnu Kāthavate, a Professor of Sanskrit in the Gujarat College, for whom Āchārya Dhruva had great veneration, retired from his service and exerted great pressure on the Āchārya to accept the post of the Sanskrit professor which had fallen vacant. The Āchārya's father and his esteemed friend Sir Chinubhai's grandfather, Sriyut Ranchhodlal Chhotalal, greatly desired that he should accept the post. The Āchārya's ideal then was Mr. Justice Telang whom he wished to equal or approximate in the profession of law. It was, therefore, not without some tears in his eyes that the post was eventually accepted.

None was happier than the Āchārya's father for this momentous choice as he had meant his son for the learned profession. Later on in one of the public utterances, the Āchārya remarked that he had no reason to regret at all for having accepted the professor's post and that if his heart was as simple as that of a child, tears of joy must flow from his eyes for the acceptance. Āchārya Dhruva graced the chair of the Professor of Sanskrit in the Gujarat College from the beginning of his appointment in 1892 until his transfer to the Elphinstone College, Bombay, in 1919.

Ānandshankarbhai was twice married and each time his married



life was blissful. His loyalty of love was supreme. At the early age of sixteen, he married Andubā, his first wife, who besides being eminently feminine was endowed with proper intelligence, skill and competence. But this happy companionship did not last for more than five years. When Ānandshankarbhāi was twenty-one, Andubā expired leaving behind her an only daughter named Chinubā.

Subsequently though much inclined to the contrary, after a lapse of nearly three years or more, he married his second wife Amirbā, in obedience to the pressing call of the parents. The second marriage was equally happy as the first and was blessed with the birth of four children of whom the two sons Dhruvabhai and Prahladbhai and one daughter Jollyben survived. Amirbā possessed the same nobility and womanly excellence as Andubā did.

Let us now revert to Rao Saheb Bāpubhāi. During his period of retirement he was more and more absorbed in the worship of gods and a part of his time he spent everyday in looking after his personal interests and also the interests of his intimate relations. He had the bearing of a born aristocrat and lived in perfect dignity. He loved and respected the learned Brahmans, called them frequently to dinner and bestowed ample and handsome gifts on them. His filial affection was remarkable. Like our eminent Poet Rabindranath's father, he provided with the utmost care, the cultural environment for the spiritual advancement of his son. Both Devendranāth Tāgore and Bāpubhāi Dhruva have set a noble example to all the aspiring parents to note with advantage that poets or philosophers "are more made than born." The value of human effort always counts beyond doubt, in the making of man. The flowers of humanity are born and grow in an atmosphere of love and reverence for the child.

Ānandshankarbhāi looked ever regardfully on his father and his love for him was boundless. His first and vivid vision of the Hindu Religion in its wholeness was derived from the orthodox but genuine religious life of his father. His father did not drink even

water without evening ablutions and worship. Ānandshankarbhāi had early included in his daily prayers the worship of god Mahādeva after the pattern of his father and recited or read everyday some portions from the Bhagavadgita, the Saptashati and the Chandipath. He was surrounded by books of various sorts in the secluded part of his house and was deeply engrossed in severe and manly thinking in "the privacy of glorious light." He had arranged a regular time-table of his routine in which the reading of books played a prominent role. Most of the extant notes which he made of the books that he read during this formative period of his life clearly show that he had a special scheme of studying the literature of the world in its different ramifications. He had set before him the highest aim of realising God through the widest range of thought. He had already begun to study the various religions and philosophies of the world in all their minutest details and had almost arrived at conclusions about the same before he was scarcely twenty-five. Though overflowing with sweetness and light he possessed a soul of noble reserve which did not make him easily accessible to all. His intercourse with the household and the outside world was as much as was absolutely necessary. He guarded his spiritual treasure of learning with the utmost scrupulous care. Nevertheless, he frequently exercised his intellectual charities or condescendences for the good of the lower intelligences that surrounded him. During this period, he was a regular visitor of the Gujarat Club every evening and used to enlighten and even enliven the clubmen by his brilliant powers of conversation. He soon became the central figure of the Club and his charm became irresistible. He continued to be the member of this Club till the last days of his life though after his retirement from Benares he only occasionally visited it.

Rao Saheb Bapubhai's 'dear delight' was the blossoming forth of the all-sided life of his son who had imbibed the experience of age without years. Rao Saheb Bapubhai, when his alter ego had reached ripeness left this world in full content and peace at the advanced age of seventy-five in the year 1893 A. D.

The father's death was a great shock to the son. Apparently as a consequence of the funeral bath on the burning ghat, Ānandshankarbhai immediately caught cold and rapidly developed pneumonia and had it not been for the sagacity of his maternal uncle Shriyut Amritrai, who used his tact to protect his nephew from the performance of all obsequies by setting aside custom, the illness perhaps would have proved fatal. Thereupon Ānandshankarbhai's sister's son Janubhai Saiyadh performed all funeral rites of the father for which his maternal uncle treated him as his younger brother ever afterwards. On recovering from illness, Ānandshankarbhai convened in his own house an assembly of the learned Pandits, including some Maithil Pandits, who argued in Sanskrit some important problems of religion in which he participated wholeheartedly. This was inevitably done to satisfy the spirit of his deceased father who was a great lover of Sanskrit learning and orthodox religion.

The illness consequent upon the father's death left some permanent marks upon the Ācharya's health. His lungs became weak and his throat became sensitive. Since then he ordered out his life very intelligently, regulated his diet and by means of abstemious habits was able to take the maximum of work from his delicate body. He went to bed early and rose much earlier before sunrise to begin the day's work in good time. He used the greatest measure of his leisure in the comprehensive study of literature on which his heart was set from his early years. He even added music to his study to help the proper functioning and respiration of the lungs and cultivated the art of both vocal and instrumental music from an expert musician who came home to impart instruction everyday. Later on when he presided at Benares in a Music Conference, he showed a mastery in the knowledge of the theory of music in his speech.

Āchārya Dhruva soon after accepting his Sanskrit Professorship in the Gujarat College earned the reputation of an excellent teacher. His profound scholarship in Sanskrit, his wonderful command of



English language and literature, his clear and distinct utterance, his original interpretation of various points in the texts, his nobility of expression and above all his sense of value and proportion made a permanent impression on the mind of the pupil. During the very first year of his appointment, he taught Kalidas's famous drama *Sākuntala* to the ecstatic joy of the pupils of the Previous class. Being the only professor of Sanskrit in those days, he taught Sanskrit Poetry, Prose, Drama, Logic, Philosophy etc. to various classes of the College. Whatever he touched he adorned. He commanded respect and admiration from almost each and all. He became the ideal of his pupils. He participated in their activities. He led the cricket teams and took them out for play to different places. He directed the Annual Social Gatherings and put the Debating society on a solid basis. He encouraged the students to read extensively and lent them books from his own home library which was very well-furnished with valuable books of different subjects. He sympathised with the poor students and gave them scholarships from his own pocket. In fact, he identified himself completely with the work he had taken in hand in the College and discharged his duty with proper devotion. Being widely read in various subjects, he taught besides Sanskrit, English, Logic and Philosophy for sometime with great efficiency. In a short time, he established the reputation of being one of the ablest professors of the presidency.

In his method of teaching Āchārya Dhruva, was like Socrates, one of the greatest exponents of clear thinking. He was the advocate of Reason in the sublime sense in which Kant has used that word. In expounding a passage or in elucidating any point therein, he always went straight to the mark and hit upon the central truth. He never aimed at producing an effect on his hearers and therefore his speech was not marked by special eloquence but was always distinguished by conviction. His language was perfect and his thought was elevating. Sometimes he was able to reveal by the simplest

of means, a mere suggestion of a word, a fairyland full of beauty and invincible charm. He knew full well what to say and what not to say to the pupils and often with the utmost economy of words expressed the highest truths. Like the late Sir Rāmkrishna Bhāndārkar he was a master of brevity, and having roused the intellectual curiosity of his pupils almost invariably dropped the matter and allowed the curious a full scope for free and open inquiry. He seldom appealed to the feeling but always aimed at thought, which in its turn generated feeling. His gigantic mind thus resembled an illimitable ocean which ever remained at full-tide and out of the overflowing waters of which the aspiring pupil was free to use as much as he could.

Āchārya Dhruva had entered upon his literary career in his early twenties. His Sanskrit scholarship had attracted the attention of Professor Manilal Nabhubhai Dwivedi, the well-known Sanskrit scholar, who was the author of many works in English including 'Adwaitism and Monism' and the edition of 'Tarka Kaumudi' in the Bombay Sanskrit Series. This eminent intellectual of Gujarat was the editor of the two distinguished journals "Priyamvada" and "Sudarshan". Both Āchārya Dhruva and Professor Manilal being believers in Vedic Monism and the Aryan ideals of old, an affectionate tie of friendship existed between them. The Āchārya contributed many illuminating articles to the Journals above mentioned, on Religion, Philosophy, Poetics, History and many other subjects during Manilal's life-time. After Manilal's death in 1897, he edited 'Sudarshan' for four or five years.

But on the closing of the nineteenth century, Āchārya Dhruva realised that the life of Gujarat was expanding in various directions. The age of Reform advocated by the journal 'Buddhiprakash' was over and 'Sudarshan's' age of philosophy was found wanting in meeting the needs of the new life. The Āchārya had the vision of the New Age that was dawning on the Indian horizon. Life was losing its limitations on all sides and many an unknown spectacle appeared

in view. The old traditions and customs and even the ancient ideals were found inadequate to assimilate the new ideas which were rapidly rushing and filling every nook and corner of our life. The new life was creating new problems which demanded new points of view to understand them and new power to solve them. A journal which could meet the growing demands of the ever-enlarging life was regarded by Āchārya Dhruva as Yugadharmā or national necessity. Thereupon he withdrew from editing 'Sudarshan' and started a new journal 'Vasanta' in 1902.

"Vasanta" did not adhere to any single tenet or dogma but admitted all ideals. It did not aim at any fragmentary truth but always kept the wholeness in view. It tried to create an atmosphere in which human life might blossom forth into true manhood and womanhood by knowing the art of noble living. It symbolised spring which is the season of the budding and the flowering of fresh life. It suggested the significance of the Spirit of the New Age which was manifesting itself through different channels of human activity. Its varied articles and especially those coming out of the pen of the Āchārya served the purpose of all grades of spiritual culture, the lower as well as the higher, by presenting a whole panorama of the life of the age, with its many aspirations and ideals. It recognised the force of the Time—Spirit—*युगात्मा*—who was changing the old forms and giving rise to the new ones for the ultimate good of man and interpreted accordingly the perpetual play of time. It had a practical motive and was started with the sole aim of elevating the life of Gujarat. It included, in consequence, in its plan, the discussions of almost all the subjects which make the human life whole, namely, religion, philosophy, poetry, ethics, politics, education, economics, sociology, science, research and various aspects of literature and life and fulfilled the same during its continuous career of forty years. Āchārya Dhruva has served to shape through 'Vasanta' the intellectual life of Gujarat to a great extent. The stamp of his marvellous versatility is remarkably seen in his various articles in 'Vasanta'.



The Āchārya came in close and constant contact with the leading intellectuals and literary men of Gujarat especially through his service, as the editor of 'Sudarshan' and 'next of 'Vasanta'. Some of these contacts ripened into intimate friendship. Govardhanram Mādhavrām Tripathi, the great literary luminary of Gujarat and the author of the monumental work 'Saraswatichandra' used to put up at his residence in Ahmedabad and held him in high esteem. It was in the house of Āchārya Dhruva that that eminent son of Gujarat and selfless servant of Gujarati literature, Ranjitrām Vavābhai, initiated the discussion of holding the 'First Sahitya Parishad' on the lines of Bengal Literary Conference before Govardhanram Tripathi and the Āchārya who gave their final approval and support. Narsinhrao Bholānāth Divātia, an outstanding poet whose ripe scholarship has become proverbial in Gujarat and whose prolific contributions to the pages of 'Vasanta' are most valuable, was another great friend of the Āchārya. Ramanbhāi Mahipatram Nilkanth, a leading scholar and social reformer of Gujarat was on terms of intimacy with the Āchārya and undertook the charge of editing 'Vasanta' for full eleven years when the Gujarat College was handed over by the Board to the Government Department of Education which restricted the inclusion of politics in the journal. Uttamlal Keshavlal Trivedi, an erudite scholar of Ethics and political science and the translator of Lokamanya Tilak's 'Gita Rahasya' in Gujarati, was a great friend of the Āchārya at whose residence in Bombay the Āchārya almost invariably put up whenever he happened to go there. Among other prominent intellectuals of Gujarat with whom the Āchārya came in occasional contact, were Diwan Bahadur Ambalal Sakarlal Desai, Rao Bahadur Kamalashankar Pranshankar Trivedi, Diwan Bahadur Keshavlal Harshadrai Dhruva, Bhulabhai Jivanji Desai, Narmadashankar Devshankar Mehta and a few others. The pages of 'Vasanta' are alive with the articles of a number of literary men of Gujarat.

Once again we go back to the year 1903 during which a great

domestic calamity occurred in the life of Āchārya Dhruva. The Āchārya's wife Amirbā became victim to the fell disease of tuberculosis and the whole family with the patient removed to Mount Abu for change of air. Āchārya Dhruva had then to face a conflict of duties. He had to attend on his ailing wife and had also to mind his college work. He solved the riddle by serving both. He divided the week between Ahmedabad and Abu and fulfilled his duties at both the places. For three days during the week he lectured to his students at the college and for the rest of the week, his great friend Uttamlāl Keshavlāl Trivedi dictated his notes to the class. Āchārya Dhruva treated Amirbā with the utmost care and affection and was quick in removing the least discomfort to her by the closest personal attention and service. Even when she slightly coughed, his whole soul went out to her in overflowing sympathy to soothe her and give her relief from pain. He spent a large and extravagant sum of money in the employment of various remedies for her recovery. But the patient's condition became worse and worse and the family finally returned to Ahmedabad. Soon after the deterioration was rapid and Amirbā's condition became critical. In the final stage she developed pneumonia and expired in the presence of Āchārya Dhruva, his mother and other relatives by her side in September 1903 when he was thirty-four.

Amirbā's death was a turning-point in the life of Āchārya Dhruva. He once told the writer that the death gave a religious turn to his life. On the very next day of this sad event, he got all his sacred books on religion transferred to the 'Devaghara' or the room where he daily worshipped the family gods. He made a firm resolution to read all the religious books one after another in a spiritual atmosphere of worship. This is how he read the Bhāgavata, the Rāmāyana, the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavadgītā, the Vedas, the Upanishads and scores of sacred books. He read these books from page to page most critically and made his notes in English on the portions read each day. These notes bear out what original thinking he did and what

religious and philosophical conclusions he reached during his thirties. Though he read and recited the Bhagavadgita daily, his regard and love for the Bhāgavata was paramount. He religiously read for nearly forty years, at least one Adhyāya of the Bhāgavata everyday, and his recitals of the whole might approximate fifty. During his last journey to Benaras in 1939, even while writhing in fever, he asked his nephew Janubhāi Saiyadh to read the usual Adhyāyas from the Bhāgavata in the railway compartment. Such was his consecration to the Bhāgavata. The essence of the Bhāgavata had permeated all his being and had transfigured him into a religious genius. He had turned his sacred reading into spiritual experience. He had become a real philosopher as a result of long reading and thinking.

Āchārya Dhruva being a comprehensive genius, his interest in politics was keen. He used to attend the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress whenever possible and the pages of 'Vasanta' are rife with his illuminating notes and comments on its proceedings and on the various aspects of the political life of the country as far as 1940. He was present at the Surat Session of the Congress in 1907 which ended in sharp differences between the Extremists and the Moderates. Soon after he strongly criticised in 'Vasanta' the extremist standpoint represented by Lokamānya Tilak but in course of time he confessed in his Journal that his criticism was then overshot. He had great respect for the Lokamānya for his profound and vast learning and on the resumption of the editorship of 'Vasanta' in 1924, with the name of God on his lips—पुनश्च हरिः ओम्—he remarked that he was reminded of the utterance of the very words by the great patriot while resuming the editorship of his Journal 'Kesari' after his release from prison. His respect for Maharshi Rānade amounted to reverence and he gratefully remembered him as a great sage whose clear seeing eye had discerned the wholeness of vision and who had pioneered all sided reforms for the regeneration of the motherland. He had great admiration for the eminent patriots



Dadabhai Navroji, Sir Surendra Nath Banerjee, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Sir Phirozsha Mehta, Pandit Madan Mohan Mālviya, and a few others who figured more or less in the pages of 'Vasanta' for the review of their various services to the Indian people. He also occasionally reviewed in his Journal the Indian politics in the perspective of the politics of the world with a masterful knowledge of the world affairs.

Āchārya Dhruva's home-library was a unique collection of valuable books and journals among private libraries. It was being constantly replenished with fresh books on different subjects. He made a selection of various books after reading the reviews of the same from "The Bookman", "The Times Literary Supplement" etc. and ordered out to the Bombay Book-sellers as many books as possible and read the same with immense interest from day to day. One of his greatest pleasures in his Bombay trips was his unfailing visit to "Taraporwala & Sons" in search of the choicest books which he purchased each time in a fairly good number. Whenever one went to see him at his residence in Ahmedabad, one would almost invariably find him absorbed in reading by sitting on a swing or a chair. Even while ailing, he lay down in bed with a book in his hand or lying on his chest which he read and mused at intervals. But he was always responsive to outside contacts. He would cheerfully receive the visitors even during the time of his daily worship and talk with them. The moment a visitor went to him, he would leave aside his book and greet him on cordial terms and satisfy him with his candid talk. Sometimes he went for a solitary walk holding some book in his hand from which he might read a sentence or a passage and reflect on the same. Even after his retirement from Benares, for sometime he went for long motor-drives accompanied with no other companion but a book for his musing. The number of Journals and newspapers to which he had subscribed would easily amount to twenty five. They included some international Journals of repute such as The Mind, the Hibbert

Journal, the Philosophical Review, the Fortnightly Review, the Review of Reviews, the Bookman, the Nation, the Times Literary Supplement etc. He looked upon them with the deepest veneration and concern.

The Āchārya's wealth of learning and spiritual insight into things had established his reputation as a great thinker throughout Gujarat at a comparatively younger age. During the year 1907-8 he worked as the Principal of the Gujarat College. Later on, when the Honours Course was introduced in Sanskrit for the B. A. Examination in 1914, by the Bombay University, Āchārya Dhruva was found at the best form by his pupils while teaching S'ānkar and Rāmānuj Bhāshya, the Bhagavadgītā, the Manusmriti and a few Upanishads. He was immediately appointed as a post-graduate lecturer in Vedānta in 1916 by the Bombay University and his lectures were attended not only by the post-graduate students but also by Narsinhrao Bholānath Divatia, Uttamlal Keshavlal Trivedi, Vālji Govindji Desāi and a few other eminent scholars.

Āchārya Dhruva had great love and reverence for his mother Manibā. After his return from the Gujarat Club in the evening, he would almost always spend his time with his mother and satisfy her with various talks on practical matters. Maniba mostly managed the affairs of the household with considerable ability and brought up the Āchārya's three children, Dhruvhai, Prahlādbhai, and Jollybhen with motherly care and affection. Āchārya Dhruva himself had also brought up his children from their cradle and looked after them with personal attention and deep solicitude. It was during the year 1914, that Maniba fell ill and never recovered from the illness. Her ailments continued for nearly two years. Āchārya Dhruva was all along by her bed side and attended to all her needs in person. He shifted his books from the second floor to the first where the mother lay in bed and served her with a rare devotion. When the mother was slightly uneasy or needed his presence, he did not hesitate to cancel

even the most precious programmes. Once he had to preside over a meeting in which Mrs. Sarojini Naidu was the speaker. But Manibā's condition in the morning became worse and Āchārya Dhruva immediately informed the organisers of the meeting his inability to be present. The mother's condition became extremely critical on the Āchārya's forty-seventh birth-day and she passed away in peace on the following day. After returning from the funeral, Āchārya Dhruva with eyes overflowing with tears consoled all mourners to cease from weeping as Manibā had lived and died most blissfully.

Āchārya Dhruva's life had blossomed forth and flowered to such an extent as to spread its fragrance all round. His journal 'Vasanta' and his book 'Nitishikshna' had attracted the attention of Mahātmā Gāndhī in South Africa. As a consequence when he was first introduced to Gandhiji on his arrival to Ahmedabad in 1915 in the Gujarat Club by its Secretary Jivanlāl Vajrai Desāi, the two eminent men met each other as if they were intimate friends for ages.

Āchārya Dhruva bent low and bowed to Gāndhiji with profound reverence and the latter greeted the former most reverentially and remarked that he had already known him intimately through his writing which had fascinated him and hundreds of his friends and disciples in South Africa. Subsequently when Gandhiji founded his Satyāgrahāshram in Ahmedabad, he came in closer contact with Āchārya Dhruva. Gandhiji sought the aid of the Āchārya in drawing the scheme and the syllabus of the National School of the Āshrama. Gandhiji was charmed with the reading of the Āchārya's book "Apano Dharma" published in 1917. On hearing the Āchārya's presidential address at the second Humanitarian Conference held at Broach in October 1917, Gandhiji was pleased so greatly that he uttered the memorable words that Ānandshankar-bhāi had conclusively proved from the Hindu S'astras that non-violence (अहिंसाधर्म) was the fundamental trend of Indian culture throughout the ages. It was at that Conference that he prophesied



that Anāndshankarbhāi was not only an ornament of Gujarat but was bound to be an ornament of the whole of India—words which might have looked somewhat exaggerated to some at the moment but turned out to be true very soon. Gandhiji became so enamoured of the Ācharya's immeasurable learning and his many excellencies that he publicly remarked that their reciprocal relation was that of a lover and a beloved—of Āshak and Māshuk.

Acharya Dhruva's vast reading and deep thinking had turned his thought into ripe experience. In 1919, there ensued a keen struggle between labour and capital in Ahmedabad and the strikes and lock-ups became the order of the day. As the settlement between the two sides was not in sight, Gandhiji staked his life and started fasting which he determined to continue till the happy ending was reached. Āchārya Dhruva who was renowned for his comprehensive outlook of life and impartiality of judgment was trusted and respected by the millowners as well as by the workers and was consequently accepted by both as the arbitrator. The award that he gave was acclaimed by both the parties as admirable and its significance is highly recognized even today in the history of the amicable relations between labour and capital in Ahmedabad. Gandhiji was soon relieved of the trial and Āchārya Dhruva grew in the estimation of all even more than what he was before.

Āchārya Dhruva had the highest regard for the profound scholarship of Sir Rāmakrishna Gopal Bhāndarkar. He occasionally remarked in the classroom of the Gujarat College that Dr. Bhāndarkar used to teach only one or two acts of S'ākuntala during his period of professorship but thereby he gave the keynote to his pupil to understand and enjoy the widest range of Sanskrit literature. He also, once told that Doctor Bhandarkar's service to the cause of Sanskrit scholarship was inestimable and that if all the scholars in the country were put in one scale of a balance and the Doctor placed in the other, the latter would outweigh all. Nevertheless, when he

differed from the learned Doctor's views on the origin of Bhakti or the Cult of Gopala Krishna or any other point, he criticised the opinion with the utmost deference. Doctor Bhāndārkar too, had great regard for Āchārya Dhruva's substantial scholarship and is said to have remarked that there was hardly any scholar or Pandit who could equal him in the sphere of Vedānta scholarship. Moreover, from the report of a remark made by Gandhiji in 1918, one can say that in the mind of the Mahatmā, the eminence of Āchārya Dhruva's learning was comparable only to that of S'ankarāchārya. When this reported estimation of Gāndhiji was communicated to him during his last days, he remarked with child-like simplicity that if it was at all so, it was Gandhiji who was great and no one else.

The year 1919 was a remarkable year in the life of Āchārya Dhruva. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, our veteran patriot and the architect of the Benares Hindu University, was in need of a first rate scholar and an able administrator to guide the expanding life of the great institution which he had established. As a consequence, he consulted among friends Gandhiji and Sir Lallubhai SāmalDas to suggest the name of a person to whom he could entrust his life-work and put him at the helm of affairs for the purpose. Both Gandhiji and Sir Lallubhai independently suggested the name of Āchārya Dhruva. Panditji was mightily pleased and he corresponded with the Āchārya to accept the post of the Principal of the Central Hindu College. Thereupon the Āchārya discussed the matter with his sons and daughters and several friends and ultimately decided to accept the offer. It should be noted at this stage that soon after the foundation of the Benares Hindu University was laid by Lord Hardinge, Āchārya Dhruva had elucidated in a brilliant article in his journal 'Vasanta' the comprehensive ideal of the University and had paid the highest tribute to Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya for his unique patriotic zeal. It was a happy coincidence that the Āchārya who had imbibed in his entire being the spirit of ancient

Hindu Religion and Philosophy and who had always stood for the ideals of Hindu culture should be asked to guide the destinies of the Kāshi Vis'va Vidyālaya. Āchārya Dhruva who was meanwhile transferred to the Elphinstone College in 1919 had his services lent to the Benares Hindu University and prepared to leave for Benares with the blessings of Gandhiji.

The love and regard which the past and present students of the Gujarat College showed for their venerable Professor in the farewell meeting was unprecedented in the history of the College. Rev. W. G. Robertson, then the Principal of the Gujarat College, admired the various qualities of the Āchārya and remarked in particular, that Professor Dhruva was above all a man of tact. Gandhiji who was present in this meeting said that Gujarat was bestowing the best of her gifts on Benares. Āchārya Dhruva, while rising to speak, was overcome by emotion but with considerable restraint assured all students that he was leaving the College after serving the same for full two generations and that the love so generously extended to him by thousands of them during his twenty-seven years' stay at the College, would permanently remain as a precious possession of his life.

Āchārya Dhruva accompanied by his two sons went to Benares and put up in the Hostels there but was soon taken to the spacious building of Shivprasad Gupta with whom he afterwards befriended very closely. When the Āchārya assumed the charge of the Principal of the Central Hindu College, the University was passing through a crisis and its inside view was exposed to criticism. Āchārya Dhruva in less than six months set right several things through the force of his supreme scholarship and the impartial judgment of affairs. Professor Kripalani, the present General Secretary of the Indian National Congress, who was then a popular professor at Benares, helped the Āchārya a great deal in the establishment of order and discipline among students. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya was highly



satisfied with the Āchārya's profound learning and wisdom and soon became one of his greatest admirers. Panditji trusted the Āchārya in almost all the matters and after a year or so of his arrival, he was unanimously voted to the post of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor which he occupied for nearly fourteen years without break. Āchārya Dhruva's stamp of scholarship and tact began to be marked in almost all the branches of the University. He inaugurated to impart the religious teaching to the students everyday for the first ten minutes and hundreds of students heard him with rapt attention. His presidential remarks at various meetings began to be regarded as perfect models of sound scholarship and excellent wisdom. His comprehensive grasp of the world and Indian affairs had already provided him with the widest and the most liberal outlook of life and he was therefore able to view the various currents of the surrounding life with wonderful equanimity. He was seldom ruffled but was always alert in mending things when the least went wrong without hurting anyone. He soon thereby became the friend, philosopher and guide of students and professors alike and was loved and honoured by both. The status of the whole University rapidly rose in the estimation of all by the charm and tact and wisdom of his unique personality blessed and backed by the genius of Panditji.

In 1920, when Pandit MadanMohan Malaviya came to Ahmedabad accompanied by Āchārya Dhruva, in connection with the collection of the funds for the Benares Hindu University, he gave a public utterance in which he fellingly said that he was deeply indebted to the city of Ahmedabad for giving him the gift of Dhruvji. Panditji further remarked that Āchārya Dhruva was not only competent to be at the helm of affairs of the Benares Hindu University but was perfectly capable to direct the education of the whole of India. Āchārya Dhruva was perhaps the first President of the Inter-University Board which held its session at Simla in 1930 or thereabouts.

Let us pause for a while and obtain a glimpse of the rapidly expanding Benares Hindu University in the artistic but abridged words of Āchārya Dhruva, interspersed with the ideals of the University :—

“.....The road finally opens abruptly into a spacious compound of thirteen hundred acres—or two miles by one mile—on which the University is situated. As you enter the grounds, the first building which greets your eyes is the combined Hostel and College for Women, a very happy augury, indeed, for things to come. You pass on and see on your right a beautiful building which is a combined Hospital and Ayurvedic College. A hundred yards more and passing by the Vice-Chancellor's Lodge you find yourself in a meeting place of four roads from where one can obtain a general view of the lay-out of the University buildings. These are situated in three concentric arcs. Of these the outermost arc contains residences of professors with a U. T. C. parade ground at one end and a line of the post and telegraph office and marts of general provisions and stationery at the back; the middle one consists of Students' Hostels with large playing fields in front of them, and the innermost is a row of Colleges of Arts, Science and Engineering, Law being for the present accommodated in the Arts buildings. The Arts College and the Science Laboratories make a fine row of buildings constructed in the Hindu style of architecture, surmounted with towers reminiscent of temples and faced with ornamentation of well-known Hindu symbols. Next to the Science Laboratories as you go towards the Engineering College, and on a spot which is the centre of the University, we have started building a Library and Museum. Next after it is the site of the future Technological Institute, two of whose important branches, Industrial chemistry and mining and metallurgy, have been provisionally located in the chemistry building. Further up, the last but not the least in the line, comes the Engineering College, with its electric power-house and the workshop.

"The visitor at the end of his inspection may well ask—what does the Benares Hindu University stand for? What does it aim at in the middle of all this variety of buildings and the different branches of human knowledge which they represent? Is it simply a medley of colleges located in one place in the hope of reaping such benefits as we can from a common residence of professors and students? The last with its continuous opportunity of a threefold co-operation between professors and students, students and students, and professors and professors is not the least of its benefits. But there is something more which the University distinctly aims at. Let the visitor look at the lay-out map of the University. It may be an accident—perhaps, it is not—but anyhow it is a very significant accident that the Engineering College and the Institute of Technology have been placed at one end of the arc—the west, and the College of Theology and Oriental Learning at the other—the east. Both of them are parts of one whole, although we cannot yet claim that the holy spirit of ancient Hindu Religion and Philosophy has been breathed into the Engineering College, or that the Oriental and Theological Colleges have imbibed the engineering spirit of practical work. The map on the wall is not the actual University but only its representation on paper; so is the actual University only a faint shadow of the great ideal for which it stands. The realisation of the ideal is a work of time and conscious human endeavour. We are doing the latter to the best of our power and our means, but the completer, nay, even a satisfactory realisation is distant yet. At present all that we can do, and as a matter of fact do, is to emphasise the fact that work is worship and worship work—two births which have to be exchanged every moment of our lives between the two ends of the University. This comprehensive ideal of the Benares Hindu University was well set forth by our present Vice-Chancellor, Pandit MadanMohan Malaviya."

The building up of the Benares Hindu University was the great work of Achārya Dhruva during the seventeen years of his life at



Benares. He firmly believed that teaching and research should both go hand in hand and that the one should not be done at the expense of the other. He himself taught for twelve periods a week in addition to the heavy administrative work and other unavoidable duties. He sometimes used to say that the work of administration was a sort of dirt which if a man did the less, the better for him. He had so wisely arranged his daily work at Benares that he could find adequate time for reading, thinking and writing in spite of his many occupations and engagements. He attended the meetings of various Associations of students and occasionally presided over them. He invariably proposed a vote of thanks to the distinguished speakers who came from outside to address the students and made each time a memorable speech which was a model of brevity and sense. His remarks were regarded by the audience as remarkably luminous and pregnant with profound learning and experience. His sermons on Sundays and on the days of religious festivals had become the attractive features of the University. The foreign scholars that came from Europe, America or Asia, to visit the University were deeply impressed with the comprehensive learning and wisdom of Achārya Dhruva. It was a treat for them to talk with him not only about the University affairs but also about the Indian culture at large. He expounded the essence of Indian Religion and Philosophy most summarily to many a foreign aspirant for truth when the latter evinced some genuine intellectual curiosity. Notwithstanding his intense love of learning, he could find time in the evening to go to the staff-club and talk with his colleagues on various topics and enliven the company. He frequently went for walks in the evening and took a two-mile round of the University.

Achārya Dhruva lived in a modest bungalow situated on the grounds of the University. His doors were always open to each and all. He hardly sat on the ground floor except for his meals and was almost always found surrounded by books in the middle of the three

rooms on the top-floor. Once Kākā Kālelkar remarked at the Āchārya's residence that if he would pay a little attention everyday, a beautiful garden would grow round the bungalow. The Acharya replied that he seldom looked at the surroundings of the bungalow or sat downstairs lest the servants who otherwise enjoyed the freedom should be constrained in their usual activities. Kākā Kālelkar had nothing but admiration for such a rare catholic outlook of life as of the Āchrāya.

It was at Benāres that Achārya Dhruva came in personal contact with some of the most eminent men of our country. It was here that he became an all-India figure. It was during his stay at Benares that he took part in various conferences and congresses either as a president or as a speaker. His address at the Second Indian Philosophical Congress, at Benares in 1926, as President of the Section of Indian Philosophy, was highly appreciated by the most eminent scholars and Sir Rādhākṛishnan at the end of the lecture greeted Āchārya Dhruva with the words "Magnificent, Mr. Dhruva." His masterly survey of Contemporary Philosophical Thought as the President of the Fourth Indian Philosophical Congress held at Madras in 1928, evoked equal admiration and Sir Shivswami Ayer, at the termination of the lecture is said to have remarked, "Do you really belong to Ahmedabad, Mr. Dhruva?" In an instantenous reply Āchārya Dhruva said, "Not only myself but many generations of mine in the past have belonged to that city." Evidently, Sir Shivswami meant that it was too much to expect from a commercial and industrial city like Ahmedabad the birth and growth of such a ripe scholar.

Āchārya Dhruva had immense love for Ahmedabad, the city of his birth. As the President of the Reception Committee of the Sixth Gujarati Sahitya Parishad held at Ahmedabad in April 1920, he extolled in his lecture the unique attractiveness of the city of Ahmedabad. When he was long ill at Benares in 1924, and when

his condition once became critical, he requested Panditji to remove him to Ahmedabad. Panditji replied that the sacred bank of the Ganges was there and that it was no use going to Ahmedabad. Soon the Āchārya said, "But the bank of the Sābarmati is sacred with the memory of Dadhīchi". Even while lying in bed during his last days in Ahmedabad, he remained the city's "Admirable Mentor and Master Recorder". He felt and looked upon the whole city as one being and whenever something went wrong somewhere, he evinced great anxiety and suggested the means to remedy the wrong. The writer is aware what anxious days and nights he passed in hard thinking during the Hindu-Muslim Riots in the city in 1941, eventhough he was ailing in bed all the while. He used to remember with gratitude the services of Sheth Hemābhai and Shethāni Harkur to the city in times of trouble and feelingly remarked that the city lacked leaders of their eminence who could command confidence of all communities and also encouraged some public-spirited men to emulate the same. One of his supreme ideals of life was the all round enlightenment of the citizens and all sincere attempts in the realization of the same would be the fittest memorial to the greatest intellectual of the city.

In the year 1929, Āchārya Dhruva presided over the "Ninth Gujarati Literary Conference" held at Nadiad. His presidential address was remarkable for its comprehensive survey of modern Gujarati literature and its valuation of various writers. He reviewed the problems of Gujarati Literature in the perspective of world-literature and made very valuable suggestions for its amelioration. The most prominent idea that he lays down in his lecture is that thought and literature are the stuff from which this world is made ( "यो वेदोभ्योऽखिलं जगत् निर्मेमे " ) and that Poetry which is the "Immortal Art of the Soul ( "अमृतामात्मनः कलाम् " ) is "the finer breath of all knowledge." As the president of "Sarva Dharma Parishad" at Kangdi, near Haradwar, he made a convincing synthesis of all religions and religious sects ( "सर्वधर्मसमवाय " ) and concluded that God



alone was the ultimate goal of all. His presidential lecture on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of the 'Jain Dharma Prasarak Sabha' at Bhavnagar, was a clear exposition of the highly complicated doctrine of Syādvād (स्याद्वाद) or Anekāntvād (अनेकान्तवाद) i.e. the doctrine of many-sidedness of Truth and the co-relation of the same with the doctrine of Ahimsa (अहिंसा). He delivered an illuminating lecture in the capacity of the President of the Philosophical Section of the Oriental conference held at Baroda, on the 'Logical Development of the Darśanas' pointing out the successive steps which bind them in a single evolutionary process of thought. His extempore lecture on the 'Bhagavadgītā' which inaugurated "Shree Sayajirao Lecture Series" and which was delivered at Baroda, was distinguished by his complete assimilation of the teachings of the "Bhagavadgītā." Thus wherever and in whatever capacity he spoke, his speech was always characterized by conviction as a consequence of the conclusions he had reached in almost all the branches of human knowledge.

Acharya Dhruva was connected in various capacities with the younger as well as the older Universities of India. His vast and profound scholarship in Sanskrit had brought him in intimate contact with the Pundits of Benares who looked upon him as a great expounder of ancient learning. He could talk with ease and elegance in Sanskrit and participate in the learned discussions with great interest.

He admired the immense labour with which Sanskrit learning was acquired by students who studied at the feet of the Pundits not only in the city of Benares but also in the surrounding district within an area of twenty-five miles. He occasionally awarded prizes to encourage the aspiring students who could talk and argue in Sanskrit. His six extempore lectures on "Sanskrit, Pali and other allied Languages" to the Post Graduate Students of the Bombay University showed his complete mastery of the subject. He was specially invited

and honoured by Rabindra Nath Tagore at Shantiniketan and the Poet paid a very remarkable tribute to the Philosopher. He was on the Board of Sanskrit Studies of several Universities and long examined students in Vedanta at the M. A.

Āchārya Dhruva's profound scholarship in Sanskrit and his penetrating power of intellect are noticeable in the various researches he has done in the realm of Sanskrit literature. His learned edition of 'Syādvādmanjari' in "The Bombay Sanskrit Series" and his admirable edition of Dingnaga's "Nyāya-Pravesh", have firmly established his reputation as a great Research-Scholar. Out of the many letters of congratulation which he received on his publication of the Nyaya Pravesh from eminent Sanskrit scholars of our country, those of Vidyāratna Kokileshwar Sastri, and Prof. S. N. Dasgupta, which substantially reveal the character of the book and the mind of its author are quoted below:—

Vidyaratna Kokileshwar S'astri, Professor of Sanskrit and Philosophy, Calcutta University, while acknowledging his gratefulness for the presentation of the book writes "Every page of the book where you have carried on a particular discussion on any point gives abundant evidence of your versatile genius and scholarship and thorough and clear grasp of the subjects treated therein. In these days of superficial scholarships, such a profound critical acumen as you possess is rarely to be seen elsewhere. It is a flawless product which will be admired by the learned world of oriental scholars. You have rendered a great service to the country by pointing out certain very vital dogmatic errors into which Dr. Keith has fallen belittling the importance of "Brahmanic Logic" in certain essential points."

Prof. Dāsgupta in a letter of thanks regarding the intrinsic merit of the work states "Years ago when I was in London a great English Sanskritist was rather jealous that the book was being published by you—he was eager to edit it himself. I had not had time enough yet to dive deep into the book but from the portions

of it that I could go through, I must congratulate you on the publication of this important work which would distinctly add to our knowledge of Buddhism. I am rather surprised that even in your mature age, you have the strength of body and the virility of mind to go through the publication of such a work, particularly when one remembers that the academic role of the B. H. University is largely managed by you."

Besides these congratulatory letters, Dr. Gangānath Jha, M. Hiriyanna, Mahamahopadhyaya P. V. Kane, Dr. V. S. Sukthankar, S. D. Bhattacharya, H. N. Mundle, Dr S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, and a few other scholars of eminence have paid very high tributes in their letters to the author for his depth of learning and great originality.

Āchārya Dhruva edited the 'Benares Hindu University Journal' for a few years. The tone of the Journal rapidly rose after he assumed the editorship. His learned lectures on 'Tennyson and Browning' and 'Kant and Tennyson' which had become renowned for their originality were reprinted in this Journal. It was through his editorials and articles in this very Journal that he elucidated from time to time the ideals of the Benares Hindu University and interpreted the essential elements of Indian Culture. Moreover, it was from Benares that he continued to edit his Gujarati Journal 'Vasanta' and made several contributions to it inspite of his being hundreds of miles away from Ahmedabad. He kept the Gujarati readers of 'Vasanta' as much informed as possible of the main currents of his cultural activities. He frequently used to say that his period of Benares was a period of his own education and that he had learnt and profited much by going there. He discharged all duties in life as best as he could and made the most sagacious use of time at his disposal.

Āchārya Dhruva had won the hearts of thousands of students and had become the guiding spirit of the great educational establish-



ment. He had always the good of his students at heart and looked on them with love and reverence and addressed them all as "Gentlemen"—"आचार्य". When Prof. Sheshadri left the Benares Hindu University, Āchārya Dhruva took up the work of teaching English to the B. A. classes for a pretty good time to the supreme satisfaction of students. The students marvelled at his versatility and his mastery over English language and literature and intensely longed to learn English at his feet for all the time during their studentship. His values of life were spiritual and never material. Having long cultivated the habit of emphasising common points rather than differences, he on his part never came in conflict with any one. In the early days of the Non—Co-operation movement, when the Benares Hindu University was shaken to the very foundation, Āchārya Dhruva behaved with perfect poise in the midst of heavy disturbances in the actual working of the University. But the students were fully convinced in the end that intellectual patriotism was highly fostered in the University and that emphasis was laid on the Indian aspect of every study. Āchārya Dhruva while describing the distinguishing features of the University remarked that Religion and Patriotism were the two pillars on which rested the arch of the University. Subjects like Indian History, Indian Philosophy and Modern Indian Languages "in which the Indian Aspect is obvious" and the subjects like English, Politics, Sociology and Indian Economics "whose Indian aspects are not very obvious" were all being taught in the University with plenty of scope for research from the Indian point of view. The Āchārya believed that Indians should read English literature for imbibing its great ideas.

Āchārya Dhruva used to say that a University was not brick and mortar but was a Community of teachers and students. It was the University life that was really important. The students' hostels, their sports, their clubs and societies, their festivals, dinners and dramas, their music and painting, all those varied and manifold features constituted the life of the University. The distinguished visitors

that came and addressed the students played a great part in the shaping of the students' life. The Benares Hindu University was visited by many an eminent man every year and the students benefited greatly by their presence and discourse. The Āchārya fostered and encouraged the wholeness of the life of the University by participating in the various activities of students in association with teachers of the University.

Āchārya Dhruva would sometime enlighten in his discourses how the movement for the Benares Hindu University became necessary in the special circumstances of India. As eloquently put by him, "Benares as it strikes a traveller—a modern educated man, is a city of 'the dead and the dying,' as it strikes an average Hindu, is a city of Pandas, and as it strikes a Hindu with historical imagination is the oldest University in the world.' True to the traditions of Benares, the University has constructed its exalted edifice on the two great pillars viz Religion and Patriotism. The Acharya was fully aware that they at Benares were exposed to a double fire of criticism. With a view to reconcile their relations with Aligarh and 'Depressed classes', he emphatically said 'Not militant and superstitious but reflective Hinduism' was engendered by them at Benares. The method employed by them was historical and therefore Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, and Aryasamājists, all, found their proper and dignified place in Hinduism. It was the synthesis that they always aimed and expected to make.

A strong conviction was resolutely dawning upon the mind of Āchārya Dhruva that Gujarat was on the eve of a great intellectual awakening and that students were destined to play a great part in it. He felt that Teaching and Residential as distinguished from Examining and Affiliating University was the need of the Times. He had a concrete case of Ahmedabad in view and thought that the city had certain distinguishing features of its own which might help the establishment of a University there. If he had left Benares

at sixty and returned to Ahmedabad, his dream of a University in Gujarat might in all probability have materialised. But he could not be easily spared from Benares. Pandit Madanmohan Malaviya desired that Dhruvji should retire after him or that both should retire simultaneously. It was at the ripe age of sixty-seven that he was able to free himself from Benares in 1937 after serving the University for full seventeen years. Gujarat was all along waiting for the return of her eminent son whose coming was delayed.

A cloud of gloom was overcast on the whole University when Āchārya Dhruva had finally made up his mind to leave it. The voice of Gujarat had become irresistible and he obeyed the call in spite of the pathetic appeal of Panditji whose wishes he had tried his best to respect as far as possible. It was also his earnest desire to pass the few remaining years of his life with his children whom he said he had brought up from their cradle and devoutly wished that 'God and he' should be the sole concern of his life at that age. In a Mammoth Farewell meeting, in which students, professors, eminent men and prominent citizens participated, Panditji paid the most glowing tribute to the all round qualities of Āchārya Dhruva. Panditji felt the parting so painful that his entire speech 'was punctuated with tears' as Sardar Gurmukhsinhji has vividly described it in this volume. The love and respect showered upon the Āchārya were unparalleled in the history of the University and everyone felt as if he was violently separated from his dearest and nearest person. Among the various addresses of students and societies received by him, the best which he liked was that from the Chemistry students who simply wrote in the address "We love you." A man who loved all life from the inmost depth of his heart had the vision to see an epic of human love in the epigram.

After his arrival in Ahmedabad, Āchārya Dhruva began to live in the infinitude of leisure meditating on the immediate and ultimate problems of life. His love of reading was as fresh as ever. His morning prayers and worship continued in the self-same manner as



before. He went for solitary drives in the mornings as well as in the evenings with a book placed by his side for reference and reflection. He took the best possible care to keep his body fit and his mind alert. He devoted more time than before to the improvement of his Journal 'Vasanta'. But almost from the moment of the news of his return to Ahmedabad he was overwhelmed with pressure to preside over various sorts of meetings and on several occasions had to sit for more than two hours and forego his evening drives. He was soon appointed President of the Ahmedabad Education Society, the Gujarat Vernacular Society and the Gujarat Sāhitya Sabhā. This triple presidentship drew upon his leisure to a large extent and he fulfilled all calls and discharged all duties arising therefrom most scrupulously.

He was appointed the Vice-President of the Eleventh Gujarati Literary Conference presided over by Mahatma Gandhi who had made it abundantly clear that owing to many pre-occupations it was not possible for him to function adequately and that the real president of the conference was Āchārya Dhruva. In spite of his failing health, Āchārya Dhruva assisted Gandhiji as best as he could and participated in as many functions as possible. Meanwhile the demand for presidentship over local meetings became so embarrassing that while watching a cricket match on the Gujarat College Grounds, he immediately called the writer from the pandal in the recess and asked him whether he should put up an advertisement in the local weekly 'Prajabandhu' to the following effect: "Wanted a full-time president for all meetings in Ahmedabad." Of course, he uttered these words as a great joke but there was a sort of pathetic seriousness about the same. Being of a nature so sweet and sympathetic and being ever devoted to the commonweal, he would yield to pressure and this overwork brought its toll of total collapse of health very shortly.

Meanwhile, the provision of Rs. 12,000/- (recurrent) being made in the budget of 1939, by the Congress Government for "Research

in Gujarat', Āchārya Dhruva with the help of the Managing Committee of the Gujarat Vernacular Society instituted Research and Post-Graduate Department which was recognised in the same year by the Bombay University to conduct research and Post-Graduate work. Āchārya Dhruva was the Honorary Director of this institution and it was his heart's desire to direct as much research work as possible in various subjects. He had scarcely begun to devote his time and energy to one of the choicest works of his life when while conducting the general meeting of the Gujarat Vernacular Society he was suddenly seized with a mild stroke of paralysis. He had to be instantly carried home and was soon attended by doctors. The moment the stroke was over, he inquired of the attending doctors the minutest details about the nature of the disease. The doctors requested him to take perfect rest which he, of course, did. But the sense of wonder which to him was the origin of all knowledge continued uninterrupted even during this long illness which ultimately proved fatal. He marvellously maintained his consciousness during this mind-obliterating disease almost upto the moment of his passing away.

After his arrival from Benares, Āchārya Dhruva publicly discoursed once a week on the first three Adhyāyas of the Bhagvadgita with the utmost lucidity and simplicity and created a sort of sacred atmosphere. When the discourse was becoming the most distinctive feature of the city's activities, it came to a standstill as he had to go to Benares for the L. L. D. degree. On his return after receiving the honour, Dr. Dhruva was greeted and garlanded on the station by his admirers and eminent citizens of Ahmedabad and all the while he sweated with apologies for the unexpected honour conferred on him. The Gitā class never revived thereafter.

During the last two years of his life, Āchārya Dhruva was more or less confined to bed. His body was slowly crumbling. He was specially advised by his doctors not to read or exert his mind in the least.

For the major part of the day he lay in bed and enjoyed his own thoughts. "His mind", as Wordsworth says, "had become the dwelling place of all sweet sounds and harmonies." He lived for the most part on the sweet remembrances of the past and the beautiful visions of the future. He received the visitors and talked with them on various topics of interest. He read the newspapers fairly generally and kept himself in touch with the times. He occasionally communicated in the course of conversation his reflections on war. He had to stop the publication of 'Vasanta', the Journal which he edited for forty years and the various soft voices of which vibrated in his memory. When his mind was pricked even during the ailing state of his body, it showed considerable vigour of thought. He had maintained the same penetrating insight into all fundamental questions. He kept an objective of going out for a drive in the evening either accompanied by his eldest son Professor Dhruva and his wife or by his nephews. His evening drives continued as far as the end of life with the exception of the last four days.

Even during the feeble state of his health, he took part in the cultural activities of the city which he regarded as his vital breath. Even at the risk of a probable breakdown, he participated in the various meetings addressed by Sir S. Radhākṛishnan during his cultural visit to the city and in the final meeting while rising to read as its president the address presented to the honoured guest, he felt giddy and his voice failed him. The writer is also fully aware how in spite of his heavy uneasiness he allowed and even exhorted all the speakers to speak as much as possible on the life and literary services of Narsinhrao Bholānath Divatia, on the occasion of the condolence meeting which lasted for more than three hours. His advice was sought upto the last month of his life on important educational matters by Hon. Ganesh Vasudev Mavlankar, the Speaker of the Bombay Legislative Assembly and Sheth Kasturbhai Lalbhai in connection with the Ahmedabad Education Society.



Āchārya Dhruva's solid but silent educational work had become most eloquent in Gujarat and outside it. A large number of High Schools and Colleges in Gujarat were manned by many of his pupils who had great love and regard for their venerable preceptor. He was looked upon most regardfully by thousands of students all over India who always cherished as a precious possession his magnificence of mind and love of truth. He used to say that education was not an object which could be divided into primary, secondary and higher stages but that it was a whole process. He further declared with emphasis that the three stages as mentioned above were not intended for practical life but that practical life itself was a fourth or final stage of education. In his opinion, life was the largest school of which man was a pupil for all time. This was his idealistic or spiritual conception of education. To the question 'who is an educated man?' he replied that an educated man was a Brahman (ब्राह्मण) whose life was always progressive, whose vision was ever broadening, and who possessed charity (शील) and wisdom (प्रज्ञा) in the highest degree. He had realised these sterling qualities in his own life and therefore can truly be termed 'the last of the learned Brahmins' as eloquently put by the eminent writer and statesman Kanaiyalal Maneklal Munshi. He remained a learner all his life.

Āchārya Dhruva's love of Gandhiji was supreme. He regarded him as the highest expression of the spiritual excellence of our age. He tried his utmost to understand and interpret Gandhiji's ideals and actions in life and reviewed the Congress policy mostly determined by the Mahatma with a rare sympathy and profound understanding. He examined and even ably expounded wherever possible through his journal 'Vasanta' Gandhiji's views on Religion, Politics, Sociology, Education etc. and criticised the same if necessary, very respectfully. He modified his views concerning the importance of English as the medium of instruction in the teaching of schools and colleges in the light of Gandhiji's thinking and publicly announced his conver-

sion. He almost on each occasion, discussed with Gandhiji on the eve of his taking a big step and the Mahatma on his part, heard him with the utmost consideration and even agreed with him in his views but politely replied that as he had made up his mind and as he wished to speed up the achievement of Swarāj during his life time, he regretted he could not change his decision. He did not stop short here. Even when the step was taken by Gandhiji, he never looked on the same with the slightest indifference, but considering the step as inevitable continued to enlighten in his writings the underlying mentality and motive of Gandhiji with exceptional insight and the utmost possible conformity. He expounded the nation's duty under the circumstances and exhorted all to fulfil the fourfold programme emphasised by Gandhiji for winning Swaraja. During the twenty one days' fast at Delhi, he readily responded to Gandhiji's request to send him the verses from the Vedas proclaiming the oneness of God in an exceedingly tender and touching letter which conveyed what boundless love he had for the Mahatma. At the time of the 'Poona Pact' Āchārya Dhruva, at Gandhiji's instance, conclusively proved in Sanskrit in the assembly of the Pundits through 'Canons of Interpretation' (शास्त्रार्थ) that untouchability was never a part of true Hinduism and that it was the height of irreligion and the rankest superstition to treat any human being as untouchable. Later on, when pressed by Gandhiji after his retirement from Benares, to undertake the work of addressing from place to place Ancient India's message of Untouchability among the caste-ridden Hindus, he modestly declined the exhortation in a reply which stated that he was a mere writer and that the mighty work required the eloquent appeal of the genius of Pandit Madanmohan Malaviya. During the last two or three years of his life, he occasionally remarked that the nation, no doubt, had to look to Gandhiji for the solution of its immediate problems but it had also to keep in view the ultimate problems of religion and philosophy for the preservation of its solidarity. He expressed at times his

anxiety for India and felt that all round efforts to assist-Gandhiji's constructive work should be made for things to come.

Āchārya Dhruva held women in high esteem. He felt that he had not specifically rendered any service to women's education except that the first two women graduates of Gujarat, Lady Vidyagauri Ramanbhai Nilkanth and Shrimati Sharadagauri Sumant Mehta had learnt something from him at the Gujarat College. He viewed that the question of women's education was not so difficult in thought as it was in action. The difficulties mostly arose in his opinion from the social customs of the land but bearing the same in mind, he said, some way must be found out. No doubt, the pioneers of women's education were men but it was a matter of great gratification to him that the question was lately taken up by women themselves. He was very delighted to see that education was spreading among women and that educated women were undertaking the responsibility of educating their daughters. Once while agreeing to the view of Sir Shankaran Nair, he said that the beginning of modern education in India was made for that class only which was able to take its advantage and it was therefore incumbent upon the selfsame class to educate the masses, that is to say, average men and women. His Convocation Address at the Women's University founded by Prof. Kurve and his inaugural address at the Women's Conference held at Ahmedabad show how profoundly he thought about women's education and their various problems.

He regretted that woman was still a picture of pity (दयाया भगिनी मूर्ति:). He always encouraged "to develop all that is best and noblest in woman to its utmost perfection." In his Essay on "Nāri Pratishthā" (Dignity of Woman) he has elucidated the Aryan ideal of womanhood as descending from Arundhati, through Sita, to Sakuntalā and Vasantsenā. He has remarked on another occasion that the same ideal persists in the famous works of the great Gujarati writers Govardhanram, Nanalal, and Kanaiyalal in the



characters of Kumud, Jayā, and Manjarī. The ideal does not alter though the conditions of life have changed. It is the ideal that is real to him, as to Plato.

Thought or to put more accurately, higher consciousness was the essence of Āchārya Dhurvā's life. To him life was never a drift or an artificiality but he always conceived it as an art and lived like a great artist of life. His contact with the world and its things was very elastic. He was ever ready to renew his contact with the world but the moment the need was over, he retired into the inmost chamber of his mind and meditated on the ultimate problems of existence. This habit of contemplation had given him a comprehensive vision of this vast universe and he occasionally remarked that looking from the universal point of view, the earth of ours was a tiny speck and its modern giants who shook it so tremendously had little magnitade and were utterly insignificant. At the same time, he looked with the utmost intensity at life. Once while looking at a lizard on the wall which pounced upon an insect and devoured it, his entire bodily frame which was lying in bed, shivered in compassion and his nephew who was just sitting by him anxiously asked what had happened to him. Quite characteristically Āchārya Dhruva replied that he had a right to feel and that people sitting by him need not be unnecessarily upset. He talked so softly and sweetly in the course of his final illness about the happy memories of the past, both of persons as well as places, that one would like to love life with all its troubles and worries and sorrows. To him almost everything was "the Consecration, and the Poet's Dream". Even the 'saddest thoughts' he regarded as the 'sweetest songs' and 'the former had the power' he said, 'to intensify the real happiness of life.' This he was able to achieve because he had filled his entire being with the breadth of universal life.

During his last illness, he had gradually withdrawn himself from the life of the world and was devoting his time while lying in

bed "to meditation on the nature of the Infinite Being and to the consummation of his deliverance by absorption in God." Once he said from the inmost depth of his being आत्मसंस्थं मनः कृत्वा न किञ्चिदपि चिन्तयेत् (स.गी.) 'Having fixed the mind in the Higher self one should not think of anything at all.' At another time he uttered "like a wandering monk of old who had renounced his all" that he was absolutely unaffected by the world and its life. Like the ancient Sannyāsi, he had no regulation establishment of pupils but he was a direct messenger of Divine love or Divine Unity. He had turned his back on all things secular and the thought of God was the sole sacred vocation of the remainder of his days. In the words of Manu, he looked on life and death with equanimity—'नामिनन्देत मरणं नामिनन्देत जीवितम्'. He met death with exceptional poise as if it was a matter of daily routine.

About a week before he expired, he had realised that the end was immediate. He had lost his appetite and had abandoned all food. His eldest son, Professor Dhruvabhai, who was nursing his father and who was suffering himself from acute blood-pressure was advised and pressed by him to go to Domus for change of air and the two daughters-in-law Sulatabehn and Pratimabehn, his eldest daughter Chinuba and his nephews Janubhai and Leenubhai served him with admirable care and devotion. Though he had apathy towards food and medicine, yet he continued to go in his car as far as the Bhadra kālī temple in the city even during the last week of his life. His illness soon became serious and contrary to his wishes became known to relations, friends and citizens. The visitors began to pour in. He belessed almost each and all with the waving of his right hand though he was breathing hard and feeling extremely restless. He lay in his bed all bones and yet all dignity so long as the light of life was there. He controlled all senses as he maintained his consciousness almost upto the end. When Dhruvabhai, Prahladbhai and Jollybehn—his two sons and daughter—came in the early morning, he greeted them all with great affection. His meeting with his daughter

Jollybehn was very touching and he consoled her with perfect poise. He expressed his desire to expire before the family gods whom he had worshipped with piety all his life. A few hours before he died, he asked his eldest son Dhruvabhai to mark how the sense of sight was losing its power. A little after this, he entered into the state of utter oblivion of death and passed away in perfect peace at 4 P. M. on the seventh day of April, 1942. His funeral was largely attended by prominent citizens. His last rites were performed and the body was burnt on the Dudheshwar Ghat, consecrated to sage Dadhichi, and regarded by him as holier than the holy Ganges.

The Hon. Mavlankar aptly remarked on the day of his demise :  
“ We have lost our very great man the approximate or even tolerable approach to whom is not in sight.”

The death of Āchārya Dhruva was mourned by many and a number of telegrams, letters and resolutions received by his two sons Dhruvabhai and Prahladbhai were full of admiration for the most precious services rendered by “ this ripest scholar ” of India in various fields of human knowledge. Out of the many journalistic obituary notes, the one from the pen of Natarajan, the eminent editor of ‘ The Indian Social Reformer ’ is quoted in the abridged form as follows :—

“ The death of Professor Anandshankar Dhruva leaves a void in the world of scholarship, the depth of which those who were not personally acquainted with him and his work cannot adequately appreciate. He was an authority to whom one turned for information and advice that would be absolutely uncoloured by view of any kind. His great work during the greater part of his life was the building up of the Benares Hindu University... He was the embodiment of Hindu culture and philosophy in the finest form.”

Āchārya Dhruva left behind him two sons and two daughters and their children. His eldest son Professor Dhruvabhai A. Dhruva, who is an Oxford graduate, is a professor of English in the Gujarat



College, Ahmedabad. His second son Prahladbhai A. Dhruva B. A., LL. B is a practising lawyer on the appellate side of the Bombay High Court. His eldest daughter Chinuba resides in Ahmedabad with her large family and the youngest one Jollybehn is married to Hon. Justice Harisiddhabhai Vajubhai Divatia M. A., LL. B. one of the puisine Judges of the Bombay High Court. All the members of the family have inherited the nobility and deep culture of their great father.

A few months before he expired, the present writer went one morning to offer his salutation to the Āchārya when he surprised him with the words, "Shall we celebrate the Vasanta festival?" The writer gazed at him with curiosity as he could not make out his meaning. Āchārya Dhruva immediately elucidated. He said that he had a longing to see all the books of his library arranged in a hall and have a comprehensive look at them. After casting the last look at the old familiar books he would bow to them and write on a small piece of board below them the words: "These have made me." "This," he said, "was the celebration of the Vasanta festival ( वसन्तोत्सव )." The writer was moved to tears of joy and admiration when he realized the immeasurable love and reverence which the great man had for knowledge which alone he thought was the spring festival of his life. In fact, he had made his life a perpetual festival of spring.

Soon after this incident, he suggested to his son Dhruvabhai to remove his books to a safer place during the riots of 1941, and decided to place them in the underground cellar of the Brahṁchari Vadi temple. Dhruvabhai asked his father whether he meant to put the books permanently there and added that he was glad if he desired to do so. Thereupon the Āchārya expressed his desire to make a gift of his library to the Research Department of the Gujarat Vernacular Society of which he was the Honorary Director and in whose direction he actively participated even to the last days of his life, even though

he had ceased from all other activities. A few days after the Āchārya's demise, his two sons, Dhruvabhai and Prahladbhai, in respect to the wishes of their father handed over to the Society his entire library of the choicest books and journals approximating 10,000 and worth more than Rs. 50,000. This rare and rich collection of books is at present arranged in the Central Hall of the building of the Gujarat Vernacular Society, which henceforward will be known as "Āchārya Doctor Anandshankar Hall." This writer speaks out not only his single voice but echoes the voices of so many when he says that the fitting memorial to Āchārya Dhruva should be nothing less than the development of the present Research and Post-Graduate Department founded by him into a full-fledged University in Gujarat.

Āchārya Dhruva has laid down in a fairly large number of books written mainly in Gujarati and partly in English the results of his lifelong thinking. His book "Āpaṇo Dharma" (Our Religion) is a unique work of its type written in Gujarati and reflects the profoundest thoughts on religion which was the nearest subject to his heart and which was interpenetrated in his entire being upto the last breath. He has translated the "Rāmānuja Bhāshya" from Sanskrit into Gujarati and has written "Hindu ( Veda ) Dharma," "Dharma Varṇan". "Nīṭishikshana" and "Hindu-dharma ni Balpothi" through the encouragement of the Baroda State. The Gujarat Vernacular Society has published so far the three volumes of his writings namely, "Kāvyaṭattvavichāra," 'Sāhitya Vichāra' and "Dig-darshan" and aims at publishing many more volumes from his various articles on different subjects contributed to his Journal "Vasanta". Moreover, he published in English the two pamphlets "Tennyson and Browning" and "Kant and Browning" which attracted the attention of the literary world for their originality. His presidential addresses at the second ( Indian Section ) and the fourth Philosophical Congress are also magnificent monuments of his penetrating power of philosophical thought. Besides, his edition of

“Syādvādmanjari” and that of “Dingnāga’s” “Nyāya Pravesha” reflect his ripe scholarship in the introduction and notes of the two volumes. His extempore Wilson Philological Lectures on Sanskrit, Pāli and other allied languages yet remain unpublished and most of his English articles published in the “Benares Hindu University Journal”, in the Malviaya and other commemoration volumes and different journals demand publication in the interest of oriental scholarship. Such was the literary output of Āchārya Dhruva. The mind that thought and spoke and wrote these thoughts was both beautiful and sublime and was ever inclined to prepare the present generation for things to come. He rendered inestimable service to the literary and scholarly world of Gujarat and also of the whole of India by his ceaseless striving after wisdom.

It was the intention of Āchārya Dhruva to write a popular treatise on the Bhagvadgītā, a book on the Trānsition Periods of History, a third book on Shakespeare’s Politics, and the last on the Survey of Indian Religious and Philosophical Thought. But after his return from Benares, his body began to decay much earlier than it was expected to do. He was never sorry for his inability to do what he had intended. He was in the habit of surrendering everything to God’s will. He stood on the rock of truth and looked at things impersonally. He had indelible faith that an individual did not count in this vast universe and that his work will be continued by others in near or distant future. He was always contented and at peace with himself and everything else as he did not live the life of desire. His values were eternal and he lived accordingly.

Āchārya Dhruva’s life may be divided, as he himself said, into four parts. The first part was the period of his early life and education from 1869 to 1892. The second part was the period of his professorship in the Gujarat College from 1892 to 1919. The third part was his work in the Benares Hindu University from 1919 to 1936. The last division was the duration of his retirement



from Benares to Ahmedabad from 1936 to 1942. He had the brightest memories of all the periods and during his last years, he described at times various things in the sweetest and the most luminous manner. Sometimes the image of Bhāskar Sāstri would appear before his mind's eye and he would feel as if he was only fourteen learning Sanskrit at the feet of the learned S'astri and describe with intense joy the pleasures of Sanskrit learning. On another occasion he would visualise the unforgettable image of Govardhanrām Tripāthi and reproduce some important talks with him. He would occasionally refer to the episode with the late Sir Rāmkrishna Gopal Bhāndarkar when he took his two sons for salutation to the most eminent scholar who was very delighted to hear the names Dhruva and Prahlad. Not infrequently he would describe the greatness of Pandit Madanmohan Malviya, and admire his generosity of heart. Once while describing the speech of Shrimati Swaruprani Nehru at the Benares Hindu University, his eyes became wet when he said how the heart of the mother felt for the son while referring to the incident of the providential escape of Jawaharlal when the bullet passed exceedingly close to him. He used to say that the three men in the country who had the privilege to bestow their blessings on men and institutions were Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, and Pandit Madanmohan Malviya.

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The writer of this Sketch is aware that he is sometimes exceeding the limit of his privilege and slips into the function of a biographer. But the life of the great man which he has sketched so far is so much alive with hundreds of memories that nothing short of a biography can do justice to this ample subject. He, however, will be content to sum up after setting forth a few considerations which such an excellent life can present.

Āchārya Dhruva, like Robert Browning, was a great lover of life. He believed that life should be lived under all conditions, that joy

was there in the mere act of living, and that he himself would like to relive his life. But he had also discovered for himself that life could be lived from a higher level and that man could see with the eyes of the spirit rather than with the sense of sight alone. He had formed the habit of looking within from his early years and was able to see the ultimate reality. He was passionately attached to the higher life, and discharged all duties of life with the utmost care and attention.

Nevertheless, it was not the Kantian ideal of morality which he loved and followed in life but had in him the Gospel of Duty as preached by the Bhagavadgītā. Morality was never to him a perpetual struggle against evil but duty itself had become pleasure to him because he did all things consecrated to the will of God. Though his life was a magnificent achievement of reason, yet he trusted his own instincts. He had long realised that the desire for fame was an illusion like everything else and therefore he was free from "the last infirmity of noble minds." His values were "the eternal Verities" and were nothing short of them. He acted in such a way that every act of his became a universal rule of action for all men. When the two opposites presented to him, he rose to a higher level than both and the two principles which seemed antagonistic to others were found to him as natural allies. This power of synthesis was the secret of his thought and life. Self-control in all things, singleness of aim and action and practice of meditation or concentration were the principal means through which he had realised his highest nature, viz., self-realization (स्वरूपसिद्धि). Āchārya Dhruva never aimed at efficiency in life yet his was one of the most efficient lives ever lived. He disliked all kinds of compulsion or coercion or pressure and believed in the freedom of man. In his opinion there can be no real discipline in life except self-discipline and advocated that "Self-knowledge, self-reverence, and self-control" can "alone lead life to sovereign power." He was Greek or Socratic in his conception of Virtue. Virtue to

him was knowledge and he proclaimed that all the ills of life were the outcome of ignorance. He therefore laid emphasis on the education of the whole man which was the sole means of reforming the world and advancing its life. In spite of butchery and bloodshed of wars and the aimless struggles of life, he held an ineffaceable faith in the doctrine of love towards which, he said, the whole humanity must move. He firmly believed in the moral evolution of our race, which he pointed out, was a postulate of our civilization and was a demonstrable fact. He had surveyed the literature of the world and arrived at the sole and solid conclusion that Truth and Love were the guiding principles of human life.

Āchārya Dhruva whose life was a unique synthesis of Truth and Love maintained that both these principles were the two halves of a single principle of Unity and that the history of man was an eternal play of the manifestation of both. He said that Truth, which was a static principle, constantly required the aid of a dynamic Principle, viz., Love. Adherence to truth alone invites occasions of war, while love reconciles. The whole truth, he said, was uttered by Shakespeare, one of the greatest students of human nature, when he sang "Mercy seasons Justice."

A question may well be asked "What is the estimation of such a life as Āchārya Dhruva's?" The answer is not quite difficult to give. Āchārya Dhruva represents a real type of a civilized human being who has a deep understanding of the underlying reality of life and has therefore taken all aspects of human nature into account and developed all. He has realised his entire being, his whole आत्मा and raised it higher. He turned his nobler impulses into higher reason. He did his duties in life to which his nature would force him to adhere. He had long realised that reason was necessary for his progressive life. It had also early dawned on him that human life was infinite and that eternal life demanded the exercise of reason because man is a creature that "looks before and after." He made his senses



the servitors to reason but acted in sense. He harmonised the life of reason and the life of sense. He firmly believed that reason which was the human prerogative should always predominate over senses and that senses should be rationalized. At the same time he looked at life in a healthy "anti-puritanical, anti-ascetic and anti-stoical way, which of course was never epicurean" and upheld the ideal that growth of muscle and nerve and animal spirits was as necessary as every other growth in man. But he applied a force to his life more potent than reason viz. resignation or self-surrender to the Divine Will. He had resolute faith in the invincibility of God's Will and His Grace. He thus transcended the Greek ideal of life in which reason was made the dominating principle of human life. He always rose above individualism or particularism and accepted the Universal in man and in Nature as the All-embracing Reality which we call God. Gradually the encircling rim being broken, his heart began to lose its limitations and became as wide as the Universal Spirit. His achievement in life is the achievement of human effort in the profoundest Realms of Thought and Life. His life is a progressive realisation of harmony of both wisdom and action. He is a highly evolved human being who is a whole man and who is the living embodiment of the Ideal Man—संख्ययोगिभक्त—as sketched in the Bhagavadgita : It is the spirit of such a man which will generate truth and love and joy through a beautiful life and help to remove falsehood and selfishness and war which make the world so ugly. It is this "Dhruva Spirit" (or "the Gita Spirit") so appropriately called by Professor Shishirkumar Maitra of the Benāres Hindu University, which will achieve the miracle of eliminating ugliness and war from the world by spreading sweetness and light and peace and good will. If man persists in the imbibing of this spirit and consciously evolves on his lines, he will blossom forth into highest and holiest manhood which will always help, never hinder. He is thus a model for humanity for all time and particularly for things to come.

## LATE ACHARYA DHRUVA

DR. SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN

Acharya Anandshankar B. Dhruva was one of the most cultured Sanskrit scholars of our generation. Unlike many Sanskritists who belonged to the past he belonged to the India that is to come. His published writings which are not an adequate measure of his thought and character revealed his integrity of mind and spaciousness of imagination and understanding. His work was of a most liberating character and recognised the essential values of Indian Culture. He felt convinced that mankind's future could be safeguarded only by devoted service to the eternal values which the seers of the past had revealed to us.

He was connected with the Benares Hindu University as its Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Principal of the Central Hindu College, and Professor of Sanskrit. He worked in the closest association with Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and the position which the University occupies today is in no small measure due to his loyal and devoted services. Many who were brought into contact with him during his period of office at the Benares Hindu University remember him still as a warm-hearted and generous friend and a great scholar.

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## ACHARYA DHRUVA : STUDY IN PERSONALITY

PROF. DR. S. K. MAITRA

WHEN I think of the late Acharya Dhruva, I think of a man who was of this world and yet was not of this world. He no doubt travelled on life's common way, yet his soul dwelt apart. His ideals, his standards, his methods were totally different from those of others. He no doubt took interest in the things which concerned his daily life, but this interest never prevented him from maintaining his detachment from them. The standards which ruled his conduct were so different from the standards which ordinarily govern men's lives that he would have been called a crank or at best a visionary if he had not been so successful in every work which he undertook. The most wonderful thing about him was that he achieved so much success without his ever believing in success.

### THE PARADOX OF EFFICIENCY

Yes, he never believed in success. He never believed in efficiency. Yet he was very successful, very efficient. This is an instance of what I may call the paradox of efficiency, namely, that it is only by not thinking of efficiency that one can become efficient. Be that as it may, the fact remains that Acharya Dhruva never believed in efficiency. He never thought it was a great thing somehow to produce results. Results were a matter of little importance to him; what he cared for was how the results were obtained. He would not, for example, care to get any work done if he felt that it meant forcing people to do things against their will. He considered human freedom to be too great a value to be sacrificed for the sake of results.

And yet he did obtain results, and striking results too. How?



Because, I think, there is a relation between the higher values and the lower ones, according to which the conservation of the higher ones does benefit the lower ones also. If you want to get the best work out of a man you can only do so by making him feel that he is a free agent and not by making him think that he is a slave. Of course, Hitler and Mussolini do not believe it nor the innumerable lesser Hitlers and Mussolinis, of whom unfortunately the world is only too full to-day. Nevertheless it is a truth, and a most fundamental truth, that the best way of promoting the lower values is to conserve the higher ones. For instance, you cannot promote the economic welfare of the people if you take away their freedom.

#### UNCONVENTIONALITY PERSONIFIED

Dr. Dhruva was unconventionality personified. One of his favourite sayings was : " Freedom is worth nothing if it does not mean freedom to err." He was not in favour of the present system of education in which examinations held such a prominent place and used to say that he would welcome the day when there would be no examinations. In fact, what he wanted was full expression of a man's personality, unfettered by artificial restrictions.

He had no false sense of dignity, and therefore he could mix freely with all men on a footing of perfect equality. When he was Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the Banares Hindu University he used to come very frequently to the staff club and share the club life; with the students also he used to mix very freely, and very rare were the occasions when their requests to him to preside at their meeting or participate in their functions were met with a refusal.

He never went out of his way to help people, but when people wanted his help, they always got it. And when he helped people, he never did it with an air of condescension. In fact, whatever he did he did with such grace and naturalness that it seemed to be the only thing that was possible for him to do.

## THE BIOLOGICAL MIND

His mind was not of the mathematical, but rather of the biological type. That is to say, it could find room for contradictions without losing itself. To the mathematical mind the coexistence of contradictories is an impossibility. But to the biologically-minded the coexistence of contradictions, far from being an impossibility, is on the contrary a most natural thing. In fact, life would lose all its meaning if it could not embrace a host of contradictories in its own flexible nature. To Dr. Dhruva contradiction never meant a challenge to truth. It only meant that truth in its flexibility could find room for the contradictories.

This was the secret of his toleration. It was because he felt that truth was many-sided, that he could be tolerant of views which were opposed to his. He never claimed for himself any monopoly of truth. He therefore never felt perturbed when other people contradicted him. Contradiction meant only for him the possibility of the existence of some aspects of truth which were hidden from him.

In fact, what he wanted to avoid more than anything else was dogmatism. His whole life was a protest against dogmatism of all forms. Dogmatism can creep not only into religion, but into practically every sphere of life. Religious dogmatism we all know and we can guard ourselves against it. But there are other and more subtle forms of dogmatism which make a more insidious approach, and these it is very difficult to avoid.

It is, I think, one of the greatest illusions to suppose that a man of action must necessarily be dogmatic. Does not a man of action require co-operation from others? And how can he get it if he considers himself infallible and has contempt for other peoples' opinions? The dogmatic attitude is really the anti-social attitude. Dr. Dhruva could get more work from his colleagues and subordinates than most people could do, because he respected their views and did not consider himself infallible.

### VALUES vs. RULES

Another reason why he could be so tolerant was that what he cared for was values rather than rules. Throughout his life he tried to preserve and promote the essential values. As a teacher and as an administrator he tried to inculcate these values in the minds of those who came in contact with him. Love of values is very different from love of rules. Rules are rigid and inflexible things to which the only admissible attitude is strict conformity. Values do not demand such conformity. They, on the contrary, require for their realization a certain amount of want of conformity, a certain degree of independence. The value of truth, for example, can only be pursued as an ideal if no rigid rules are laid down and if everybody is given the freedom to pursue it in the best way he can. The scientist, the philosopher, the religious man are all of them votaries of truth, yet they follow different paths to reach their goal. Can we lay down one path for all of them? Impossible. The very idea is ridiculous. A single value may be pursued in innumerable ways, some of which may be diametrically opposed to one another. Some may find truth by going into the forest or entering a cave; some may, on the contrary, find it in the market-place and in the busiest centres of a big commercial city. It would be sheer madness to suggest that truth should be sought in one particular way.

### THE DHRUVA SPIRIT

This brings me to what I may call the Dhruva spirit, the spirit of unconventionality, of free unfettered expression of personality. It is the direct antithesis of the mechanical spirit which believes everything to be ruled by inflexible laws. The mechanical spirit is responsible more than anything else for the present enslavement of more than half the world, for it is the spirit of acquisition, of conquest. It has no respect for freedom, for in its scheme freedom has no place. It would not be quite true to say that it attacks freedom; it would be more correct to say that it has no consciousness of it.



The Dhruva spirit is gaining ground steadily. The world is sick of the mechanical outlook of life. The present Titanic struggle is really a struggle between mechanism and personality. The Axis Powers represent the mechanical spirit, while the United Nations represent the spirit of freedom. And the victory of the United Nations will mean the triumph of personality and the collapse of the mechanical order.

## AN APPRECIATION

PROF. SHYAMA CHARAN DE

An appreciation of some of the qualities of head and heart of late Dr. A. B. Dhruva, M. A., LL. B., D. Litt., I. E. S., by his friend, colleague, and admirer, Professor Shyama Charan De, M. A., who acted under him as Head of the Department of Mathematics and Vice-Principal, Central Hindu College and also as Registrar of the Benares Hindu University.

MY ACQUAINTANCE with Dr. A. B. DHRUVA dates as early as October 1919, when he was appointed in the Benares Hindu University as Principal of the Central Hindu College and Head of its Department of Sanskrit. In April 1920, he was also appointed Pro-Vice-Chancellor for the period ending December, 11, 1920, the date on which the next annual meeting of the Court was held. In this meeting he was elected Pro-Vice-Chancellor but for two years only. At this time the University was passing through a great crisis, but Dhruvaji's magnanimity, generosity, keen sense of duty, justice and responsibility, and above all his utter selflessness secured for him confidence from all quarters, and all these added to his sweet temper and great learning won love, respect, admiration of each and all—students, staff, and authorities—alike. His administration proved so successful that at the end of two years he was unanimously re-elected Pro-Vice-Chancellor for a full term of three years and the Court continued to confer on him the same honour term after term till his retirement in 1936.

The old Central Hindu College is now split up into three different colleges—the College of Arts (which still retains its old name C. H. C.), the College of Science and the College of Technology—each with a separate principal of its own. Besides the duties

mentioned above he had to look after the proper management of the College of Theology and Oriental Learning and also to act as the Principal of the Law College. He bore and bore creditably too this heavy burden for a long period of 17 years—a period which in the history of the Benares Hindu University was one of steady progress and peaceful administration.

Dr. Dhruva was a man of great erudition. As regards his scholarship it would suffice to mention that students called him, 'A moving encyclopedia'. When Professor P. Seshadri M. A., Head of the Department of English, (who afterwards became Principal, Government College, Ajmer) left the University, Dr. Dhruva voluntarily took upon himself the task of teaching English in place of Prof. Seshadri to the students of the B. A. and M. A. classes. His pupils were so much satisfied with his lectures that they wondered how could a professor of Sanskrit acquire such a mastery over the English language and literature. His discourses on the Bhagvad Gita used to be superb—unsectarian, rational and illuminating. He was a man of great originality and this trait of his used to reveal itself particularly in his presidential addresses. Babu Kali Prasanna Chakravarty, the retired Joint Head Master of the Central Hindu School for boys, referring to Dr. Dhruva writes:—

"His versatile genius, erudite scholarship, clear conception of a subject discussed in a meeting over which he had to preside and his final summing up of all arguments used by others and giving his own in his inimitable, clear and chaste language invariably impressed even the casual observer in his audience that Dhruvaji was the master of the subject and the special speaker of the day was only eclipsed by his final exposition."

Acharya Dhruva judged everything from the humanitarian point of view. He always acted according to the spirit and not according to the letter of the law, for which he was sometimes accused of not being a strict disciplinarian. On one occasion Babu Kali Prasanna



Chakravarty applied for a loan from his Provident Fund. The application was presented when Dr. Dhruva was just going to hand over the charge of his office as Pro-Vice-Chancellor to his successor who raised a technical objection to its being granted. Dhruva with his usual coolness and smile on his lips took the application in his hand, wrote 'sanctioned' on it, put down his signature as Pro-Vice-Chancellor, and then handed over the charge. This is only one of the many instances of its kind. His discipline was not military but voluntary as the outcome of thorough veneration which people had for his person.

Acharya Dhruva was never obstinate in his dealings and behaviour. The desire for name, fame, power and position never found a place in his mind and he was never troubled with the thought of losing power or prestige. When Pandit Keshav Prasad Misra, Head Pandit, Central Hindu School, was transferred to the Hindi Department of the University, the School Board met to appoint his successor. Dr. Dhruva presided over the deliberations and personally recommended Pandit Ambika Dutt Upadhyaya, M. A., Sahitya Shastri, as the best candidate for the post. The Head Master of the School recommended Pandit Vindeshwari Prasad Shastri on grounds that he was already in service and though inferior in qualifications, yet good enough to teach Sanskrit in school classes. Dr. Dhruva pointed out that Pandit Vindeshwari Prasad did not know English and as such he could not be expected to be a successful teacher of Sanskrit in higher classes. But when the Head Master still insisted on giving Pandit Vindeshwari Prasad a chance, Dhruvaji yielded with his characteristic smile and Pandit Vindeshwari Prasad was appointed on probation for six months. After four months the Head Master met Dr. Dhruva in a party where in the course of conversation he asked the Head Master about the working of the school and how Pandit Vindeshwari Prasad was doing. The Head Master told him point blank, "Sir, you were right and I was wrong. Pandit Vindeshwari Prasad's ignorance of English rendered him unable to main-

tain discipline in the higher classes." Dhruvaji smiled and began to talk on other subjects. When the question of confirmation of Pandit Vindeshwari Prasad came before the School Board Dr. Dhruva did not speak a word; it was the Head Master, who placed the whole case before the Board and himself recommended Pandit Ambika Dutt Upadhyaya for appointment as Head Pandit of the School. This attitude of compromise of Acharya Dhruva gave him the final triumph and this especial character of his made his administration not only peaceful but eminently successful as well.

It is said : ब्राह्मणे दारुणं नास्ति, मैत्री ब्राह्मण उच्यते । ( i. e., Severity, unkindness and cruelty are non-existent in a Brahmana, One who is full of universal love is called Brahmana ). It is also given in the Gita:

शमो दमस्तपः शौचं क्षान्तिरार्जवमेव च ।

ज्ञानविज्ञानमास्तिक्यं ब्रह्मकर्म स्वभावजम् । (XVIII-42)

( i. e., control of mind and senses, practice of austerities, purity ( cleanliness ), forgiveness, uprightness, knowledge, spiritual perception and belief in God are the qualities of a Brahmana born of his own nature.) Judged by these tests Dr. Dhruva could not but be called a true Brahmana. He worshipped his household gods ( गृहदेवता ) daily and regularly with faith and devotion. But still he was not an idolator for he did not worship idols but he worshipped in idols the Omnipresent God ( who is everywhere and in whom everything rests ) having full trust in the promise made by Shri Bhagavan in the Gita:

यो मां पश्यति सर्वत्र सर्वं च मयि पश्यति ।

तस्याहं न प्रणश्यामि स च मे न प्रणश्यति ॥ ( VI-30 )

( i. e., he who seeth Me everywhere and seeth all things in Me, of him will I never lose hold and he shall never lose hold of Me. )

His treatment towards his subordinates always reminded me of the Shloka:

अपराधो भवत्येव सेवकस्य पदे पदे ।

कः परः क्षमनो लोके केवलं स्वामिना विना ॥

—It is but natural that servants will commit faults, but who else on earth can forgive them except their master? Throughout his life Dr. Dhruva exemplified the motto 'To err is human, to forgive divine.'

It is a very strange coincidence that many of his outstanding qualities are embedded in his name. He was always cheerful and full of humour; it was always a pleasure (आनन्द) to be in his company. Like कर् (literally meaning Kalyanakara, i.e., doer of good), he was a source of good to others. Students looked upon him as their father (बापु) for he was their great patron, and his colleagues regarded him as their elder brother (भाई) for the loving and sympathetic treatment which they used to receive at his hands. In matters of principles and religious faith he was firm (ध्रुव) as a rock and nothing could ruffle the equanimity of his mind. Thus we find that he literally justified his name "Anandashankar Bapubhai Dhruva". He was a perfect gentleman and the most popular figure in the University. When he retired the Council of the Benares Hindu University passed the following Resolution :—

"The Council places on record its high appreciation of the great services rendered during the last 17 years by Prof. A. B. Dhruva to the University as Principal, Central Hindu College, as Pro-Vice-Chancellor and the University Professor of Sanskrit and in other capacities. His learning, character and long experience as an educationist was a great advantage and source of distinction to the University."

As a mark of recognition of his long and useful services, the University conferred on him the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Letters at its 19th Convocation held on the 2nd of March, 1937 and preserved the link between him and the University by keeping him Honorary University Professor of Sanskrit till the last day of his life.



## THE LATE ACHARYA DR. ANANDSHANKAR B. DHRUVA

### A PLEASANT MEMORY

RAJASEVASAKTA PROF A. R. WADIA

It is a very commonly accepted idea in Indian culture that Sarasvati and Laxmi do not shower their gifts on one and the same individual. This perhaps applies to communities as well, and may well furnish an explanation for the comparative scarcity of great savants among Gujaratis : whether Hindus or Muslims or Parsees. God has endowed Gujaratis with a marvellous commercial and industrial instinct. This has made them rich not merely in Gujarat, but enabled them to hold the strings of commerce all over India. Where Laxmi has smiled so benignly, Sarasvati may well hold off her favours. But every rule has an exception, and even wealthy Gujarat produced in the late Acharya Dr. Anandshankar Dhruva a worthy favourite of Sarasvati. He laboured in the field of Gujarati journalism and literature, and so his fame might not have spread beyond the four corners of Gujarat but for the fact that he was a professor of Sanskrit of no mean eminence, and as Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the great Benares Hindu University he came into contact with students from all parts of India. It was an open secret that he enjoyed a deep personal friendship with Mahatma Gandhi. All this placed him in the front rank of leaders of thought in India. It is in the fitness of things that the Managing Committee of the Gujarat Vernacular Society should have resolved to bring out a commemoration volume in his honour. That I should have been asked by the editors to contribute to this number is an honour which I greatly value. All the more so, as I left Bombay more than a quarter of a century ago and I have lost touch with most of my Gujarati friends, and the late Dr. Dhruva was but a highly valued exception.

I first came to hear about him in 1914, when he and I were among the first batch of lecturers in different subjects appointed by the University of Bombay, when this examining University took the first step forward towards becoming a teaching university as well. But our contact remained slight for years, as he remained in Ahmedabad and I left very soon for South India. It was in 1926 I met him in Benares, when the Indian Philosophical Congress met on that sacred soil. But it was not till 1929 that we came into intimate contact with each other, a contact which soon ripened into a warm friendship, thanks perhaps to the force of a common language, especially as we met year after year in different parts of India : Lahore in the north and Mysore in the south, Calcutta in the east and Bombay in the west. The second Universities Conference met at Delhi in 1929. Both he and I were members of the Inter-University Board as representatives of the Hindu and Mysore Universities respectively. In Professor P. A. Wadia we found a common friend as the representative of the University of Bombay. They had been old colleagues in the Gujarat College, and they were just Pestonji and Anandshankar to each other. I caught the infection of warm friendship and Professor Dhruva was just Anandshankar to me. It was a pleasure to watch him, quoting Sanskrit slokas, arguing educational problems, discussing politics, and displaying ripe scholarship in varied fields. Savants are usually austere, but Anandshankar was nothing if not human, and behind his scholarship lay a warm heart. He was a kindly student of human nature as well, this showed itself in sly bantering remarks which often made us melt into uncontrollable laughter.

There is one observation of his which has made a deep and abiding impression on me. A certain Hindu acquaintance of ours was known to have married a second wife even though the first one was alive. He was deeply annoyed about it, but I in a sarcastic mood said : " But, Anandshankar, why should you object to it ? Your law allows it." I noticed a flicker of annoyance in his face as

he immediately retorted : " That is all right. But what about the ideal of monogamy that runs right through the whole of Ramayana ?" True indeed ! At that moment I felt proud of him as a Gujarati and as an Indian, but most of all as a teacher, worthy to bear the honoured designation of Acharya.

So long as he continued in Benares he continued to be on the Inter-University Board and we met regularly every year. But then he sought rest as he was entitled to, and we did not meet again. The sweet memory of our contacts however did not fade. I still think of him as the President of the Indian Philosophical Congress at Madras in 1927, delivering his learned address dealing even with western philosophers, who did not come within the purview of his usual work, but this brought out the wide catholicity of his studies. I remember him as the Chairman of the Inter-University Board in 1930-31. When I was appointed to officiate as Director of Public Instruction in Mysore in 1930, he was oddly enough one of the very few who did not care to congratulate me. For he was not pleased about it; he just said: " You are lost to scholarship. " This was a compliment too ! Perhaps it was this thought shared by many that made me remain a teacher for the best portion of my life. I remember the devotion with which he was accosted at the different university centres by students who felt and saw in him a living embodiment of a good teacher and a good scholar and above all a good man, a type of man that makes us have faith in humanity in spite of all the meanness and vileness of which human nature is capable. God's good man remains the finest thing in life, and this applies to Anand-shankar Dhruva.



ACHARYA A. B. DHRUVA  
AT THE BENARES HINDU UNIVERTITY

AN APPRECIATION

PROF. S. V. PUNTAMBEKAR

ACHARYA DHRUVA retired from the Benares Hindu University on the 31st March 1936 after 16 years of service as its Pro-Vice-Chancellor. He had ceased to be the Principal of the Central Hindu College in July 1935. He had accepted the request of the University to continue as the University Professor of Sanskrit. During the last month of his stay he received a number of farewell addresses and parties from students and professors in which feeling references were made to his personality, and to his work as Pro-Vice-Chancellor, as Principal, as Professor and as colleague, eulogising his liberal mind, his great learning, his intellectual guidance and noble qualities.

I had heard of Dhruvaji at Surat in 1920 from one of his pupils. I however met him for the first time at Ahmedabad in December 1921. His keen, penetrating eyes, his joyful and humorous temper and his liberal outlook easily attracted me. But it was only when I joined the Benares Hindu University in the August of 1925 that I came in real contact with him. For ten years I had enjoyed his company and had seen him intimately in a variety of situations and had associated with him in a number of ways.

Acharya Dhruvaji was a gift of Gandhiji to the Benares Hindu University. It has been organised and governed by two wise and noble men, one a great Pandit and the other a great Acharya. The Pandit gave it an ideal form and a moral tone. The Acharya developed within it liberty of thought and intellectual search. He was its ideal professor. He possessed a mind which was open and critical,

a temper human and rational, a character simple and devoted, and an outlook broad and sympathetic. He will be remembered more as an ideal teacher and loving colleague than as an administrator or a person in authority.

Some called him a philosopher. But he was not attached to any system or school of philosophy. His mind perhaps saw prison in every system and error in every theory or ideal. It was not bound by any particular view-point or ideal to which it would subordinate itself in its desire for knowledge. He was not एकान्तवादी, but अनेकान्तवादी. He did not feel like opposing or asserting a particular view. He allowed every one to prevail or fulfil itself in its own way. What he really liked was contact of mind with mind. He was a great admirer of students' reading-rooms, professors' clubs and College libraries. He considered them as the most important aspects of a real University life. He was anxious for such continuous contacts in an educational institution rather than its particular ideals, ways and disciplines.

He was for an inward discipline. He believed in the autonomy of the student and the freedom of the professor. He did not want any particular discipline imposed on their activities or time-tables. Really speaking, there was no place in his scheme for a principal or head as a coercive authority. There might be at the top some coordinating guidance or judicial committee. I found him always referring executive matters which fell within his jurisdiction to the Syndicate for its advice and decision.

He had a typical Socratic mind which did not believe in the sanctity of laws and customs without trying to value their contents, justice and utility, and a sceptic attitude which hesitated to admit the certainty of doctrines and principles. As he was not enveloped in particular aspects of life new needs and embarrassing environments exerted no depressing or distressing effect upon him. Like a philosopher he would see all the aspects of a problem, event or situation,

but he was liberal enough not to press for his own solution. He would gladly accept the view of the majority or of the highest authority. His observation or criticism was always suggestive and not assertive. Like the Jestling Pilate he had no faith in particular solutions or visions of truth.

This attitude of his mind, no doubt, enlightened rigid minds, but it also corrupted weak or conceited ones. I do not think he believed in a regular system of day to day class lectures, though he in a way gave lectures himself. But his lectures were Socratic talks and contacts, enlightening, thought-provoking and bringing out new viewpoints and aspects of the problems under discussion. He would not impose his personality or opinion on the student, but would whet his intellectual appetite and upset his fixed and narrow ideas. He wanted the students to read more as well as to think more. He himself was a voracious reader and a great lover of books. His motto was 'Truth and Love.' His mind was certainly inspired by a philosophic doubt which was always in search of reality but not finality. It was in a state of process. It did not claim any achievement, for that would mean stagnation—a state which he abhorred. It would like to unveil every 'golden vessel' in order to get a vision of the nature of truth contained or confined within it.

Intellectually he was cast in a Hellenic mould, though culturally he was a great Hindu. But like them he did not create a world of barbarians and mlechhas in his intellectual and cultural outlook. He believed in reconciling the ideals of a true Brahmana who is devoted to knowledge and welfare of society and of a true Sramana who is engaged in renunciation for the spiritual development of the individual. To him there appeared no inherent contradiction between the two. A happy combination of their attainments and attitudes in life would evolve a higher type of man and mankind. He was in favour of properly balancing Pravritti and Nivritti ways of life and of rightly harmonising fourfold ends of life.



He was not attracted to the University for position of power or profit, but was actuated by an idealism of higher culture and science which made one's mind enlightened and life fruitful. He did not consider it to be his function to make people do something as much as to make them approach it for developing their intelligence and achieving their enlightenment.

As a scholar he did not devote himself to any particular subject or pursue any particular line of research and confine himself to it. His knowledge of various subjects was deep, detailed and comparatively valued. He was quite familiar with most of the branches of Hindu and Western learning.

As a principal he did not create or advocate any particular idea or system. He considered himself more a judge than an officer bound to carry out or apply laws. He liked to take human weaknesses and faults into consideration. He did not show any irritable temper but kept a cool head and balanced mind. Students and professors had not to fear a threatening eye or hectoring look when he sat in the chair. He was all geniality and welcome. He did not try for the combing out of unfit students. He would admit all into the temple of learning, and he would allow them scope for all their activities.

As a colleague and a person in authority we found that he had not built any walls around him nor had he encased himself in a fixed form of routine. He did not form a party or a group. He developed no prejudice, predilections and favouritisms of his own. He kept up a receptive and responsive mind.

He was a good conversationalist with enlivening humour and enlightening satire. He loved intellectual company and talk. He was a regular member of the Staff Club and made its life jovial and cheerful. He did not miss lectures delivered in the University under the auspices of various institutions and had to offer very enlightened remarks at their close. His democratic open-mindedness and his want

of any superiority complex endeared him to all. His personality was not found merged in his authority, but his authority got submerged in his personality. He was human before he was anything else.

He was a great defender, if he at all defended anything, of the great heritage of the nineteenth century, of liberalism, humanitarianism and democracy. His ideal was that of justice. Like a philosopher he wanted to reign but not to rule. In the University he maintained peace, harmony and cooperation during his sixteen years' tenure of office. This is his great service to it.

## TRIBUTE TO DR. A. B. DHRUVA

SIR MEHBUB I. KADRI

I FIRST came into contact with the late Dr. A. B. Dhruva in the year 1889 when after passing my matriculation from the R. C. High School, I joined the Gujarat College. The Doctor was then in the B. A. class, two or three years senior to me; but since my friend from childhood Mr. Mulchand Asharam Shah and he were in the same class, I was brought into contact with him through this common friend. His frankness, deep love for learning and kind and sympathetic nature won for him general admiration. After finishing our college career, we were thrown in different walks of life, but used frequently to meet and the friendship contracted during college days continued through life right up to the very day of Dr. Dhruva's death.

I particularly remember two incidents which have created a deep impression on me.

Once we were both returning to Ahmedabad from Bombay. In those days, the Bombay Central Station was not built and the passengers used to get into the train at Grant Road. We were both travelling in a Second Class compartment with two others. The train started, and one of our companions suddenly discovered that he had forgotten a suit-case containing valuables on the platform. He was frantic and started shouting, but Dr. Dhruva calmly pulled the alarm chain and the train stopped. To his great relief our companion recovered the suit-case.

The second incident was, when in the course of my tour of inquiry on the Age of Convent Committee, I was at Benares in 1929 I visited the Hindu University and then walked to Acharya Dhruva's bungalow. I found him on the upper storey of his bungalow sitting on a carpet in very plain clothes with books all around him. I re-



membered Tennyson's ' Charge of the Light Brigade ' and thought that my friend had—

Books to right of him,  
Books to left of him,  
Books in front of him,  
Which he read and pondered.

He looked quite like an ancient Rishi with his pile of books. After his retirement and return to Ahmedabad we often used to meet and talk of our old days. He delivered several public lectures and whenever there was an occasion to refer to the relations between the different communities in Ahmedabad, he would refer to the friendship between me and Mr. Mulchand A. Shah as typical of the said relations.

He was a great good man. His death is a loss not only to Ahmedabad but to the whole of India, which mourns the loss of a versatile scholar, a profound thinker and a great teacher.

MAY HIS SOUL REST IN PEACE.

REMINISCENCES  
OF  
THE LATE DR. ANANDSHANKAR BAPUBHAI DHRUVA,  
M. A., LL. B.; D. LITT.

DR. JOSEPH BENJAMIN

THE LATE Dr. Anandshankar Bapubhai Dhruva belonged to a very respectable family of the Vadnagara Nagar Grahastha community. After taking his M. A., LL. B., degrees, he was appointed as Professor of Sanskrit in the Gujarat College, Ahmedabad. I first came in contact with him in the year 1893, when I had to treat members of his family, while he was residing in "Akashethkoova's Street, whereas my dispensary was located in Sheth Virchand Dipchand, C. I. E.'s Dehla outside Rupasurachand's Street. I had at that time frequent occasions to come in contact with him, when I was impressed with not only his scholarship but also his genial disposition. At the Gujarat College he not only taught Sanskrit, but also taught English and other subjects. He was loved by all his students. He was their Guru in the real sense of the word.

In the year 1895 when I stood as a candidate for membership of the Ahmedabad Municipality in the triennial general election for Khadia Ward No. 2., he as a voter from that ward proposed my name for it, the proposal being seconded by the late Rao Bahadur Kamalashankar Pranshankar Trivedi, B. A., who was then Vice-Principal of the Premchand Raichand Training College for Men, Ahmedabad.

In the year 1901, I delivered a lecture in the Gujarat College, Ahmedabad, on "The Vital Statistics of Ahmedabad," it being arranged there through his efforts.

His interest in the temperance cause was proved by his joining

the Ahmedabad Total Abstinence Association in the year 1900 of which he continued as a member for 42 years upto his death. He was also member of its Managing Committee for forty years from the year 1902. In the year 1938 when the Golden Jubilee of the Ahmedabad Total Abstinence Association was to be celebrated it was he who suggested the name of Dr. M. D. D. Gilder, M. D. (London) who was then Minister of Health and Excise to the Bombay Government, to preside at the public meeting. Accordingly Dr. Gilder was requested to preside, which he did, and so the public meeting proved a success, for which credit is due to the late Dr. Anandshankar Dhruva.

When the All Religions Conference was held here in August 1936 in the Hansraj Pragji Hall, the speech which he made on the occasion as Pro-Chairman revealed his deep study of all religions.

On his retirement from his post at the Gujarat College, he was selected by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya for the post of Principal of the Central Hindu College Benares on the recommendation of Mahatma Gandhi, where by his splendid work he won the hearts of all there. He was then made Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the Benares University. On his retirement from his Benares post, the Benares University conferred upon him the distinguished Honorary Degree, D. Litt., for his eminent services. On his return here from that place he devoted himself to the cause of the Gujarat Vernacular Society. As its President he rendered yeoman services to it. It was through his initiative and efforts that a Research and Postgraduate Department has been opened in connection with the Gujarat Vernacular Society for which he succeeded in also getting a grant from Government. He was very anxious to have a separate University for Gujarat. By his demise the loss sustained by the Gujarat Vernacular Society is simply irreparable. Though he was an orthodox Hindu, he tolerated the views of others who wanted to have reforms in Hindu Society.

He was a great lover of books. His reading was vast. The



splendid library, worth about rupees fifty thousand, which he had, and which has been presented by his good sons to the Gujarat Vernacular Society, testifies to his great love for learning. He was an eminent educationist. He was also editor of the 'Vasanta' magazine. In fact his life, which he devoted to education, not caring to take up legal career, where there was every possibility of his rising to the High Court Bench, was spent in that noble cause. He has thus set an example to the younger generation to emulate.

May the soul of this departed ornament of Gujarat rest in peace.  
Amen.

## REMINISCENCES OF ACHARYA DHRUVA

Prof. VIDHUSHEKHAR BHATTACHARYA

I HAD the privilege of making an acquaintance with Acharya Anandshankar Bapubhai Dhruva quite in an unexpected way. It was through the late lamented Prof. Sylvain Lévi. In 1921 Prof. Lévi came to the Viśvabhāratī, Sāntiniketana, as its first visiting professor for delivering some lectures specially on Indology. But accidentally at my request he introduced there the study of Chinese and Tibetan of which I myself was one of his first students. He gave me the *bīja-mantras* of those two languages thus becoming my *guru* and I began to mutter them as far as I could.

With a view to seeing the ancient sacred city of Benares he went there, and as could naturally be expected, he paid a visit to the Benares Hindu University of which Acharya Dhruva was then the Pro-Vice-Chancellor. Both the scholars met each other and discussed various topics. Within a few days Prof. Lévi returned to Sāntiniketan being not quite satisfied with what he saw there in the University. He observed, I remember, "There are no arrangements for Chinese and Tibetan, nor even of Pali and Prakrit, yet it is a *Hindu* University" The authorities of the University might take note of it. It may, however, be mentioned here that the last two languages are now provided for, but the first two are not introduced even though they are essential for an adequate appreciation of Hindu Culture in general, and specially of Sanskrit Literature in its wider sense.

Just before Prof. Lévi's arrival in India Prof. Mirnov noticed in an Annual of the Jain Svetambar Conference a work on Buddhist Logic, viz., *Nyāyapraveśa* of which he secured a *tīkā* but not its original. Making search in different Jaina libraries in Gujarat, which

have still been preserving some Buddhist works, though not to the same extent as Nepal, Acharya Dhruva succeeded in finding out the original Sanskrit Text of the work together with two commentaries. He was thinking of editing them and discussed the matter with Prof. Lèvi when the latter met him in Benares. Prof. Lèvi suggested to Acharya Dhruva to prepare an edition of the Sanskrit Text comparing it with its Chinese and Tibetan versions. It was further discussed between them that while the Sanskrit portion of the work would be done by Acharya Dhruva the portion relating to Chinese and Tibetan would be entrusted to me. Prof. Lèvi having returned to Sāntiniketana from Benares told me of it and I was simply amazed as to how he could suggest my name in this connexion, as I was then only a novice of those two languages. First I refused the proposal downright. But Prof. Lèvi prevailed upon me encouraging me for its acceptance. I did not and do not still know how he could insist on offering a work to one who was really not fit. However, I had to accept it and in a few days I received a letter from Acharya Dhruva on the subject and we began to work carrying on the necessary correspondence. It goes without saying that Prof. Lèvi helped me much taking greater interest in this work. He could not stay long in Sāntiniketana and went to Japan, and I, on my part, went on working at the *Nyāyapravesa*. This work in two parts is published in the Gaekwad Oriental Series.

In October, 1922, my mother was seriously ill in Benares and I had to go there. I already intimated Acharya Dhruva of my going there saying that I would not see him with my hands empty, meaning thereby that I would show him what I was doing of the *Nyāyapravesa*. The illness of my mother proved fatal and I was to return as soon as possible and so I was in a hurry to see Acharya Dhruva. I went to the University and saw him there in his residence. An unassuming and simple man, just like a *Brāhmaṇa Pandita* of our country as he was, Acharya Dhruva at once impressed



me very much by his appearance reminding me of the following line of Kalidāsa: *ākaraśadrsaprajnah*. We talked and talked on different topics certainly not leaving the subject of the edition of the *Nyāya-praves'a*, and became nearer to each other. I took leave of him and had had other occasions to meet him again in Benares.

IN 1933 the All-India Oriental Conference was held under the patronage of His Highness Sayaji Rao Gaekwad at Baroda. I went there to attend it as a member of the Executive Council and as a Representative of the Viśvabhāratī of the Vidyābhavana of which I was then the Principal, carrying with me a message from our Gurudeva, Rabindranath Tagore, regarding the financial position of his great Institution. I personally delivered the message to His Highness explaining to him all about the Viśvabhāratī. There I met Acharya Dhruva and the occasion ripened our intimacy all the more. He presided over the Philosophy Section of the Conference in which I had the honour to read a paper. I remember here how kindly I was received by the late Bhagavanji in his Āśrama at Karelībag where I put up. He took so much care for my comfort that I felt myself at home.

On my way back from Baroda my esteemed friend, Suniti Babu (Prof. Dr. Sunitikumar Chatterjee of the University of Calcutta) was with me and we both broke journey and halted at Ahmedabad being guests of Muni Jinavijayaji, our common friend. I had already much intimacy with him as for three years he had lived at Santiniketan being the Head of the Department of Jaina Literature. In those days in the Viśvabhāratī, in its different departments such as School, College, Research, Music, Art, and Village Reconstruction, there was a good number of students, boys and girls, from Gujarat. In that connection I was fortunate to have made many a Gujarati friend there, and I was so glad to meet some of those students and friends at Baroda and Ahmedabad. One Śrī Narsibhai Patel lived for some time at Santiniketan, with his wife, two little daughters, Śāntā and

Vimalā, and a son Ramanbhai. In order to meet me Patelji kindly came to Ahmedabad from a very far off village. Dr. Manilal Patel, first a pupil and then a colleague, was with me from Śantiniketan. Bhaktiprasad Trivedi, Pināki ( he preferred to be called *Pinakin* ) Trivedi with his wife Śrimati Indumati, all students of Śantiniketan, as well as many other students came to meet. I had also the pleasure of meeting some parents of my Gujarati students, who came to Baroda. So I felt myself in no way a stranger.

Here I must particularly mention the name of Śri Karunashankar Kuberji. I had, already made him my friend at Śantinketan. Occasionally he used to come there to pay his homage to Gurudeva and to look after the Gujarati students reading there. Indeed, his name Karunashankar is literally true, he being full of kindness and conferring happiness. Rare is the type of man to which he belongs. He was my constant companion there grudging no pains nor care for my ease and comfort.

Muni Jinavijayaji's house at Ahmedabad which is significantly named *Anekantavihara* is a rendezvous of the scholars of the place with a good library. It gave me an opportunity for meeting a good many scholars whose friendship and association I can hardly forget.

A meeting was arranged by the friends in the local Gujarati Sahitya Sabha to meet Suniti Babu and myself. With much reluctance I had to accept the invitation. This meeting was attended by some of the celebrated persons of the town and the members of the Society including Śri Keshavlal Harshadrai Dhruva and Acharya Dhruva, the former being the President of the assembly. The President, Acharya Dhruva, Muni Jinavijayaji and Dr. Manilal spoke suitably of the occasion in the meeting and welcomed us both in an *arthavāda* the literal sense of which, according to Mīmāṃsists, has no validity at all. Then came there our turn for giving reply. The meeting was proceeding rightly in the local language, Gujarati. I was glad that it was not in English.

But it put me into a great difficulty. For my philological studies I had a stammering knowledge of Gujarati just enabling me to use somehow or other a grammar or a dictionary of that language. So it was simply impossible for me with that amount of knowledge to express myself in that language, and specially in such a learned gathering. In this helpless state I had no other alternative than to take resort to my broken Hindi with which somehow or other I attempted to manage. Suniti Babu spoke first partly in Hindi and then partly in English.

Next day Sri Ambalal Sarabhai, a well-known figure of that part of the country, whom I had already met once at Santiniketana invited us to a tea party in his house. Acharya Dhruva occupied a prominent place among the guests present there and the function which we enjoyed so much was a great success mainly on account of his presence there.

Here I must note one thing that struck me very much during my sojourn in Gujarat. I shall and can never forget the warmth and the depth of hospitality, courtesy and kindness that I received from my Gujarati friends and students alike.

In July, 1934, I met Acharya Dhruva for the last time at Santiniketana. He came there only for two days having broken his journey to Calcutta. The inmates of the Āśrama including the teachers and the students accorded to him a reception befitting a person of his position. I had the honour of taking him round all the departments of the Visvabharatī situated in Santiniketana and Srīniketana. On the morning of the second day of his sojourn there he went to see the work of Srīniketana and addressed a small gathering of workers there highly appreciating the idea of the Poet which was being translated into action. In the Visitors' Book kept there he wrote only one word underlined thrice, and it was "Excellent". In the evening there was arranged a big meeting in the Uttarāyaṇa, the house of Śrī Rathindranath, Poet's son, Gurudeva himself presid-



ing. In reply to Poet's address welcoming the august guest and dealing with the ideals of the Viśvabharatī he expressed his high appreciation of what he had heard for years witnessing the varied achievements in the Viśvabhāratī.

Next morning he started for Calcutta. After that though we could not meet, our friendship continued uninterrupted to the last day of his life. The University of Calcutta felt proud of him having him occasionally as an expert in making some high appointments, and as an examiner in Sanskrit of M. A. Examination, as well as of those for Premchand Raychand Studentship. Last year he refused with regret the offer on the ground of ill health and after sometime we received the news of the sad demise of that great savant and "The last of the learned Brahmins of Gujarat"—as Sri K. M. Munshi would like to express.

## THE DOYEN OF GUJARATI GRADUATES

By: Prof. FIROZE C. DAVAR M. A., LL. B.

Gujarat College, Ahmedabad

IN SPITE of all the subtle attempts of thinkers and poets to explain the advantages and soften the terrors of death, it still continues to retain its grim preponderance over the human heart, especially when the victim claimed is a worthy, whose loss can hardly be expected to be adequately filled in the near future. On 7th April, 1942 our country sustained a grievous loss by the demise of Āchārya Anandshankar B. Dhruva, the doyen of Gujarati graduates, who passed away at Ahmedabad at the ripe age of 73. Born and educated in this city, and beginning life as Professor of Sanskrit in the Gujarat College, this intellectual giant outgrew his environmental limits, and at the time of his death was ranked among the dozen or half-dozen profoundest scholars of the country. Early in life he took all knowledge to be his province, and there was hardly a subject, Eastern or Western, ancient or modern, that escaped his thoughtful attention.

It has often been asserted that truth is an organic whole, but one could realize this assertion in all its implications on hearing Dr. Dhruva's illuminating treatment of any subject, his natural transition from religion to philosophy, politics, history, science, literature and back again to religion after taking his enraptured audience on a long but pleasant journey through Saraswati's realms of gold. Though he had drunk deep of the springs of Western philosophy and literature, he was not swept way from his traditional moorings, but remained a true representative of Aryan culture and Brahminical lore. Western philosophy and science never drove him to scepticism as it does many an unfortunate Indian admirer of Spencer and Mill : nor did

he remain a hidebound conservative by the intensive study of his own faith. He never glorified the East at the expense of the West, nor minimized the one to indulge in dithyrambic praise of the other. Like the honeybee he sucked the sweetness of knowledge from all the blossoms in God's spacious gardens, whether in or out of India. His mind was characterized by a wonderful sanity, a sense of proportion and balance, devoid of prejudices, but inspired by a keen desire for justice and fair-play. Though an admirer of the numerous virtues of the West, he remained a true Indian to the core and a rare efflorescence of Aryan culture in the twentieth century.

But culture is very much more than the hunger for and acquisition of knowledge. Dr. Dhruva was a great scholar but he was greater still as a gentleman, and Cardinal Newman's definition of that term as "one who never inflicts pain" can be applied to him in its entirety. He piloted his life-bark with the star-light of Truth and Love, which words he often inscribed in the books collected in his vast private library. His devotion to knowledge may be judged from his own words in his monthly journal "Vasanta" of A. S. 1980. He said (to quote him in English):—"The heart, unilluminated by knowledge, is blind. I am purely Socratic in my views on character, for I hold that morality is knowledge, immorality is ignorance: I feel that morality is contained in true knowledge, while immorality is possible only in ignorance."

An aspirant for knowledge is naturally pledged to the pursuit of truth, but he knows that that phoenix is never available without great sacrifices and sincere dedication to the ideal. Even after cleansing the mind of prejudices, pet theories and preconceived notions, the whole truth still escapes the grasp of mere finite man: and the little that is available is the subject of hot controversies, for each must see the truth according to the light that is vouchsafed him. Dr. Dhruva was perfectly conscious of this relative aspect of truth, and he always conceded to the other man the right to see it in his own



way. But by his shrewdness, courtesy and wisdom, he often brought him round to his own way of viewing the subject, with a tact which never wounded the softest susceptibilities. He often stooped to conquer by surrendering to a certain extent to the point of view of the opponent, till the latter himself realized how unsound it was in the light of further thought suggested by Dr. Dhruva. It was Truth that fought but it was Love that won the victory. Love without Truth would create a position inconceivable to a scholar, while Truth devoid of Love would give rise to an atmosphere which Dr. Dhruva, the pink of amiability and affection, would never have liked to breathe for a day.

Matthew Arnold summed up the requirements of culture in two words—Sweetness and Light. With true knowledge goes humility, often preached but oftener forgotten. Rather we find knowledge frequently associated with pedantry, pugnacity, parade of words which ill conceal the paucity of thought, and the resolution to seal one's eyes and brains to the point of view presented by the other party. A true devotee of knowledge like Dr. Dhruva would consider himself and others as only co-aspirants after the same goal, helping each other by mutual advice and suggestion. It was difficult to surpass Dr. Dhruva in his masterly art of elucidating a subject, anticipating our difficulties, throwing side-lights upon his theme from different religions and systems of philosophy, and presenting it with a freshness and fragrance which revealed the born teacher of youth and the lover of humanity. This freshness of ideas remained with him till the last, and the dews of dawn were still perceptible in the gathering shades of eve. But one phase of his greatness baffles all ingenuity at depiction, and that was the light of his genius, beaming in all his works, his speeches and even his conversation. His ideas, matured by constant reading and reflection, were expressed, whether in Gujarati or English, with a characteristic grace and urbanity, which soothed chronic troubles and reconciled conflicting views and opinions.

It has often been asserted that Dr. Dhruva was rather unduly fond of pleasing all parties, and in the attempt to do so it was difficult for him to hold any one particular opinion at any time on any subject. He compromised too freely, said his critics, and too lightly. This accusation is untenable, and even if the charge of compromise be conceded in favour of the devil's advocate, it was only on rare occasions that the gentleman in him prevailed over the seeker of truth. It must be remembered that a devotee of truth must be prepared to see it from various angles of vision, and must yield to his opponent if he were to show even a gleam of truth from his side. Though wedded to orthodoxy he was never in favour of intellectual stagnation. Like a true scholar he continually evolved, ready to realize the truth even in the heat and fervour of debate, in the shifting sands of politics, the rainbow hues of literature, and the fluctuating lights and shades of philosophy. He was not so modernized as to ignore the old : he was not so fossilized as to be inattentive to the spirit of the modern age.

What he sought, therefore, was not compromise, which consists in the achievement of an expedient end by a partial surrender of the truth, while truth was to Dr. Dhruva the be-all and end-all of existence. Rather he strove for harmony, the co-ordination of various points of view, the synthesis of conflicting creeds and philosophies. Uncharitable critics are unfortunately more numerous than uncritical admirers, yet one and all will agree in holding that Dr. Dhruva was matchless in his skill of synthesizing the various views placed before him, the multiplicity of which would have easily disconcerted another scholar, less qualified than Dr. Dhruva in tact, profundity and ability. During a controversy, with the searchlight of genius he winded his way through the labyrinth of thoughts till he invariably landed on the *via media*, for after all truth, if found anywhere by erring mortals, must be found in the middle. It was this characteristic trait of arriving at the truth, worthy of the scholar and the gentleman, and conducive to conviction and general satisfaction, that Gandhiji

had in mind when he happily described Dr. Dhruva as the bridge between the orthodox and the reformist camps.

True culture must consist of the harmony between Truth, Goodness and Beauty. In connection with Dr. Dhruva's noble character, reference has already been made to his adherence to Goodness; but a very cursory delineation must now be attempted of his religious and philosophical works (which fall under Truth) and his views on literature and art (which can be comprised under Beauty). It must be confessed that it would be extremely difficult to refute the charge that Dr. Dhruva's works do not reveal the full dimensions of his scholarship, and that the man after all remained far greater than his works. The reason was that he was a voracious reader, never more happy than when poring over some tome, and he was always inclined to prefer perusal to the composition of books. In fact the scholar prevailed over the author, and if we fail to have a fairly adequate idea of his intellectual greatness from his works, "the love he bore to learning was in fault."

His books largely deal with religion, philosophy and ethics. "Āpṇo Dharma" consists of his contributions to the "Sudarshana" and "Vasanta" journals on Hinduism. "Dharma varṇana" is a work on comparative religions, describing the essence of every faith. "Hindu Veda Dharma" depicts the evolution of Hinduism from the Ṛgveda to the rise of Dayānanda Saraswati and the Ārya Samāj. "Niti-Shikshaṇa" is a book of moral tales largely derived from Paurāṇic sources. "Hindu Dharma nī Bālpothī" is a sort of "religion without tears" for the use of children. The "Shri Bhāshya" is Dr. Dhruva's Gujarati translation of Rāmānujāchārya's famous commentary on the Brahma Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, with a learned introduction. Two of his latest productions, which revealed his love of research, were his editions of the "Nyāya Praveśa," a treatise on Buddhist logic, and of the "SyādvādaMañjarī" a work on Jaina philosophy, both in the "Bombay Sanskrit Series." All these works show only too



clearly the predominant bent of the writer's mind towards the subjects nearest his heart.

But it was through his monthly journal, the "Vasanta" that he contributed substantially to the cultural life of our province, and his editorial notes in particular were eagerly awaited by his appreciative readers. After the death of the eminent scholar Mr. Manilal N. Dwivedi, the editorship of his 'Sudarshana' was worthily assumed by his friend Dr. Dhruva, who soon after saw the necessity of starting the "Vasanta" almost on the same lines. It lived to see its Silver Jubilee in 1927 when the "Vasanta Commemoration Volume," largely consisting of articles from Gujarati writers, was presented to the distinguished scholar. The object of the "Vasanta," as explained by its editor when its career began in 1902, was, (to put it in English) "to adequately represent the problems of the times, to observe, deliberate upon and discuss every question, idea or institution in its true light and proper perspective, but invariably to establish religion as the inextinguishable soul of every subject;" for Dr. Dhruva held that the only unfailing test for all questions and activities was the moral test. In the midst of Dr. Dhruva's multifarious activities at Benares, it became increasingly difficult for him to continue the journal, but at considerable inconvenience and even financial loss sustained from year to year, Dr. Dhruva adhered to this work of cultural uplift as a pure labour of love till 1939, when he was definitely crippled in health.

It has been truly said that journalism that endures is literature, while literature that fades is journalism. The high abiding quality of some of the articles published in the "Vasanta" may be judged from the suggestion made by the late Prof. Narsinhrao B. Divatia to the Vasanta Silver Jubilee Committee, to extract the best contributions made to this journal during its career and publish them independently as Part II of the Commemoration Volume. Dr. Dhruva had made it a point to give a long English quotation on the hind-

cover of every issue of his journal. One feels that very thought-provoking material could be provided to the public if all these English quotations alone were to be arranged and separately published in the form of a booklet. At last, realizing the danger of Dr Dhruva's valuable literary services remaining entombed in the files of the "Vasanta," the "Gujarat Vernacular Society" moved in the matter, with the result that under its auspices were published three estimable works on Poetics and Literature—the "Kāvyatatvavichāra" the "Sāhityavichāra", and the "Dīgdarshana" containing his contributions to the "Vasanta" for almost half a century. It is gratifying to note that the mine of gold is not yet exhausted, and that a fourth volume, to be named the "Vichāramādhurī" is awaiting publication from the same Society, to which Gujarati scholars will indeed feel grateful.

A brief account of Dr. Dhruva's career and the high posts he filled may now be attempted. Born on 22nd January 1869 in Ahmedabad in a Vadnagarā Nāgar Grihastha family in affluent circumstances as the only son of his father, he was the favourite of Shri and Saraswati, but few have turned the favours of these two goddesses to better account in seeking all available opportunities of attaining knowledge than had been accomplished by Dr. Dhruva. His respected father, Rao Sahab Bapubhai, a Daftardar in the Kathiawar Agency, was a gentleman of taste and refinement and was prominently religious in his outlook, and the father's culture and orthodoxy were inherited in large measure by the son. Mr. Dhruva studied in the Gujarat College and attracted the particular notice of Principal Jamshedji A. Dalal by his fluent command over English. His knowledge of Sanskrit at once brought him into intimate contact with Mr. Kāthwate, Professor of that language in the Gujarat College. Mr. Dhruva was so devoted to the study of Sanskrit that he sought to extend his knowledge by taking instructions from Pandit Shree Bachhā Jhā, an eminent Sanskritist of Kāshī and Mithilā, who was then fortunately residing in Ahmedabad. On the departure of Prof. Kāthwate in 1893, it was by his special recommendation that Mr.

Dhruva was installed in his chair in the Gujarat College, whose best traditions he helped to promote by his deep devotion to knowledge for 27 years, acting as Principal during 1907-1908, immediately after Mr. W. H. Hirst's retirement from that post. Sanskrit alone did not claim his attention, for he willingly took up the work of lecturing on English, Logic and Philosophy, whenever necessary. In 1920, eight years after the administration of the College had been handed over to the Government by the "Society for the Promotion of Higher Education," which had hitherto conducted it, he was raised to the Indian Educational Service and appointed to the Elphinstone College, but that institution was not destined to profit by his profundity.

It was about this time that the post of the Principal for the Benares Hindu University was advertised by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, another noble representative of Aryan culture. On making inquiries, Gandhiji and the late Sir Lallubhai Samaldas independently suggested the name of Prof. Dhruva for the high post. This was perhaps the master-stroke of luck in Prof. Dhruva's career, for an orthodox Brahmin can never be happier than when he is installed as a preceptor in his sacred language and philosophy in a sacred city. His scholarship and experience widened at Benares by his coming into contact with numerous celebrities, and even his delicate health improved by the change. Both Benares and Prof. Dhruva profited by the transfer; it was Gujarat that lost when she cast her gem of the purest ray serene in Pandit Malaviyaji's begging-bowl. Had Ahmedabad continued to secure the further services of Prof. Dhruva, had the "Ahmedabad Education Society" been formed at an earlier date with Prof. Dhruva at the helm of affairs, the University of Gujarat, the goal that still looms in the dim future, might have perhaps become by this time a settled fact. Principal Dhruva soon rose to be Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the Benares Hindu University, thus depriving our province of his great services; for an educationist of his experience and abilities, might well have been considered fit to grace the post of Vice-Chancellor in the University of Bombay.



When Principal Dhruva was appointed to the Hindu University, the affairs of that institution were completely out of joint, and a mere scholar without tact and prudence would have proved an egregious failure. But it speaks volumes for Principal Dhruva's shrewdness and amiability of disposition that he soon reconciled the refractory elements, with the result that the work of the University proceeded smoothly in an atmosphere befitting a temple of learning. Scholars are often accused of being impractical day-dreamers: if this be so, Principal Dhruva was distinctly an exception to the rule. One can safely assert that he would have shone out in any sphere in which his lot had been cast. If after taking his degree in Law he had chosen to pursue a legal career, he could have risen to be a dexterous and ingenious counsel. Judging from his editorial notes on the current political problems of the day in the "Vasanta," one could say that in him we lost a far-seeing and able statesman. In 1918 began the first friction between labour and capital in Ahmedabad, when no more level-headed person than Prof. Dhruva could be found to act as arbitrator. His ruling proved acceptable to all parties, and as Sheth Kasturbhai Lalbhai observed at the public meeting convened in April 1942 to express regret at Dr. Dhruva's demise, it was to this ruling that we owe the present amicable relations between labour and capital and the subsequent industrial advance and prosperity of this city.

The cornucopia of high academic honours was now emptied on Principal Dhruva, whose worth and abilities had by this time been sufficiently recognized. In 1920 he was appointed President of the Reception Committee of the 6th session of the Gujarati Sāhitya Parishad held in Ahmedabad, and in 1928 his services to Gujarati literature were rewarded by his election as President of the 9th meeting of the same literary conference held at Nadiad, the soil fertile in the growth of Gujarati men of letters. In 1930 he became President of the Inter-University Board, which honour he enjoyed

for several years. In 1927 the editor of the "Vasanta", who had set an example of disinterested service in the propagation of polite literature, was worthily appointed President of the Reception Committee of the second Gujarati Journalists' Conference, held in Ahmedabad. He was Sectional President in Indian Metaphysics at the second Philosophical Congress held in Benares, and in 1928 he was appointed to preside over the fourth meeting of the same body, that met at Madras. In 1933 he was Sectional President in Philosophy and Religion at the seventh All-India Oriental Conference held in Baroda, but it is to be regretted that the one great honour that failed to fall to his lot was the Chairmanship of that august body of orientalists, invariably presided over by some of the most distinguished votaries of learning. The inestimable services rendered by Principal Dhruva to scholarship in general and to the Benares Hindu University in particular were appreciated by that institution in 1937 by the conferment on him of the honorary degree of D. Litt., which crowned a career exclusively devoted to the pursuit of learning.

Reasons of declining health at last compelled Dr. Dhruva to sever his connection with the Benares University in 1936 and seek his well-earned rest in his native city. But the rule that greatness has its penalty to pay operated relentlessly in the case of Dr. Dhruva. His numerous admirers in Ahmedabad naturally concluded that a person who had so lavishly given of his best to Benares must needs do something for the city of his birth, with the result that neither Dr. Dhruva's advancing years nor the poor state of his health could deter these enthusiasts from exploiting the little energy that was left in that frail figure. His very presence proved invigorating to the "Ahmedabad Education Society", and the work done by it under his able guidance and the impetus given to higher education in arts, commerce and law are too well known to the public to need any elaboration. He was one of the foundation-members & Vice-President from 1936-1939 of the Gujarat Research Society of Bombay,

which endeavours to promote, organize and co-ordinate research in all branches of knowledge with reference to Gujarat. The Gujarat Vernacular Society, of which Dr. Dhruva was President from 1936 till his death, co-operated with the local Colleges in inaugurating a "Research and Post-Graduate Department" with a view to provide facilities in research in Gujarati, Sanskrit and Ancient Indian Culture, and Dr. Dhruva was asked to shoulder its responsibility as Hon. Director. In fact after Dr. Dhruva's retirement from Benares there was hardly an educational activity in our city with which the departed gentleman was not prominently associated.

He was, besides, almost invariably requested to take the chair on the occasion of the visit to our city of some celebrated figure. His lectures on the Bhagavad Gita, recently delivered, will long remain fresh in the minds of those who had the privilege to hear him. His presidential remarks at the conclusion of numerous lectures and the conversations arranged with him were always heard with rapt attention by his admiring audiences. His house was a place of pilgrimage for all who thirsted after knowledge, and his advice in the solution of intellectual problems was freely sought and generously rendered. At last came the beginning of the end when at a meeting of the Gujarat Vernacular Society Dr. Dhruva was struck down by a mild attack of paralysis. Even afterwards, such was his anxiety to associate himself with lectures and literary masters, that he insisted at considerable risk to health on being present at the learned and eloquent orations of Sir S. Radhakrishnan during his recent visits to our city. The decline of this sun of learning was looked upon not with fear or tears but with a sense of awe and resignation at the inevitability of the decrees of fate, though the actual sunset, even when anticipated, left the huge circle of pupils and admirers overwhelmed with grief at the loss, which threatens at the moment to be intensely hard to be adequately made good. Many scholars there have been, who were respected to the verge of idolatry, but



the intelligentsia of Gujarat can hardly be said to have lavished an equal measure of love and veneration on any other devotee of learning than Anandshankarbai.

This appreciation of Dr. Dhruva may be permitted to end with a purely personal note. Together with thousands of his pupils, I have always regarded Dr. Dhruva as my beau-ideal for the width and profundity of his scholarship, his essentially moral and religious outlook, and the serenity & nobility of his nature—in short, for the harmony of Jñāna, Bhakti and Karma (Cognition, Emotion and Volition) that radiated through his life. His teaching left a lasting impression on the minds of his students, who remembered their revered Guru in the multifarious walks of their lives. Though Persian language and literature are dear to me as life itself, I occasionally but keenly regret my ignorance of Sanskrit as having deprived me—firstly of the joy of reading the Gita in the original, and secondly of the gratification of sitting at the feet of “Dhruva Sāheb” at the Gujarat College. Had I received the light in Sanskrit literature from Dr. Dhruva as I actually did from him in English, I am sure the lore of the Vedas and the mysticism of the Upanishads would have had for me a profounder and more vital appeal, while the imageries of Kālidāsa and the sentiments of Bhavabhūti would have been invested with a novel and more fascinating charm. But that was not to be—at least in this life. Those who were intimate with Dr. Dhruva cannot do better than apply to him the well-known words in which Hamlet refers to his departed father:—

“He was a man, take him for all in all,  
I shall not look upon his like again.”

## ĀCHARYA DHURVA

My FIRST AND LAST VISIT TO HIM

RAM KUMAR CHAUBE

M. A. (Benares & Calcutta) LL. B., L. T.

हरत्यघं सम्प्रति हेतुरेष्यतः शुभस्य पूर्वचरितैः कृतं शुभैः ।  
शरीरभाजां भवदीयदर्शने व्यक्तं कालत्रितयेऽपि योग्यताम् ॥

“ĀCHARYA DHURVA”—such was the appellation by which Panditvara Anandshankara Bapubhai Dhruva became known when he arrived in Benares, the heads of the colleges till then being designated as Principals. About the same time, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya began to be called Kulapati and the Benares Hindu University became initiated as Kāśi Hindu Viśvavidyālaya. With Ācharya, Kulapati and Kāśi Viśvavidyālaya the trio thus assumed its completeness. Dhruvaji, it appeared to all, had brought a hale and panorama of Ancient Hindu Culture and its Greatness with him from the Western India, where it had survived the Muslim and European attacks and implanted them again at the centre of Ancient Hinduism, Benares, and so the New Era began with Samskrit initiations ( Nāmakaraṇa ).

### MY FIRST VISIT TO HIM

I became acquainted with Ācharya Dhurva on the very first day of his arrival in Benares. I was then a student of M. A. Mathematics and Dr. Ganesh Prasad D. Sc. was the Principal and my teacher of Mathematics. He was well known for his unique and rather strange manners. He was a complete mathematician even to an inch in all things. He held quite mathematically and so far, in his own way, quite reasonably that he continued to be the Principal and hence master of everything in the Benares Hindu University till he had handed over the charge of the last item to his successor Ācharya Dhruva, which would take several days. Consequently no

arrangement for his reception was made and he was accommodated like a very ordinary guest in a small room of Boarding House No. 1 of the old Central Hindu College. His two sons, the elder one whom—Dhruvabhai Dhruva—I still remember faintly, were with him with a heavy luggage. Having learnt that Ācharya Dhruva came on the request of Mahatma Gandhi himself, I went, full of joy and curiosity, to pay my respects to Dhruvaji. At his very sight it came to my mind that I had met really a great man, a Rishi. I was at once reminded of the lines quoted above from Māgha:

‘The sight of persons really great removes sins of the present birth, is the cause of coming good, and is brought about (as a reward) by pious acts done before. It indicates the worth of corporeal beings (who come into contact with great men) in the three divisions of time, the past, the present and future.’

I was pained to see him so ill-accommodated. I was living then, as I do still, in the Palace of the Hon'ble Raja Sir Motichand, C. I. E. I requested him to shift to the Guest House of the Raja Sahib who was at that time not in Benares. Seeing that I would not leave my persistence, he agreed to accompany me. In an instant I called a vehicle from outside; Dhruvaji got into it with his son and we were on our way, in a few minutes, to the palacial residence of Raja Sir Motichand. This was the first day of my visit to him and I felt it to be one of the happiest days in my life. As the Raja was absent then from Benares and I had brought Dhruvaji there solely on my own responsibility, he never forgot this and used to remind me, off and on, that he was my guest on his first arrival to Benares. He remained as the guest of Raja Sahib for more than a week at the Palace.

#### MY LAST VISIT TO HIM

TWENTY YEARS rolled away easily and to me rather too soon, as it is often, when one's life is happy, during seventeen years of which Dhruvaji was the Principal, the Pro-Vice Chancellor and University Professor of Sanskrit. He visited Benares for the last time in 1939.



I had gone to leave him also at the Station twice, once when on his retirement in 1937 he was going to Ahmedabad and again between this and his last visit which I am describing here. He visited Benares only twice after his retirement. When he was leaving Benares in 1939 for the last time, I had learnt that he was going away just at daybreak. I got up at night and went to Kashi Station, a distance of 4 miles from my place on my bicycle, as I had to attend the Central Hindu School at 6-30. a. m. where I am still an Assistant Teacher. I found Ācharya Dhruvaji there with Sardar Gurmukh Nihal Singh and Professor Shyma Charan De, the last being his most intimate friend in Benares, a great Tyagi, a very good teacher and perhaps the ideal servant of the Benares University. When the train arrived he got into the Second Class compartment. Both the Professors bade him farewell. I had got into the train to put his luggage in order, and so as the train whistled I bent down to touch his feet. He took me in his arms and said, "You had received me on the first day when I arrived in Benares and I am glad that after twenty years you have come to see me off." I little thought that it would be his last visit to my city and to us. Once before when he was retiring as principal I had gone to see him at his Bungalow and asked him if there was any service for me. He told me that Dhruvabhai, his son, had written to him that he could ask the gentleman, meaning myself, to see that his luggage was properly packed, as he was sure that I would help him in his arrangements for his departure, as I had done on his arrival in 1929. The learned scholar Dhruvabhai Dhruva, his son, like Newton in the story for ordering big hole for big cat and small hole for small cat, perhaps forgot that Dhruvaji was then going back as the revered Ācharya of thousands of students and uncrowned king of learned hearts of Benares at least if not of the whole of the United Provinces and stood little in need of an humble and insignificant man such as I am.

I can still feel him going to his office in the Arts College

Corridor with balanced steps moving his head every now and then to somebody who happened to be conversing with him and can visualise him very clearly in my memory's eye 'which is the bliss of solitude' in Wordsworth's words, being dressed in his long khaddar coat and a red Gujarati turban laced on a corner and with his tika of roli on his broad Rishilike forehead.

I may take liberty to mention, if I am excused of a little self-praise which cannot be avoided, of the inheritance (Dayad) which I got from him as my share. Always during the twenty years I made it a point to attend all his lectures which I could. Though he was not an orator, he had his own unique method of imparting knowledge through lectures. There was always some unique and new point in every lecture which went straight to the heart of the listener, and by these lectures I always was nourished. He gave me in a word THE LOVE OF LEARNING AND PLAIN LIVING. I have passed M. A.S in twelve different subjects, MATHEMATICS, PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, HISTORY, ISLAMIC HISTORY AND CULTURE, ANCIENT INDIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE, SANSKRIT, PALI, HINDI, URDU, PERSIAN, and ENGLISH. Besides I passed L.L. B. and B.T. and Diploma Librarianship. I have done humble research work also in many branches of learning and read many papers at various Literary Congresses and Conferences. All this I mention because I regard it as heavy Guru-rina, a debt to a great teacher, which I do hereby acknowledge, very respectfully !

May he live with God in Swarga for all time to come.

## TO THE MEMORY OF DR. A. B. DHRUVA.

RANJIT S. JAIN, B.S.C. (ILLINOIS, U. S. A.), A. M. I. E. E., MEM. A. I. E. E.)

THIS HUMBLE homage is not from a scholar or a student of literature, philosophy or Sanskrit, but it is from a layman as he has seen and felt about Dhruvaji.

I first met him in July 1921, when I came to Benares for an interview. He immediately impressed me with his fine humour and open smile. Dhruvaji was not a long-drawn face scholar, as scholars quite often are. He had a considerable amount of human touch in him. He was a lover of fine and subtle humour, classical music and games, which were the recreative features in the life of Dhruvaji. I mostly came in contact with him in Club and on Cricket field and in Musical parties.

It was great pleasure for any one to meet Dhruvaji as a friend in Club or on Cricket ground. He would forget his age and his scholarship when he was with friends. I can imagine what a pleasure it would have been to be a student in his class room but that pleasure was not mine, yet I enjoyed the pleasures of his company as a friend although much junior in age and position and no where near him as a scholar.

For a long time one thing more remains in the memory of most of the people who met him, after he had left the Hindu University, and it was short illuminating and invigorating remarks from the presidential chair after a literary talk. He was a scholar of the first rank in the country but the tie between him and me was his cultural taste and smiling face and subtle humour and the open mind, which I shall never forget in my life time. His religion was the religion of humanity much higher than the classical, sectarian and dogmatic belief. His ideas about Sanskrit literature were much higher and higher than what average man can even grasp or understand. He has left on the minds of those who came in contact with him a permanent impression in the country, a gap which is very difficult to fill.

I pray that God may grant him an everlasting peace which he loved most, and the scholars of his calibre to this poor country.



## "A BRIGHT BEACON LIGHT"

Mr. K. V. DHOLAKIA

As HIS STUDENT, I had the excellent luck to come in close contact with the learned Professor Anandshankar B. Dhruva in the Gujarat College, Ahmedabad, for about four years (1909-1912), and the more the years began to roll on since I fell within the enchanting circle of his ennobling influence, the more and more I felt convinced how much we owed to his profound scholarship. Not only was he a "savant" of Sanskrita literature and of all systems of Indian Philosophy, but also he had drunk deep and dived deeper into all the springs of Western Philosophy, from Thales to Hegel and Herbert Spencer, and an intelligent comparative study, made with unique skill and labour, of both the eastern and the western doctrines, naturally raised him head and shoulders above others who were expert only in either. His thorough grasp of Kantian and Neo Kantian theories made him a master of Metaphysics in all its spheres from various points of view, and it was a riddle to us whether it was his bottom-fathoming knowledge of all western dogmas that enabled him to handle so splendidly the numerous branches of Indian Logic and Philosophy, or vice versa, or each elevated the other in him like one light kindling another.

Nearly a valetudinarian in physique, he regulated the routine of his daily life so wisely and with such marvellously self-controlled discipline, that he was able to earn a very fair longevity that could hardly have been practicable for most others of that type. The serene sanguineness and sober sincerity that permeated his public career, seemed to vie with the profound purity and saint like sanctity of his private life; and he perused, practised, performed and perfected what contemporary scholars with robust physical constitution did verily wonder at. Neither hatted nor booted, neither foreign-

trained nor foreign-fed, he commanded a spontaneous and genuine reverence even from foreigners to a degree.

That he successfully handled and guided the helm of the Benares Hindu University for years amid the most learned and astute prodigies from various provinces of the land, forms the apex to his illustrious career, and is an ever eloquent proof of his towering versatile genius and matchless merits, which may well be regarded as a just and right cause of proper and permanent pride for every son of what is now called Maha Gujarata.

A single lecture heard from his lips opened up large vistas and fruitful fields of higher contemplation for the audience, and his tone and voice, though not stentorian, were sweetly solemn and ever edifying. The hearer felt himself "a wiser man" after listening to his lecture, whatever the subject, though he might have heard before, and from Professor Dhruva himself too, numerous other lectures.

His strict impartiality seemed to border on Stoic coldness, and the goodness of his kind and gentle heart breathed angelic grace. His was a peerless brilliancy that was not burning and scorching like that of the sun, but cool and serene like that of a self-luminous full-moon, shedding its unborrowed light in an unclouded sky. His life was a veritable model for worthy imitation, and his death, preceded by a pious presentiment thereof—a gift to God-favoured souls alone—has been a bright beacon light pointing to the unimpeachable validity and eternal glory of all the Sanatana Hindu Theories pertaining, among other things, to the Colossal Calm, the Transcendental Tranquility, which is part and parcel of, nay, absolutely identical with the very nature of that infinitely wise Supreme Being "whose smile kindles the universe."

## PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF ACHARYA DR. A. B. DHRUVA

RAO BAHADUR C. S. PANDIA, B. A. OF SURAT

NEARLY a year before I retired from Govt. service I had arranged for a tour programme for visiting most important and sacred places of pilgrimage in India. In pursuance of this plan it was decided to see South Indian shrines first, as they are well known for their architectural and artistic excellence. I, therefore, in company with my wife and three other relations, visited Rameshvar, Madura, Trichinopoly, Shri Rangam, Tanjore, Kumbkonam and Konjivaram in the month of August 1921. After performing pilgrimages at those places, we pursued our journey to Jagannath Puri. Then we went to Calcutta, and after staying there for a couple of days, we reached Benares on 17th September, 1921. Next day, that is on 18th September, we visited the Benares Hindu University and saw Acharya Dhruva at his bungalow. He received us cordially, and though he came into our contact for the first time, he talked with us freely without making any show of formality, and we were so much impressed by his frank and hospitable treatment, that we felt that we were before a *saintly soul*. My first acquaintance with Acharya Dhruva thus took place nearly quarter of a century ago.

2. On 19 September, 1929, my wife suddenly passed away on account of heart failure, causing a great shock to my mind. I could not reconcile myself to the new situation which had arisen on account of her sudden death, and therefore to divert my attention from this unhappy and unfortunate incident, I applied myself to a closer study of religious subjects including the Vedant philosophy—but the latter subject I found somewhat difficult to master, without the guidance of an expert teacher. I therefore wrote out a short Note, discussing in brief, the fundamental principles underlying the Shankar



School of Vedant. This Note of mine also contained certain points, which needed further elucidation and explanation. Taking advantage of my previous acquaintance which took place in 1921, I submitted the above-mentioned Note of mine to Acharya Dhruva in January 1931, with a request to kindly send me answers to my queries, and this, he was pleased to do at his convenience. Quotations from my Note, and Acharya Dhruva's remarks thereon by way of reply are given side by side as shown below:—

*Quotations from my Note.*

The fundamental doctrine underlying the केवलद्वैत system of Vedant is that the only Absolute Reality is निर्गुणब्रह्म, and that the world in which we live and have our being is an illusion superimposed on Brahman by अज्ञान, i. e., cosmic ignorance, and that the world as such was never created by anyone and does not exist *at any time* not even *in the present*, and what appears as existing is due to an illusion created by Maya.

माया is sometimes described as अनिर्वचनीय and sometimes as an illusion, like a serpent in a rope, or water in a mirage.

*Acharya Dhruva's remarks.*

Quite correctly summed up.

Some of the Shankar Vedantins describe Maya as अनिर्वचनीय and apparently stop at that. But the demonstration of अनिर्वचनीयता is really intended to imply "illusion" as unreality. It should be noted that Maya is used in two different, though connected

This instance of रज्जुसर्प is off and on quoted by all classes of Vedantins. A serpent never existed in reality at anytime, past, present or future, so the world never existed at any time, *not even in present.*

If this were correct, then all human beings and animate and inanimate things which we see with our naked eyes are like clouds of invisible vapour or will-of-the-wisp, but this view offends against the very fundamental fact of the प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण.

senses. Thus Maya may mean (1) the World, or it may mean (2) *that something which is posited to account for the World*, which does not very well fit in with निर्गुणब्रह्म or with Shastra or Higher Reason. In the latter case, it is what you would call a "force"; in the former, the effect of it.

Right.

There are two ways of meeting this objection known in Shankar Vedant. (1) One school denies that प्रत्यक्ष is "fundamental." All science, all philosophy starts prepared to fight common sense if it be found necessary. You will note that modern science has absolutely no respect for प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण, nor has philosophy. Even Reid, the British philosopher, who is known as an advocate of common sense had

to justify common sense at the bar of Higher Reason, thus making the latter the final Judge. (2) The other school of Vedant endeavours to show that प्रत्यक्ष far from contradicting the position of Shankar Vedant confirms it. (See the summary of the doctrine of this school in Shri Bhasya I-i. See also 'Vivarana', which represents certain Shankar School of Vedant. )

If Brahma is unknowable (I mean unknowable to *ordinary mortals*, it may be knowable to a *Yogi in Samadhi*) and if माया does not exist, it follows that शबलब्रह्म is equally shadowy, as it is a combination of Brahma and Māyā.

If माया does not exist, and शबलब्रह्म is equally shadowy, the necessity of कर्म, उपासना, भक्ति etc., goes to the winds, transmigration of souls turns out to be a pure myth etc.

Please note that Brahma is not "*unknowable*". Cf. विदिताद-विदितादधि-(Upanishad). Brahma is known more even than the so called '*known*'-अविज्ञातं विज्ञानताम् and विज्ञातमविज्ञानतां ∴ तत्त्वमसि-अयमात्मा ब्रह्म "Cogito ergo sum"-not as applied to "I" - the ego, but to Brahman - the Ego of the Ego - आत्मा behind and at the root of अहम्.

Who says it does not exist ? It exists in the sense in which the 'World' exists.—the world which it is posited to explain. As you and I exist, and as the world exists, so does शबलब्रह्म and so the necessity of कर्म, उपासना and भक्ति. They do not "go to the winds" so long as we and our world do not go



If as stated above, માયા does not exist and Brahma is unknowable, the result is pure atheism. I therefore pursued the subject further by reading standard works, but they failed to solve my difficulties, and confirmed my doubts that the કેવલદ્વૈત system of Vedant, which is applauded as the finest product of most cultured brains of the ablest philosophers is nothing short of atheism, pure and simple.

In his description of માયાસ્વરૂપ covering over 40 pages of સદુપદેશ-શ્રેણી-પંચમ સદુપદેશ which was published some years ago by the શ્રેયઃસાધક અધિકારિવર્ગ of Baroda the late Professor J. J. Kania, writes as under:

“સાધારણ મનુષ્યોની દૃષ્ટિ પ્રમાણે માયા વસ્તુરૂપ છે. જે વિશેષ વિચાર-શીલ છે તેની દૃષ્ટિથી માયા અનિર્વાચનીય છે, પરંતુ તત્ત્વજ્ઞાનને પ્રાપ્ત થયેલા

to the winds. I drink water to quench my thirst. What does it matter if the scientist demonstrated that water is Oxygen and Hydrogen?

It is not “atheism”. The atheist affirms himself, affirms the world, but denies God. The Vedantin (Shankar) is God-intoxicated, and denies himself, denies the world, in fact every thing but God. He is pan( = all)-theist and a cosmist. He is the very reverse of an “atheist”.

Professor Kania refers to the different grades of thought. The second must lead to the third. The second is an

મહાત્માની દૃષ્ટિથી માયા 'તુચ્છ' છે, અને અનિર્વાચનીય નથી. તુચ્છ છે એ કહેવાનો અર્થ એ છે કે માયા નથી જ અને માયા નથી, એટલે જગત જીવભાવ આદિ કંઈ પણ નથી, પણ સમ્યક્દાનંદ સ્વરૂપ અદ્વિતીય બ્રહ્મતત્ત્વ જ છે."

It is clear as daylight that according to Prof. Kania, and according to the orthodox કેવલદ્વૈત Vedant, it is not right even to predicate the mere existence of Maya as a definite thing.

intellectual conviction. When the intellectual conviction ripens into spiritual experience, the third stage is reached.

3. In 1939, the Sarvajanic Education Society of Surat resolved to celebrate its Silver Jubilee with great pomp and enthusiasm, it having completed 25 years of its existence, and eminent scholars and well-known educationists were specially invited to take part in the Jubilee celebrations. Acharya Dhruva was also one of the persons so invited. On 21st January 1939, he had to attend three different functions. In the forenoon, he had to preside at a public meeting of the well-known citizens of Surat which was held in the N. G. Zaveri High School. There, he delivered a very nice and thought-provoking speech on the subject of Education. After this function was over, he was good enough to attend a small party of his friends and admirers, which was arranged for by me at my house, in his honour. I thus had an opportunity of paying my humble tribute of respect to his august personality. In the evening, he attended another public meeting which was held in the Hindu Gurukul Buildings, and there he was requested to unveil the portrait of the late Sheth Vithaldas Thakordas Choksi, the founder of the Hindu Gurukul of Surat. While performing this unveiling ceremony, he delivered a short speech in *Gujarati* on the subject of the *Sanatan Dharma*. He compared the Sanatan Dharma with the sacred river Ganges taking its rise

from the mighty Himalayas. Just as on the banks of the Ganges, there are several holy places of pilgrimage, so on the banks of the Sanatan Dharma, are situated several Teerthas such as the Vedas, the Mahabharat, the Tulsi-krit Ramayan and the Bhagwat. This mighty current of the Sanatan Dharma has, ever, been flowing uninterruptedly throughout the world even upto the present day. He emphasised the importance and practical utility of the Sanatan Dharma by citing the following illustration: Suppose a man has got a very handsome face, but if his nose is slightly cut, how would he look before an on-looker? Similarly human life would be of no utility, if it is not based on the foundation of religion. The inter-connection of the soul and body is so close that one cannot function without the help of the other. Thus, a man cannot have a vision of the soul unless he has a body. Similarly, a body cannot live, unless there is a soul in it. In the same way, the Sanatan Dharma cannot flourish and prosper, unless there are institutions of the type of the present Gurukul.

4. Since the year 1939, my acquaintance with Acharya Dhruva began to grow more and more intimate, and I was convinced that he was one of the most remarkable personalities, I had, ever had, the good fortune to come across, in my whole life. Though he was a literary giant, the simplicity of his life was marvellous, and there was not the least trace of egoism in him. He was a confirmed advocate of Vedant Doctrine, and his knack of explaining religious truths by giving homely illustrations was remarkable. He was an embodiment of noblest virtues such as are described in the Bhagvat Gita. He was very human and understood the difficulties and perplexities of mankind. Turning to his writings, one finds a wonderful catholicity and universality of outlook. He typified in his life the ideal of a 'Rishi', which is the highest ideal according to our Hinduism. In short, the Indian literary and spiritual life has lost one of the grandest personalities by the death of Acharya Dr. Anandshankar B. Dhruva. May his soul rest in eternal peace.



## ANANDASHANKARBHAI, AS I KNEW HIM

Rao Bahadur P. C. DIVANJI M. A., LL. M.

THE LATE Āchārya Anandashankar Dhruva was old enough to have been my professor during my college days (1902-05). Yet it was not as a teacher and a pupil that we came in contact with each other as he had then been serving at Ahmedabad and I had been studying at Bombay except for one year spent at Baroda. Nevertheless his fame as an able Sanskrit scholar had reached my ears and so I had begun to admire him and respect him even as a student, although I had never had the pleasure to meet him personally.

The occasions for us to know each other came later in my life. Some of them have left deep and abiding impressions on my mind of some of the good qualities of his head and heart, and therefore deserve mention here.

I was serving as a subordinate judge at Nadiad in 1924. My friend of middle school days, Mr. Chandrashankar Pandya, having then come there persuaded me to help revive the Sāhitya Sabhā thereby delivering a lecture on the "Literary Service rendered by the late Prof. Manilal Nabhubhai" (Svargastha Manilāl Nabhubhāi-ni Sāhitya-seva) and specially invited Āchārya Anandashankarbhai from Ahmedabad to preside over the meeting at which it was arranged to be delivered. At the commencement our introduction was merely formal but at the end our hearts were down together and he left wishing that I should once go to Ahmedabad and deliver a lecture there. Needless to say I was impressed with his unostentatiousness and sincerity. The impression became deeper when I having sent up the Mss. of the lecture to him as the editor of the "Vasanta" for publication found it published therein with a foot-note below my

remark that he had left incomplete a retrospect of the works of Manibhai on various subjects which he had been contributing to the "Sudarśana," a journal started by Manibhai and continued for some time after his death by his brother Madhavlal. In that foot-note he acknowledged his inability and expressed regret for it. After some time I recieved a letter requesting me to be a subscriber and to send contribution to it off and on according to convenience. I used to comply with both requests till the journal was discontinued in or about August 1938.

The eighth session of the Gujarātī Sahitya Parishad was held at Nadiad in 1928. I had been transferred to Borsad shortly before it. We therefore happened to be fellow-guests at the house of his nephew Mr. Janubhai Sayyad. From his attitude towards me during our stay there I could easily mark that we had several things in common to have regard for each other, namely :-love of the Sanskrit language and literature, study of Indian philosophy, simplicity of mode of living, scrupulous regard for the indigenous form of culture, admiration for the erudition of Manilal Nabhubhai and the service rendered by him to the cause of Gujarati literature during his short span of life.

The said session of the Parishad was a memorable one. It was presided over by the Āchārya, who on account of his mature age, wide experience, impressive personality, depth of learning, length of devoted service to the causes of the literature and culture of Gujarat, non-excitability and non-liability to be deflected from his purpose even under great provocation, could command respect and submission even from the most recalcitrant young literary enthusiasts who had assembled there in a large number. The reason for the large assembly was that the most prominent issues before that session were whether it was possible to amend the constitution of the Parishad as desired by some of the writers of the old school led by the late Mr. Ambalal

Jani and if so, what changes should be effected therein in order to remove from it the defects which, according to them, had crept into it as it had been got sanctioned hurriedly at the sixth session held at Bombay in 1926. The principal defect, as alleged by them, was that it left little scope for the use of the intelligence of and active work by any one else except Mr. Munshi himself as he had so packed with his yes-men the Madhyastha Sabha, in which all power had been concentrated, that any voice questioning the wisdom of any step taken by him or drawing attention to any omission of which he was guilty was completely drowned in the chorus of their applause of whatever words fell from his lips.

This is not the place to discuss the validity or otherwise of those objections and the reasonableness or otherwise of the changes sought to be made out by the Jani party. Suffice it to say that Mr. Munshi succeeded in getting the issues side-tracked for a further period of two years by persuading the Subjects Committee and the plenary session to agree to the appointment of a committee for their consideration with a mandate to report before the next session. As could have been expected, about a year of inertia followed the passing of this resolution, with the result that agitation in the press was revived. It was so persistent that the Committee had to meet, discuss the suggestions that had been recieved and prepare a draft of the amendments agreed upon. They were placed before the ninth session of the Parishad held again at Nadiad but now under the presidentship of Mr. Bhulabhai Desai, a Bombay lawyer of established reputation from whom Mr. Munshi had taken lessons in forensic skill. The amendments were passed with slight changes here and there and the Jani group congratulated itself for the time being on its success so far. When the Executive Committee was formed under the amended constitution Mr. Jani was appointed one of the four secretaries, in recognition of his services. He maintained that position from session to session till shortly before the Andheri session in 1940 he took up his pen again to expose the illusoriness



of the changes that had been effected and the schoolmaster proposed to punish him by chucking him off for his civil disobedience. There was in the Madhyastha Sabhā meeting none so recalcitrant as to protest against the proposal, none so disloyal as to move an amendment in his favour. He did not long survive the shock. So far as I can recollect Āchārya Dhruva did attend this session but only as a silent visitor.

Shortly before our next period of contact of a fairly long duration commenced early in 1938 he had returned to Ahmedabad on retirement from the post of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the Benares Hindu University to spend the rest of his life in public service there and I had to take up my residence there for the remainder of my official career in order to discharge my duties as the Judge of the Court of Small Causes there. Between January '38 when I did so and April '40 when I left the place, we exchanged visits at each other's house but once only. We had however frequent occasions to meet at the public functions held there during that period. Thereout I particularly remember the opening ceremonies of the S. L. D. Arts College, the Commerce College, the Law College, the Public Hall near the western end of the Ellis Bridge, and the celebration of the Diamond Jubilee of the Gujarat College. At almost all of them I found him honoured as *the first citizen of Ahmedabad*. Many persons of all-India fame, out of whom I specially recollect Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Messrs. Vallabhbhai Patel and Manubhai Subedar, and Dr. Sir S. Radhakrishnan, visited Ahmedabad to take the leading part in these functions during the said period along with this *unelected mayor of that capital of the Gujarat province*. Besides such occasional activities, he used to have fixed periodical ones as the President of the Gujarat Sāhitya Sabhā, Gujarat Vernacular Society and the Ahmedabad Education Society.

At one of our meetings I suggested to him to invite on behalf of the said Education Society the Indian Philosophical Congress over

whose session held at Madras he had once presided, to hold its session of 1939 at Ahmedabad. But he did not think it possible to collect funds for it from the utilitarian industrial magnates of that place. At another he had renewed his old request to me to deliver a lecture there under the auspices of the Gujarāt Sāhitya Sabhā on a subject of my choice. I complied with it after some time, the subject chosen being *Smṛti-Kāla-ni Saṃskṛti* (social organisation of the *Smṛti* period), and the place Premabhai Hall. As the President of the Sabhā he made some concluding remarks and the lecture was published in the Sabhā's Annual Volume of that year and re-printed in my *Rashmi Kalāpa Pt. I* published on the date of my retirement from service in July 1940.

Although he was a well-recognized student of Indian philosophy and had edited works on the Bauddha and Jaina systems of Nyāya, which had kept up the development of the Nyāya system during a long hiatus in the activity of the Naiyāyikas of the orthodox school, such as the *Nyāya-praves'a* in the G. O. Series, Baroda and *Syādvāda-Manjarī* in the Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Poona, the subject of his special study was literature and that of his enthusiastic activity, education. Having been serving at Ahmedabad during the experimental and preparatory period of the life of Mahātmā Gāndhī, it was natural that he should not have remained uninfluenced by the wave of nationalism that swept over Gujarat and particularly Ahmedabad during that period. The editorial remarks in the issues of the "Vasanta" of that period made almost immediately after the occurrence of each event of major importance bear ample testimony to the truth of that statement. But that is not the whole truth; they also bear out that just as the nationalist in Gāndhījī influenced and modified his educational ideals, the educationist in him fearlessly tried to influence and modify the national ideals of the Congress leader, by drawing his attention to the probable consequences of a step which he had taken or proposed to take.

I am not aware whether he had any share in the foundation of the Vidyāpīthas at Ahmedabad, Poona and other places but from what I had seen of the collection of books at the Pītha at Ahmedabad I was led to infer that at least his advice must have been taken when the choice of books for research studies was made. Be that as it may ! Being at the helm of affairs at the Benares Hindu University for nearly 17 years he must have been the chief adviser of Pandit Malaviya in shaping the policy of that university which made it an ideal for other universities to follow in several matters of academic interest in India.

In him, therefore, not only Gujarat but India as a whole has lost an ideal Hindu citizen of the orthodox school, a sound Sanskrit scholar and a well-read and far-sighted educationist of nationalist views. May his pure soul rest in peace wherever it may have journeyed from this world of mortals !



## IN MEMORIUM

Mr. R. G. AKOOT., M. Sc., L. T., BENARES

A NAME to conjure with ! May it abide,  
Resound for ages long and be a guide !  
In memory of him we homage pay,  
And do in feeble strain begin our lay.

As "*Dhruva*" signifies in Sanskrit "sure"  
Ideals lofty his the surest cure  
For ills which make life's journey insecure  
And gross new-fangled ways of life impure.

Pole-star he is—as old tradition bears—  
To earthlings drifting on the sea of cares.  
The helm of 'varsity did long he hold,  
With ardour, tact and sacrifice untold.

A Āchārya of East'rn and Western lore,  
A silver tongue and hoary hair he wore.  
Deed, word and thought—all golden to the core—  
White raiment and complexion fair he bore.

The symbol of simplicity he was,  
A teacher most accomplished, free from flaws.  
A man of modesty and culture wide,  
In him did tenderness of heart reside.

The noblest soul, the pink of elegance,  
Of intellect he showed rare brilliance.

A paragon of virtue and good-will,

His friends and pupils him remember still.

A glory to the 'varsity he served,  
For which his time and talents were reserved.  
In him its acme piety had won,  
A leaf out of his book take ev'ryone

## ACHARYA A. B. DHRUVA AT BENARES

PRINCIPAL GURUMUKH NIHAL SINGH

### I

My ACQUAINTANCE with Acharya A. B. Dhruva goes back to October 1920, when I joined the Benares Hindu University as Professor of Economics and Political Science and was attached to the Central Hindu College, the central institution of the University.

Mr. A. B. Dhruva had been appointed Principal of the Central Hindu College and University Professor of Sanskrit only a few months before. The Central Hindu College had witnessed a very strict, vigorous and troubled regime under the previous principal, who was a distinguished scholar but was a person of strong, determined, narrow and rigid views with sectional and partisan loyalties and with a memory which was both stupendous and terrible which forgot nothing and which forgave very little. And during his short regime the Central Hindu College became a veritable battlefield between scholars of repute and of great promise. The whole atmosphere was full of party spirit and strife and of pettifogging jealousy and intrigue and the conditions necessary for the performance of higher academic work were conspicuous by their absence. Pandit Madan Mohan Malviyaji took counsel with Mahatma Gandhi and on his suggestion and recommendation obtained on deputation the services of Mr. Anandshankar Dhruva from the Government of Bombay to pour oil on the troubled waters of the Central Hindu College and to create the atmosphere requisite for real University work at Benares—an atmosphere which would not be alien but Hindu—Hindu, not in any narrow, sectarian sense, but in a wider and liberal sense, as nearly national as possible.

## II

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya had succeeded in collecting at the University some of the well-known Indian scholars from all over the country and in attracting a number of promising young men who had returned from abroad with brilliant academic records. At the time when Principal Dhruva took charge the Central Hindu College had on its staff two honorary workers of great sincerity and devotion and of fair ability—one of them unfortunately died a few years after but the other, although very old, still continues to tender valuable service to the University. There was also one Englishman in the University, who had come there after resigning his Government post, who threw himself heart and soul into the work of the building up of the Engineering College and making it popular and known throughout the length and breadth of the Indian Empire.

Acharya Anandshankar came among these scholars and workers early in 1920 and succeeded in winning almost immediately their esteem, affection and loyal co-operation and in creating at the University an atmosphere of freedom, peace, goodwill and tolerance. It is true that rivalries and intrigues did not come to an end altogether and laxness of discipline increased and the administration became and continued to be weak. Scholarship too did not achieve any very tangible or outstanding results. But there did come to prevail a rare spirit of freedom and of comradeship and a sense of oneness and nationality among the members of the staff and an absence of officialdom, red-tapism and the spirit of master and servant or of hierarchal divisions or snobbery. The relations between the staff and the students were ideal—candid and affectionate and at the same time respectful and reverential.

## III

Acharya Dhruva achieved universal popularity at Benares very quickly. Within a year he became the Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the



University, which was an honorary elective office which he continued to hold till he left Benares for good in 1937.

When I first met Principal Dhruva in October 1920 he used to wear a Murshidabadi silk turban, tied rather loosely—later replaced by the permanently fixed *sethia*-turban of red colour—a white, Gujarati long coat of mercerised Khadi, with removable silver buttons on each of which there was a picture of *charkha*, a thin Ahmedabadi, mill-made Dhoti and moving about with gold-rimmed spectacles on his face, a well polished stick with a crook in his right hand and a pair of simple, well made champals at his feet, looking like a modern, educated *rishi*.

Principal A. B. Dhruva's greatest asset was his winsome personality—his bright and charming presence, his sparkling, shining eyes, his charming manners and style of conversation with a smile constantly playing over his slightly parted lips, his gracious face lit up with honour and frequent laughter; his elasticity and suppleness of mind, his bonhomie and his ever readiness to be interested and interest others in conversation.

The second set of characteristics and qualities which were responsible for the general esteem in which Dr. Dhruva was held were his erudition, versatility, wide reading, love of good books, genuine interest in literature, religion, philosophy, history and politics—in one word—the humanities—his command over English language, his many-sided interests, his liberal and catholic outlook, his quick intelligence, his real love of life, his shrewd appraisal of man and books, his equable and sweet temperament, his inoffensiveness and consideration for the feelings and foibles of others.

Thirdly, the characteristics and qualities which made Principal Dhruva very popular among the staff and the students were the candour and gentlemanliness with which he met every one, his unfailing courtesy to and his genuine interest in them all, his desire to go to the utmost extent to accomodate and help, his readiness

to listen to every viewpoint or grievance placed before him, his laissez faire attitude and disregard of unessential technicalities and formalities, his belief in giving utmost freedom of thought, expression and action, his robust nationalism and his readiness to forgive and forget.

Fourthly, the success achieved by Dr. Dhruva at Benares was due in a large measure to the establishment of a perfect understanding and mutual respect and admiration between himself and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviyaji, the creator and controller of the destinies of the Benares Hindu University, till he retired in 1937—which lasted without the least flaw for well over twelve years—a unique record particularly when it is borne in mind that during this period the University was expanding very rapidly and was also faced with serious financial and political difficulties.

Dr. Dhruva was able to win the confidence, respect and admiration of Pandit Malviyaji on account of the personal qualities already noted but more particularly on account of his piety, orthodoxy, and belief in *Sanatan Dharma*. Dr. Dhruva used to keep a long, big *choti* with the front part of the head clean shaven. He used to rise early in the morning, bathe and worship his gods daily, recite *gaetri* and other *mantras* and if his Gujarati Nagar Brahman cook was ill or on leave of absence, to cook his food with his own hands dressed only in *pitamber*, silk *dhoti*. This life of an ideal *Sanatan Dharmi* Hindu made an irresistible appeal to the most important champion of *Sanatan Dharma* in the whole of India, the Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. However, Dr. Dhruva's knowledge of comparative religion, philosophy, Hindu Dharma, his Sanskrit scholarship, his love of English literature and his charming and erudite conversation had their own share in winning for him the respect and admiration of Pandit Malaviyaji. Besides these there were two other factors which were responsible for enabling Dr. Dhruva to establish such cordial relations with Panditji—they were

his shrewdness, which enabled him to understand the great personality of Panditji and in regulating his behaviour and attitude accordingly, and the quality of loyalty and willing co-operation, which enabled Dr. Dhruva to identify himself completely with the views and wishes of Panditji. This did not mean blind obedience to Panditji's wishes—as, to my knowledge, Dr. Dhruva was able to influence Pandit Malaviyaji and to get his own way in several matters but it did mean that if he failed to convert Panditji to his own point of view he would carry out loyally, willingly, with good grace and outward semblance of complete agreement the decisions of Panditji as befitted a trusted lieutenant.

#### IV

For full twelve years there was complete understanding and mutual trust between Pandit Malaviya and Dr. Dhruva and whether Panditji was in Benares or not—for a larger part of the year he was not in Benares in those days—he was sure that his policy would be loyally carried out and his wishes respected in all matters, both large and small, at the University.

In 1932 there occurred a grave crisis in the life of the University. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya joined the National movement and was arrested. Nearly two hundred students and a few members of the staff were also arrested. There was picketing at the University and for several weeks the University was unable to function. The Government of India withheld the payment of the help—yearly instalment of grant and raised a number of delicate issues. The financial condition of the University became grave. In the absence of Panditji in jail the situation was handled with great care and caution and tact but a rumour gained currency that Dr. Dhruva would like Pandit Malaviya to resign and to become Vice-Chancellor in his place for the period of his absence in jail. Intrigue became active and Panditji's mind was poisoned against Dr. Dhruva and although Mr. Dhruva did not leave Benares for good till 1937 the



old understanding, confidence and cordiality in their relationship disappeared. There also occurred defalcation of a fairly large sum and also of minor sums and Principal A. B. Dhruva was not very happy at Benares during the last four years of his stay there but it was still a great wrench for him to leave the University altogether in early 1937. Both the staff and the students were very sorry to bid farewell to Dr. Dhruva—a mammoth meeting was held at the Shivaji Hall to bid farewell to him over which Panditji presided and made a most feeling speech punctuated with tears. There was a grand farewell party too on behalf of the whole University and a very large number of other parties by various members of the staff and by various institutions and associations. A few of his most intimate friends were present at the station including the writer of this article and the faces of all of them were stained with tears when the train carrying Dr. Dhruva steamed away from the Benares cantonment Station.

## V

Acharya A. B. Dhruva was very greatly missed at the Benares Hindu University during the next two years while I was still there. He was missed particularly at the University club and the public meetings over which in his days he used to preside and made illuminating and interesting presidential remarks.

Dr. Anandshankar B. Dhruva was essentially a "clubman" although he neither played auction or contract nor did he smoke or drink or join dinners. Of course the University staff club was not like the ordinary social clubs as both drink, non-vegetarian food and stakes were strictly forbidden in its premises but it was a place where academic men relaxed, played and passed pleasant and happy evenings.

During the last five years of his stay at Benares Dr. Dhruva used to spend almost every evening about an hour at the club. All those who were not gamefans would gather near him and listen or

join in the conversation began by him—which was usually sparkling, lit up with wit and humour and full of pleasant reminiscences and past experiences. Nothing was eschewed—all subjects under the sun were discussed, particularly the topics of the day, with great animation and frankness but without any unpleasant consequences or the least rancour. Professors forgot their difficulties and abstruse problems or their domestic troubles and worries and after hearing the 7-30 news bulletin from London on the Club Radio wended their way homewards.

## THE PERFECTION THAT IS REALITY

Prof. A. K. TRIVEDI

WHEN thinking of Āchārya Dhruva Saheb, I must think of some topic, the discussion of which would be a proper homage to the Parama Puruṣa of that revered Guru.

Ever since the beginning of philosophical thinking, sharp division is noticeable between the Absolutists and the Relativists, between the Objectivists and the Subjectivists, between the Monists and the Pluralists and so on. While on the one hand the Vedantist intuitss the Brahman to be real, on the other hand at the other extreme, the S'ūnyāvaadin, revels in the S'ūnya as his Perfection. S'ūnya at one stage got identified with Dharma and Dharma with S'iva or Viṣṇu. The following is an interesting reference from the Dharmapūjāvidhāna of Raman Pandit :

बाढी कोथा पंडितेर कोन देव भज ।

कोन मूर्ति ध्यान कर कोन देव पूज ॥

Oh Pandit ! where is your abode, which God do you worship, which is the idol you think of, and which the God you pray ?

And the answer is interesting and emphatic :—

बाडी मोर बल्लुकार ।  
 पूजि देव नैराकार ॥  
 सून्य मूर्ति ध्यान करी ।  
 साकार मूर्ति भजि ॥

My abode is Ballukār (river), I worship formless God, I meditate S'ūnya form and I worship an image with form.

The same is the contrast of the Absolutist and the Relativist in the West. Bradley considers that the only real is the Absolute. The world (as in S'ankara's doctrine of *Māyā*) is simply an Appearance which in its physical and spiritual manifestations realises by various stages the One Absolute principle. The Absolute is perfect, and it has no degrees in it as Teleologists try to make out. There can be no more or less in perfection. And so, the more or the less perfect are predicates which belong only to the world of Appearance—व्यावहारिक सत्ता.

Wherein then lies the Perfection which is Reality? According to Bradley, Perfection whether of Truth or of Reality consists in positive, self-subsisting individuality. And, therefore, that which has a greater *harmony* in it, and that which is more self-comprehensive is more Real, for such an Entity approaches a single all-containing individuality (the Absolute). Take an appearance in time. How shall we estimate the amount of its Reality? We may say that whatever spreads more *widely* in space and lasts *longer* in time, is more real; for it has greater harmony and comprehensiveness in it, a fuller individuality.

Teleologically minded Metaphysicians would give this thought a teleological turn. They would say that there must be an organisation of purposes in the world, and the world order to be Real must be a systematic purposive whole. To understand the World Appearances, we must take the light of the whole. Some appearances exhibit the structure of the whole more adequately than others, and these are those which have more of (1) Comprehensiveness, and more



of (2) System (Bradley's Harmony) in them. Thus, living beings have more of Reality in them than Matter, for they have more of the (1) and the (2) in them than in Matter. And in the same way, the more of (1) and (2) in them in any other existence, say in forms of social organisation, the more of Reality in them. In Morality too we esteem one life worthier than another, either on the ground of the superior Comprehensiveness of its Ideals, or of the greater Harmony among the Ideals. Surely the better man is a man with a *wider ideal*, or the man with a *purer devotion* to his ideal. And from this angle of vision, for Morality as for Metaphysics individuality is preeminently a thing of degrees.

However, we note that this idea of the Degrees of Reality is subversive of our ordinary notion which says that something either *is* or *is not* Real and that there can be no degrees in this. The Indian Objectivist, even in the simple statement, 'तमसो मां ज्योतिर्गमय' aimed at perfection in the Absolutist's sense.

In this connection we may note that Metaphysics is not free from what Bacon would have called *Idola* of the Forum. The Real is confused with (1) The True, (2) the Existent, (3) the Perfect, (4) the Absolute or the Eternal.

Reality as Truth would demand that what is true is real, and that whatever is valid within any particular order is real within that order. Thus  $2 + 2 = 4$  is real in the order of numbers, but  $2 + 2 = 5$  or  $2 + 2 = 3$  or  $2 + 2 = 8$  is not.  $2 + 2 = 5$  and  $2 + 2 = 3$  are false judgments and as judgments their falsity is the same; in the *objective* order it makes no difference to falsity that  $2 + 2 = 5$  or  $2 + 2 = 8$ ; neither judgment fits in the numerical system. But  $2 + 2 = 5$  and  $2 + 2 = 8$  may be viewed in a *subjective* way; since they are our beliefs also. For when I say that  $2 + 2 = 5$  or that  $2 + 2 = 8$ , I believe in these equations. And here comes the contrast between the objective and the subjective. My belief that  $2 + 2 = 5$  is less incorrect than my belief that  $2 + 2 = 8$ . The true and the false

beliefs, therefore, have degrees in them, and to the extent to which our knowledge of the Real is identified with Truth as Belief, we must grant degrees in the same.

But Reality is at times identified with Existence; what exists is real. This is the most usual meaning of the term. Here we refer to a special order, namely, the world of experience. That which is experienced is real, and *vice versa*. Thus, we say whales are real, but centaurs are not. In the same way, pleasure and pain, life and death, knowledge and ignorance are realities. And in that very sense, U-boats and huge bombs are realities. And there can be no degrees in these realities.

Then there is another way in which the Real is referred to: Reality as perfection. Reality when equated by the Vedantist with Sat, Chit, Ānanda, is perfection. And things are more or less real as they are more or less near to the perfect or systematic whole. A western thinker aptly puts this when he says "A solid is said to be more real than a shadow, the solar system than a flash of lightning, a substance than one of its changing aspect or qualities, a man than an oyster, scientific knowledge than ordinary opinion, good than evil, beauty than ugliness." Reality as so understood, admits of degrees within it.

And yet another equation is, the Real = the Absolute or the Eternal. Thus viewed, nothing is real which is subject to qualifications, e.g., of time and space. In this sense, the phenomenal is unreal, the noumenal is real; and there can be no degrees in Reality as per this equation.

Since the beginning of abstract thinking, philosophers have tried to intuit Reality, and those who equate it with Perfection have distantly agreed in thinking this Perfection to lie in some sort of Mind-Reality. The Vedantist's concept of Brahman as Reality is a concept of Mind-Reality. Bradley's concept of the Absolute is also a concept of Mind-Reality. The matrix of that thought is the same, whether we turn our eyes to Western thinking or to Eastern thinking.

And in the midst of naked materialism and the consequences of the same as in the present world-war, the cool metaphysical conviction is, it is not perfection in armaments that is Reality ( which is also Bliss, for the perfect cannot but be anything except Blissfulness), but perfection in Spritual Realisation which is Reality and also Bliss. Well has it been known to us :—

‘ तरति शोकमात्मवित् । ’

### “ A NEW APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY. ”

BY

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[ The republic of arts and letters has suffered a grievous and irreparable loss in the death of Dr. A. B. Dhruva. He combined the old and the new without offending either. Deeply versed in ancient Indian philosophy, he was not unmindful of the tremendous contribution of our own age. His interests were wide and varied, and his collection of books shows that there was hardly a subject which escaped his attention. His was a vital, vigorous and versatile mind. But perhaps even more important than his scholarship was his catholicity of outlook, spirit of tolerance and inexhaustible kindness. Dr. Dhruva was really a cultured man of a rare type. For him philosophy was not only an intellectual pursuit but a way of life. Whenever I called at his place I received sympathy and encouragement from him. I have always been grateful to him for the interest he took in me. In the death of Dr. Dhruva we have lost a great educationist and a friend of the teaching profession. It is therefore fit and proper that there should be a memorial volume dedicated to Dr. Dhruva. The best way by which I can repay his kindness is to give this contribution on the subject in which he was so deeply versed and which he always desired to encourage —philosophy N. S. J.]



WE are confronted today with an unparalleled crisis in thought and society. Social maladies force themselves on our attention through their tragic consequences. Economic distress, political tyranny and ruthless conscription of human and material resources for profit and war betray the stresses and strains of our society. This social anarchy and disintegration has equally tragic repercussions on our ideas and behaviour. In fact there is today an anarchy in the domain of thought, which is poisoning the very springs of our culture and civilisation. In the totalitarian countries theories of science and society are produced at the dictates of their rulers, and all inconvenient knowledge and literature are ruthlessly suppressed. The memories of the Spanish inquisition and the Roman Index are being revived. But these are only the more conspicuous signs of the current intellectual anarchy. Today the crisis in our thought and behaviour has invaded almost every department of knowledge and inquiry. Even in the most unexpected domains we encounter confusion. Science and philosophy have lost their old confidence and are in the throes of a severe crisis.

In spite of the colossal accomplishments of modern science in the theory and conquest of nature some of our leading scientists have become sceptical about the direction of scientific effort and are alarmed at the prospect of the prostitution of scientific knowledge and the power it confers for the purpose of destruction. Quite a good few are busy making the universe mysterious once again and turning away from the recognised practice and theory of science. According to Eddington, for example, the world of physics is no better than a system of pointer-readings and it has to be embedded in a spiritual background. According to Jeans the physics reveals a shadowy world describable in terms of mathematics only, and such a perfectly mathematical universe can only have been created by a mathematical deity. The fact that our universe is perpetually running down is adduced as an additional evidence in favour of the original concentration, and that postulates a mathematician at the beginning

of the universe. Some of our modern realists consider that the world of experience has to be reduced to the order of *sensa*, which are neither strictly mental nor material. And we are further informed that the world of common sense has long been dissolved by modern science and only a spiritual coup de grace is now necessary. In addition, there are conflicting theories such as quantum and relativity physics and thus science seems to be a house divided against itself.

Even philosophy, which is generally considered to be immune from the worldly disturbances and confusions, has lost that immunity. Until the end of the nineteenth century there were philosophers and their schools which could be said to command undivided allegiance. In the beginning of the modern era we had the great Cartesian movement and afterwards the great philosopher of Jena, Kant. Today the older authorities and certainties seem to have collapsed. Instead we have now a plethora of pseudo-scientific and pseudo-rational philosophies. Nietzsche took Europe by storm, and his cult of "Beyond Good and Evil" and the Superman spread in fashionable quarters. Bergson's creative evolution of the *élan vital* and revolt against the Platonic tradition ushered an era of the irrational in philosophy. The Pragmatists celebrated the desertion of logic and turned towards a system of emotional satisfaction. The ideology of action found a great deal of support from the thinker and the frustrated youth. The motley crowd of realists and dynamic philosophers with their changing universe and spiritual entities presiding over it complete the picture of modern confusions in philosophy. It is not therefore surprising that in philosophy we encounter, as Mr. Collingwood bitterly complains, "an exceptional difficulty in accepting each others' conclusion and even in understanding each others' arguments." Much of our present trouble is, no doubt, due to the subtle and specious rearrangement of our deep-seated prejudices and presuppositions, collected from the social milieu. "Whatever thread of presupposition," as Whitehead remarks,

"characterises social expression throughout the various epochs of rational society, must find its place in philosophic experience." And if society has ceased to be rational, it is but natural that the irrational should emerge even in philosophy. A contemplative philosopher cannot but reflect the social confusion. But the basic reason for the modern intellectual anarchy is undoubtedly the inadequacy of our intellectual framework. The world revealed by experience and science refuses to be congealed in the traditional moulds of thought and description. Hence the supreme task of our era is to devise a new theoretical apparatus which will correct the current errors and provide a reliable instrument for progress in our knowledge.

In order to better deal with the crisis of this magnitude, let us refresh our mind with what the philosophers did in the past under similar circumstances. Socrates invented a method to counteract the relativity and scepticism of the sophists. He closed a period of doubt and division and initiated an era of brilliant progress in philosophy. Descartes sought to cleanse the Augean stables by means of a method, and when the Cartesian metaphysics reached a blind alley, Kant emphasised the importance of methodology for philosophy. Hegel and Bergson have also done the same thing. But all of them left this problem to posterity, as Collingwood rightly points out, "not conquered, but as Caesar left Britain, indicated." Hence the discovery and establishment of an appropriate philosophic method is the sine qua non of the solution of our present difficulties.

In the past discussions of this problem there are two broad tendencies: one the philosophic method must be radically different from the methods of science and mathematics, and the other the former should be assimilated to the latter. The first tendency characterises the Greek thought, the Kantian metaphysics and the Bergsonian movement, and the second dominated the Cartesian metaphysics. According to Socrates, philosophic knowledge has to be brought to birth from within, by means of questioning, and it was to be sharply distinguished from opinion, which was essent-



ially derived from without and roughly corresponds to scientific knowledge. Although his model was still mathematics, he definitely initiated the philosopher's revolt against nature and science. Philosophy was thus a peculiar and superior knowledge consisting of concepts and definitions, and its motto was 'know thyself'. In Plato we find a definite break from science and mathematics. For him philosophy is a perfect embodiment of free thought whilst even mathematics is an imperfect expression. This method was appropriate for the study of reality which lies within. For Plato ideas are real and have a transcendental existence in the empyrean region, and the function of the philosopher is to contemplate immutable essences. But the real method for Plato was the intuitive vision of reality. Divine insanity acted as a midwife to poetry and philosophy. The ideas of Plato were transferred to the *rerum natura* by Aristotle in the modified forms of genus and species and there they immobilised the processes of nature in a dead routine of classification. The Socratic method fructified in the brilliant philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, but the method of introspection soon exhausts itself. In the medieval times the schoolmen defended and canonised the Aristotelian physics and utilised the Aristotelian logic as an instrument of dialectical debate. And thus the inexorable rationality of the medieval thought ended in linguistic gymnastics. But under the impact of modern science philosophy had to bestir itself. Descartes, anxious to save the faith from the Aristotelian schoolmen and science, advocated that philosophy can only flourish if it adopts the method of mathematics. This method, according to him, rests on the indubitable foundations of axioms revealed by intuition in the last resort. The method of doubt was applied to all our beliefs and ideas until it reached the certainty of the self. The doubter must exist to justify all doubt, and once we have the intuitions of the self and God philosophy can proceed mathematically. Here we must note the ultimate access to reality is through intuition and not mathematics. Kant blamed the Cartesians for identifying

mathematics with philosophy and prescribed radically different methods for both. The Critical and transcendental method demonstrates how the categories of our understanding supply the principle of order for our sense experience and how reason when confronted with ultimate reality leads to antinomies, from which there is no escape within the limits of pure Reason. We must turn to practical reason or moral consciousness for the intimations of reality. In Hegel, reality is rational and the method is a purely dialectical movement of thought through the triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Thus philosophy which began as a movement of free thought cannot escape from its charmed circle. More recently, Bergson has advocated the method of intuition and Whitehead has followed suit.

From this discussion it is quite clear that the radical dichotomy of knowledge (science and philosophy) leads to an equally radical dichotomy of method. But that does not solve the problem of method. Secondly, in the past the methodology of philosophy has never been assimilated to the basic conclusions of philosophy. The method of logic-chopping is generally employed to demonstrate the shadowy character of the world of experience and the inadequacy of the categories of science, and intuition or introspection is the avenue to reality. Thus philosophy is sundered into two heterogeneous departments. Intuition by itself cannot lend itself to methodological treatment. Hence this topic is always shrouded in mystery and metaphor. Like the peculiar reality which admits of no comparison with any of its manifestations, it becomes a peculiar and superior mode of experience which is removed from ordinary modes of experience. Intuition is after all aberrant, it comes unbidden and departs in the same fashion. But even if it were as universal as some philosophers aver, it cannot be a method of any rational discourse. Metaphysics must be founded on the common experience and practice of men, for the basic purpose of this inquiry is not to describe merely marginal experiences but the common, recurrent

experience.

The method of philosophy as a rational discourse on the nature of reality and interpretation of the world of experience cannot be intuition. It must be broadly similar to that of the sciences. The ultimate appeal of all metaphysics, as of all science, must be to human experience and practice. The recognition of our sense-experience must be the foundation of any methodology. But obviously it has to be supplemented by inference and reason. The world of this experience and inference shows unmistakable signs of change, process or movement. And if the world is dynamic, our method cannot obviously be grounded on the logic of consistency and the law of contradiction. In that logical framework the universe must become static; it is more appropriate to the discovery of reality within than to the whole reality of the universe which includes us. Instead of stigmatising the world of experience as a colossal illusion or fraud and imprisoning reality within the static moulds of logic or thought we must revise our logic so as to recognise the dynamic character of reality. Reality does not become irrational or illogical because it changes; only our present formulation of logic and reason turns out to be defective. In our methodology there is no hiatus between a class-room theory and practice, or between reality and knowledge, and it admits of complete assimilation to the conclusions of philosophy. Its test is not finality, certainty, or infallibility, but progress or success in the clarification of the facts of our experience and practice. It recognises practice without identifying itself with any specific form of practice and thus is capable of infinite development in the light of different stages in our knowledge. This methodology includes within its scope nature, man and society. It is a dialectical method for a dialectical reality.

The methodology we have discussed above is present with far-reaching consequences for the scope and function of philosophy in the scheme of knowledge as well as for its conclusions. Let us now examine some of the important consequences.



In the first place, we have really freedom of thought in philosophy. The abstract freedom of procedure from hypothesis to conclusions and vice versa is functionally meant for the denial and not the interpretation of the world of our experience. We can and must question all hypothesis and conclusions, but we cannot explain away the datum of all our interpretations. We must accept without equivocation or reservation that the universe is real and not apparent. If the universe is only apparent in any of the divergent philosophical senses, our metaphysics cannot be anything but an anatomy of illusions or appearances. There is "no going behind the actual entities," in the words of Mr. Whitehead, to find anything more real. Though there are gradations of importance and diversity of function in the different constituents of our universe, they are all alike real or actual. If there is anything real, it is the universe in which we live. That universe and its so-called brute facts are beginnings and end of all scientific and philosophic inquiry. They are our data and we have only to explain them. Theoretically the acceptance of the existence and reality of the universe implies positivism, in the sense that the sumtotal of reality is exhausted by the sumtotal of appearances and that consequently metaphysics as a quest for supersensible reality has to be abandoned. In the latter respect we are in a very distinguished company. Most metaphysicians are agreed that their inquiry can give no more than vague intimations of reality and its purpose is largely prophylactic. In the first aspect of positivism our methodology leaves us no choice but to depart from the great Platonic tradition. Secondly, we are constrained to affirm that reality is not only known but also knowable. This is the direct consequence of our inability to transcend our human apparatus of knowledge and to resort to strange faculties and uncommon experiences. While we put our trust in our own equipment we are always prepared to recognise the inadequacies of existing representation of the universe in science and philosophy. No human knowledge is final or infallible. But if it is utterly and inherently fallible, even the philosophic knowledge will be a study in falsehood rather than truth. Further, as the function of know-

ledge is to represent and not to recapture flowing reality and reproduce it on the canvas of the human mind, the fundamental epistemic problems acquire a new meaning and significance. The universe includes us and it is because we are interacting with it that the problems for knowledge arise. The question is not how to reach the world of experience wherefrom we really start, but how to adequately represent it. The problem of the transition from the perception to physics, as Mr. Russell and others have framed it, is founded on a misunderstanding. It is a problem which can only arise for a Robinson Crusoe perpetually marooned on a spiritual or intellectual island or for a windowless monad. Further, the processes of knowledge are not the states of contemplation but the products of our interaction with nature and our fellowmen. "The spectator theory of knowledge" encouraged by a divorce between theory and practice and between manual and intellectual labour is largely responsible for the misstatements of epistemic problems. Similarly, the union of mind and body, a problem which has baffled many psychologists and philosophers, suffers from the same defect. Philosophers have unnecessarily transplanted themselves into a vacuum and then complain that they cannot reach out to the universe filled with matter and change. The essential positivist tendency of this metaphysics broadly corresponds to the similar tendency in science. While all scientific generalisation transcends the obvious and extends beyond the facts of experience, the foundations and criteria of confirmation ultimately reside in experience.

Secondly, the universe is not static but dynamic; its existence is inseparable from change or process. Everything is in a state of flux and nothing stands still in nature or life. On this subject we have to part company with the great Platonic tradition. For Plato change is unreal because ultimate reality is conceptual and therefore static and immutable. For Zeno and his followers the concept of motion gives rise to riddles which cannot be solved. In modern times the idealist philosophers reject change because it is a concept so riddled with contradictions and confusions that it cannot be regarded as metaphysically valid. Ultimately this line of

argument rests upon the assumption that human knowledge is inherently defective and only suited to the requirements of our finitude. The reality as a whole or an infinite cannot be described in terms of the categories of the finite. All our knowledge is thus vitiated by an original error, which metaphysics can only partially correct. Lately some philosophers like Bergson, the Pragmatists and Mr. Whitehead are trying to make reality dynamic. But this dynamic reality is shot through and through with spirituality. Picturesque phrases from modern science often conceal this import of modern dynamic philosophers. The *èlan vital* of Bergson and the organism of Mr. Whitehead are the classic examples of this procedure. With regard to the objections to change or motion, we can state the following considerations :

In the first place, few philosophers have denied change to the world of experience. Their difficulty is that it cannot be transferred to reality. Some, of course, have allowed the privilege of movement to god. In Aristotle there is the immovable mover; the Cartesian god is a very active creator and motion is added by him to the world of matter. In Hegel the movement, if it can be so called, becomes a purely dialectical process. Secondly, this notion of an immutable reality broadly corresponds to the Aristotelian physics. But as soon as our physics began to reveal a dynamic universe, philosophy could not ignore change altogether. And the dominant tendency of the moderns is to harness the world picture of physics and biology in the service of spirit or god.

But even more important than the foregoing considerations is the inadequacy of our intellectual framework for the understanding of the dynamic universe. So long as we stick to the Aristotelian logic and the Platonic view of reality, change cannot become intelligible. And the classical exposition of this subject in Bradley is only an example of this inadequacy. There are difficulties with regard to the various other notions employed by the scientists. Quality and quantity, continuity and discontinuity, waves and particles, energy and evolution—these are the glaring opposites which cannot be compressed within the limits of the logic of consistency. In the



light of the methodology we have suggested above, the opposites which are now emerging in science in this advanced stage, can be affirmed and united in the higher synthesis, because the universe harbours the opposites and unites them. Similarly, we have to abolish the bifurcation of nature and mind and unite perception with physics. If our experience is in nature and of nature, we cannot exclude the contribution of sense. Mathematical exactness and accuracy cannot be purchased at the cost of applicability to nature. Nature is not a dull affair, soundless, colourless and scentless. Physics and Psychology of perception must go hand in hand. Similarly, the scientist, who has generally borrowed his first principles of reasoning from the philosopher must collaborate with him in modifying the apparatus of theory and logic. It is now generally recognised that the Aristotelian logic cannot do justice to modern mathematics and a new system of mathematical logic has been developed. We have to carry our modifications a stage further and recognise the compatibility of the opposites in the universe and forms of synthesis which unite the opposites and create further opposites. And this is no logical construction but a reflex of the universe itself. Logic is after all, an instrument for the understanding of the universe fashioned through the interaction of man with nature and society and no more product of internal and exclusive thought or reason. The universe as a process is revealed by science and confirmed by our common experience, and the difficulties in understanding it are due to our modes of thinking largely complicated with spiritual realities.

The recognition of the universe as a process or ceaseless change involves the acceptance of time, space and causality as essentially sound characterisations of that universe. Further, the chronological universe is also logical and rational. Hence we can recognise without any breach of our logical or philosophical principle that life and consciousness have emerged at a certain historical stage of an equally historical universe. We can also admit that since then mind and matter have been united and have interacted with each other. Thus generally thought presupposes reality of the material universe, but with the appearance of thought one implies the other. The

chronological priority of the physical universe as disclosed by science cannot be transmuted into the logical priority of the mind or consciousness. Further, consciousness has undoubtedly developed from matter, but once evolved it cannot be reduced to matter. The evolution of the universe implies the emergence of new qualities from different quantities of physical energy and these qualities themselves become determining factors along with quantity. Evolution is a constant interaction between quality and quantity. A mechanistic universe is as much unhistorical and incapable of evolution as a teleological universe. The concept of mechanism is inevitable for the universe which excludes mind altogether, just as teleology is germane to the universe which excludes matter. But the fact is that the universe now includes both mind and matter and cannot exclude either. Hence all forms of reductive idealism and materialism are founded on arbitrary exclusion and consequently one-sided. In the philosophy we have outlined, there is a common meeting-ground for the physicist and the biologist, for the rugged idealist and the materialist. Within this broad framework there is room for a very wide variety of explanation. If the universe is complex and complicated it must lend itself to various interpretations according to its various aspects. The knowledge of the universe must include and synthesise these interpretations in a coherent and adequate manner. And the function of philosophy is to provide such an elastic framework capable of development and adaptation in the light of scientific discovery and explanation. Hence this philosophy is highly scientific in its method and conclusions. Its ultimate appeal is to common practice and experience and not to peculiar beings and peculiar gifts.

So far we have discussed what is generally called the philosophy of nature with references to the philosophy of mind dovetailed into it. The traditional dichotomy of mind and matter leads to the traditional dichotomy of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of nature. This bifurcation is fundamentally incorrect. But from the philosophy we have outlined above we can draw a number of corollaries, which may be said to constitute social philosophy. But in our case it should be remembered they are of a piece.

The basic function of a social philosophy is to explain the historical stages of human society and intellectual and cultural superstructure in terms of the general categories of the above Weltanschauung. As in nature, so in society, nothing stands still, and our social generalisations must be founded on social practice and state the laws of social dynamics rather than social statics. Human society is no more mysterious than nature. Our social and intellectual structure is determined by our material and social environment. If we make it an embodiment of divine purpose we only make it a series of miracles. Man is not himself a miracle nor a miracle-making animal; he is in nature and society and of nature and society. The conflict between man and nature can be resolved into the higher synthesis of scientific knowledge and our increasing control over nature, just as conflict between groups of men can be resolved into a higher synthesis of better society. We have freedom but only to solve specific problems and realise specific values. Absolute values and absolute problems have no meaning for our earthly existence. Utopian speculation, howsoever useful as an index of the power of the human mind, is socially undesirable; the ideals of salvation and spiritual freedom can only be realised after we have renounced our earthly estate. Further, in so far as they divert our attention from our specific problems, they become instruments for the status quo. Historically such theorising is connected with a division of society between those who work but cannot eat, and those who eat but do not work. Even social theories are rooted in social realities. If society is divided, there must appear fissures in theory and force the definition of social alignments. Even the intellectual does take sides, and the so-called impartiality is a product of an abstraction from the broad stream of our social existence. Further, if social history is the product of interactions between men and nature on the one hand, and men and society on the other, there is no room for the miracle-making great men.

This social philosophy will include a critique of the existing society on scientific lines, and no department of life shall be exempt from that treatment on grounds of sanctity or theology. We shall



rely upon factor or factors which can trace the largest number of variations. Such a factor obviously is the economic activities of men and their translation into social institutions and ideologies. This treatment is opposed to the one which refuses to recognise the extension of scientific method to the human mind and life. Just as the Catholic Church opposed science to defend the biblical dogma, so today men in positions of power and prestige resist social analysis. For this scrutiny will reveal the root causes of the social maladies of hunger and war. No social philosophy can be honest and scientific unless it traces the rottenness of our society to appropriate causes and provides an appropriate course of action to remedy it. Social philosophy cannot be contemplative; its theory must be united with practice. Philosophy is not only a way of thinking, but also a way of living, for the individual and society. It is therefore necessary not only to lay down a code of private morality, but also to delineate public morality. In the past private morality of the individual has flourished in complete harmony with public immorality, and society has not yet found its durable and just foundations. Social interdependence, one of the postulates of our social philosophy, requires the reconstruction of society on radically different lines. It must develop in the historical context in which we live and must answer the problems of our times. Broadly it must provide for a society which does not permit poverty and war and utilise all the resources of our planet for continuous social improvement. It will be a plan for social salvation in terms of our historical possibilities and historical values without which we must drift towards disaster to the human race. In our social philosophy the traditional dichotomy of the state and the individual, freedom and interdependence, natural individual inequality and social equality will wear a different complexion. Work and equality of opportunities will be the foundations of a good society and its temper will be scientific and philosophical. We shall not attempt the adventure of producing a perfect society, but only a possible better society. Perfection means death or salvation, and is essentially an unattainable spiritual ideal.

In the philosophy we have discussed above, there is a guide to the contemporary chaos in the domain of thought and society. It is not suggested that the scheme is either perfect or final. But it is undoubtedly a framework in which modern science, philosophy, a healthy social endeavour and a good society are so united as to form a complete and compact body of doctrine. It is founded upon the indissoluble bond of theory and practice and induces rational conviction and thoroughly honest behaviour. This philosophy is frankly opposed to accepted philosophical tradition. But prejudice should not prevent its examination. This philosophy explains the largest number of events and is thus worthy of serious consideration if not acceptance.

### THE MORAL BASIS OF THE HINDU THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY

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AN INSTITUTION is an embodiment of a purpose, an ethical idea; and, in considering the whole complex of institutions, which society represents, we are carried to the idea of an organization, that includes and guarantees, the harmony of the whole as one system. (1) The State has been looked upon as such an organization which seeks to represent the totality of our interests. As Aristotle said, 'every Community is established with a view to some good; but if all communities aim at some good, the State or the political Community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good. (2) The State as the supreme institution represents a systematic whole, informed by a common purpose. It stands as an embodiment of Sovereign principle of ultimate adjustment between various spheres which express the elements of our ethical life. As such, it has an outer side—a body of institutions; and an inner side—the spiritual purpose, the principle that sustains that complex of institutions. (3)

This then is the rationale of a sovereign institution like the State. We, therefore, propose in this paper, to examine and appraise the ideal which provided the moral basis of the Hindu Theory of Sovereignty.

The State according to Hindu thinkers, arises out of the necessity to put an end to the ruthless struggle for existence, which they picturesquely described by the category of Matsya-Nyāya. The instrument was devised with a view to put an end to the unchecked waste and set the individual free from the necessity of a perpetual struggle for mere existence, for the pursuit of a moral life which alone would unfold the true nature of his being and allow him to develop the highest capacities that he has in him. How deeply were the Hindu thinkers impressed with the necessity for the politically organised conditions of life may be realised from the picture of life they envisaged in the 'State of Nature'

"The creatures would soon be destroyed: the stronger preying on the weaker, . . the whole world would be enveloped in utter darkness and all things would have confounded . . nobody would have studied the Vedas . . . no maiden would have married . . . ravage and confusion would have set in on every side, and all barriers would have been swept away and the idea of property would have disappeared . . . no one would observe the duties of (1) Varnas and (2) Ās'ramas and no one would have succeeded in acquiring knowledge." (4)

In short, the State comes into existence to provide those necessary conditions which alone make the pursuit of the moral life, Dharma, possible. Again, it is Dharma that sustains the State, in absence of which the society crumbles into mutually repellent atoms. Let us then examine the nature of this supreme principle of Dharma, the very 'raison d'être' of the State.

The term Dharma is one of those terms in the whole range of Sanskrit literature that defies any exact rendering into English language. It has passed through several vicissitudes in its evolution and



is so comprehensive in its content that at different times, it has stood for different meanings. (5) In the earlier stages, it stands for the principle underlying the physical order of the Universe; again, it also signifies the Law upholding the moral universe. At a later stage it includes within its ambit the whole range of obligations and duties embodied in the scheme of Varnās'rama. Thus the concept of Dharma is most fundamental in the Hindu thought.

The Vedic seers tried to comprehend the physical world as a system guided by an intelligent principle. Observing regularity in the sequence of the physical phenomena, they expressed the idea of 'order' by the term "Ṛta". The motion of the sun, the moon and the stars, the alterations of day and night and of the seasons appeared to them as the Cosmic order, that evolves harmony out of chaos. Ṛta denotes the order of the world. Everything that is ordered in the Universe has Ṛta for its principle. (6) The dawn follows the path of Ṛta; the whole universe is founded on Ṛta and moves in it. (7) With the growing process of spiritualisation, when thought consciously speculative, begins to attempt systematic and comprehensive solutions of the problems of the Universe, a new stage is reached. By contemplating the animated world the philosophers conclude, that there must exist a power either personal, a deity or deities—or impersonal, a sort of immanent and impersonal force in objects themselves. During this stage the conception of Ṛta develops from the physical to the spiritual. Man makes gods in his own image; he cannot acquiesce in the chaos of the physical world and naturally projects his volitional agency and explains phenomena in terms of Causation. He arrives at a sort of polytheism, where the striking phenomena of nature are deified. (9)

In R̥g-Veda, such creative power is attributed to Agni and Indra. Varuna and Mitra are other gods referred to in this capacity. They are declared to be "the lovers and chastisers of law." (10) The character of Varuna is gradually transformed and exalted till

he rises to the position of the supreme embodiment and guardian of all law and order, moral and cosmic. (11) He watches over the world, punishes the evil-doers and forgives the sins of those who implore his pardon. The sun is his eye, the sky is his garment, and the storm is his breath. Rivers flow by his command; the sun shines, the stars and the moon are in their courses for fear of him. By his law, heaven and earth are held apart. He is no capricious god, but 'dhr̥tavrata', one of fixed resolve. (12) Other gods obey him. He himself confirms to the eternal law of the moral world. R̥ta thus refers not only to the physical world but also to the moral order. The world is no longer a fortuitous concourse of atoms; it is the working of a harmonious principle.

R̥ta is the Law which pervades the whole world, and which all gods and men must obey. R̥ta is holy; it is true; it is the 'right' path—the Right itself. What law is in the physical world, the Truth—Right—is in the spiritual order and both are the manifestations of R̥ta. Therefore, Varuna who is the ordainer and keeper of one is also the guardian of the moral law, the punisher of sin. R̥ta is Satya, An-R̥ta, its opposite. The conception of R̥ta has a bearing on the norm of conduct as is evident from the dialogue of Yama and Yami. Apart from the duties owed to gods there are specific duties owed to man. Kindness to all is enjoined;—hospitality is a great virtue. Conformity to R̥ta is a virtue; disobedience to it is vice. (14) In the Vedas, besides R̥ta, the term Vritta expresses the idea of a divinely ordained set of rules for human conduct. The idea of law as a hallowed tradition is also vaguely hinted at. (15) A third and closely related idea refers to the conception of law as a system of principles discovered intuitively by the seers. (15) As pointed out by Keith, R̥ta is further used in the sense of the "right order of the sacrifice." In short, "R̥ta applies to all aspects of the world, to the sequence of events in nature and to man's life." (16)

In the Upanishads, the term R̥ta comes to be replaced by

Dharma. The conception of Dharma as 'law' becomes more and more comprehensive. Derived from the root 'dhri', to 'hold', it means the fundamental principle, the innermost nature, the implicit truth of the whole Universe. (17) "The law is what is called the true" (18). The Brihadāranya Upanishad uses the terms Brahma and Satya as mutually convertible. The Brahman is the lustrous, deathless spiritual Being in the Law (Dharma) (92). This Law has 'her seat in the bosom of God, her voice in the harmony of the world.' The idea is more fully expressed in the famous passage of the same Upanishad:

"Brahman (the Supreme Being) created the most excellent Law. Law is the king of kings; therefore there is nothing higher than Dharma. Thenceforth even a weak man rules with the help of Dharma as with the help of a king. Thus Dharma is what is true."

This Law is discoverable by reason because the will of God and human reason coincide. (20) The Law-givers are, therefore called the declarers of truth, truth being equated with law.

"And if a man declares what is true, they say, he declares law, and if he declares law, they say, he declares what is true."

In the same Upanishad, we come across an attempt which seeks to explain the origin of law. "Verily in the beginning there was Brahman only. But being one, it was not strong enough. Therefore the Kṣātra was created the Kṣātras among the Devas are Indra, Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mrityu and Is'āna. Still he was not strong enough. The Brahman created the 'Vis'-the classes of Devas included being, Vasus-Rudras, Adityas, Visvadevas and Maruts. Even now he did not feel strong enough. Therefore, he created the S'udra classes as Pushan, nourisher. At this stage need is felt for something that may hold this diversity together, and ensure the security and harmonious working of the whole. Hence was created, "The most excellent Law (Dharma)". (21) We have



here the Varna system in its embryo, as an integral part of the scheme of Dharma, with its divine counterpart in the life of the Devas. The harmonizing and the integrating principle is Dharma. The philosophers of the Upanishads, in a broad sweep of their vision assert the fundamental unity of the whole creation by identifying everything with Brahman, who is ultimately equated with the supreme Law, Dharma.

The Buddhist metaphysics recognises the law of causality to explain the working of law in nature and uses the term 'Dharma' to denote this. According to Dr. Stcherbatsky, 'the conception of Dharma' is the central point of the Buddhist doctrine. In the light of this conception Buddhism discloses itself as a metaphysical theory, developed out of one fundamental principle, viz. the idea that the existence is an interplay of a plurality of subtle, ultimate, not further analysable elements of matter, mind and forces. These elements are technically called dharmas, a meaning which this word has in this system." (22) For one who aspires for salvation, the way is indicated by Buddha, who preaches the 'Dharma'. He himself gave the broad indication of the four Dharmas, viz. unshakable faith in (a) the Buddha, (b) in the Dharma (c) in the Sangha, and (d) in the possession of S'ilas, as declared by the Aryas (23). Mrs. Rhys Davids explains Dharma, as "the normal, necessary and eternal order and the law of all moral, spiritual things; it stood in place of a theodicy or cosmos created and carried on by a first and final cause" (24). It is interesting to note that the Dhamma-Chakka (the wheel of the Law) has its parallel in the Brahma-Chakka. (25)

The concept of Dharma is expounded with greater elaboration in the Epic literature. Dharma is equated with truth and declared as eternal and immutable principle. As in the Upanishads, here too, the Varnadharmas are conceived as an integral part of the synthesizing principle of Dharma.

"A confusion of the duties of the four orders is never applauded. That which is called Truth, always exists in a pure and unmin-

gled state in every one of those four orders. With those that are good, Truth is always a duty. Indeed, Truth is an eternal duty. Truth is the highest refuge of all. Truth is penance; Truth is Yoga; and, Truth is the eternal Brahma. . . Everything rests upon Truth."

In short, Truth is declared as 'the very foundation of righteousness.' (26)

The problem of life as conceived by the Hindu seers, is one of achieving 'Mukti' or 'Moksha',—true freedom—by breaking through the bonds of desire and piercing through the veil of Avidya which surrounds him. The whole complex of institutions social and personal must therefore be so planned and co-related that they help the individual to attain this end. Man's life expresses itself in terms of the four fundamental Purusharthas, viz., Dharma, Artha, Kama, and Moksha, representing the economic, emotional and spiritual aspects of the pursuits of life. Dharma here represents the basic or the fundamental norms of life in the light of which the synthesis of life is to be worked out. It is the principle of harmony which gives coherence and direction to the different activities of life.

"It is upon 'Dharma', that Artha and Kama depend. Virtue is foremost in the point of merit. It is on Dharma that all the world depend for their existence." (27)

Artha and Kama represent the economic and emotive aspects of man's happiness. The economic well-being implying the pursuit of wealth and material happiness of the individual and the group, is conceived as a necessary basis for the promotion of Dharma. It is not necessarily antagonistic to the spiritual growth of man if carried on in terms of the direction of Dharma. Likewise, Kama or the emotive aspect of life, refers to the personal happinesses of the individual realised through the satisfaction of the senses and the sex-urge with all the richness of emotional life it stands for. As we shall see later,

"The ideal man is the non-attached man. Non-attached to his bodily sensations and lusts. Non-attached to his craving for power and possessions. Non-attached to the objects of these various desires. Non-attached to his anger and hatred. Non-attached to his exclusive loves. Non-attached to wealth, fame, social position. Non-attached even to science, art, speculation, philanthropy. Yes, non-attached even to these. For, like patriotism, in Nurse Cavell's phrase, 'they are not enough.' Non-attachment is negative only in name. The practice of non-attachment entails the practice of all the virtues . . . Non-attachment imposes upon those who would practise it the adoption of an intensely positive attitude towards the world." (36)

The Ashrama Dharma refers to the evolution of the individual at the various life-stages involving the discharge of the various obligations in the spirit of Yajna, till finally he attains the full expression of his personality. Whereas, through the Varna-Dharma, the Hindu seers emphasised the aspect of the group life and sought to define the position of the individual in relation to the group 'with reference to his innate-nature, tendencies and dispositions.' In order to avoid any confusion, we must at the outset clearly distinguish between the terms 'Varna' and 'Jati'. The latter gave rise to the complex system of castes which later degenerated into a rigid, non-elastic system, emphasising the separateness in terms of gradations of superiority rather than promote the co-operative aspect of the whole group. The term 'Varna', which originally referred to the 'Arya' and the 'Dasa', came later to be utilised for the theory of Varna Dharma, defining functions in terms of the nature and nurture of the individual. (37)

Society, from very early times, has presented some sort of classification into classes either in terms of birth or wealth. The Hindu seers in their attempt to solve the problem of group life, tried to adopt as scientific a classification as possible, neither emphasising



exclusive birth nor wealth as the determining factor. "In a scientifically ordered society," observes J. B. S. Haldane, "innate human diversity would be accepted as a natural phenomenon." (38) Biologically men are born with diverse abilities, aptitudes and tendencies. It is on these basal traits that the habitat and the cultural environment have to work in order to bring about the necessary social changes and improvement. The Hindus attempted to plan the social organisation by recognising the relative importance of both nature and nurture.

The Rig-Vedic society reveals no restriction or distinction between various classes in the social group, except in terms of the Aryas and the Dasas. (39) The classes were more or less elastic and heredity played a very insignificant part in determining their composition. With the growing complexity of life, the need arose for a differentiation between the functions of the various classes with the consequent rights and privileges attached to them. The four Varnas find a specific mention in the Brahmanic literature. Birth in a particular Varna is considered as the result of karmas in the previous birth. The S'udra is of course relegated to an inferior position, but amongst the three Varnas there are no gradations. In the later period, together with the principle of the fundamental types, the functional interdependence is increasingly recognised.

The specific functions of the Brahmins are the pursuit and imparting of knowledge, living a life of purity, gentleness and selfless devotion to Dharma. The Kshatriya is called upon to protect Dharma, as is evident from the elaborate functions of the king and the onerous duties he is called upon to discharge. The Vaishya has to look after the material well-being of the community either by pursuit of trade or agriculture and thereby help the former two classes. The S'udra, who is to be maintained by the three Varnas, has the duty of serving them. (40) These are the specialised functions of the four classes, but above these the Hindu

seers have prescribed the Sadharana Dharma, Dharma of man as man, irrespective of the Varna. These duties are 'ahimsa', abstention from injury to any living creature, pursuit of truth, abstention from unlawfully appropriating the goods of others, regulation and control of the senses, forgiveness, uprightness, generosity, moral earnestness seeking the good of the other creatures (Bhutahitatva), and ablution and personal cleanliness. (41) A careful study of the list given above would reveal that the Hindus conceived of the individual not only as a member of a class or a group but also as a man, and prescribed universal duties. Again, the Varna system is made elastic during 'times of distress,' by prescribing the 'apad-dharma' in relation to 'Des'a-Kāla'. (42)

Though, birth according to karma was the differentiating principle in the initial stage, the Varna and the fitness to belong to it was to be determined by the karmas of the person, even in the present life. A Brahmin who does not pursue Dharma, practise righteousness, self-control and truthfulness is a S'udra. Likewise, a S'udra, if he practised them is a Brahmin. (43) Here the emphasis shifts from nature to nurture of the individual. As S'ukra states, 'the Varnas are not to be separated by birth, but by deeds and virtues. (44) The Bhagvad Gita gives us a clear basis of the classification of the varnas in terms of 'the different psychic energies innate in the biological and psychological nature of man.' The activities of the individual result from the complex intermingling of the three dominant gunas, viz., Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. (45) The problem of the functional organisation of the group has to be settled in terms of the dominant guna in individuals. "The respective duties of the four Varnas, Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya and S'udra, are also determined by the qualities which predominate in the disposition of each."

Thus the Varna system clearly recognised the biological, intellectual and spiritual elements in its organisation with a view to promote social equilibrium and welfare of the group. The functional

organisation of the society was not based on a rigid demarcation and isolation of the classes but on the principle of mutual interdependence and co-operation between the various Varnas. It aimed at eliminating class-jealousies and promoting harmonious relations between the four Varnas. "The Varna and Ashrama schemes were conceived to enable the society to make the best of the potentialities in the individual so that through the functioning of the best and the finest that individuals are capable of, the best may be formulated and inherited by the group." (46) The Hindus looked upon their system not as valid for a particular people only, but as capable of universal application for any social organisation. It is the recognition of the need to preserve the equilibrium of such an order that led the Hindu thinkers to what Roscoes Pound describes as the "juristic idealisation of the social order of the time and place (47)".

The Hindu concept of Dharma thus sought to define the duties of the individual with reference to social, political and economic organisation of life in accordance with certain fundamental laws. "Each of these groups is conceived as a living unit with its rights and responsibilities towards the individuals of which it is composed and towards the other units" (48). The functions of each are specifically laid down. Each Varna has its well-defined functions; each as'rama as a part of the whole scheme has its specific discipline. The King has to undergo prescribed training in order that he may be enabled to discharge his supreme function, namely the protection of Dharma. The manifold duties that devolved upon him in his relation to the Varnas and As'ramas, the guilds and corporations have been thus brought under the integrating principle of Dharma. The comprehensive synthesis of Dharma determines the Sva-dharmas of the whole complex of institutions. The Brahmin, the Kshatriya, the Vaishya and the S'udra have their respective Svadharma. There is again the definite scheme for the Brahmachari, the Grihastha, the Vanprastha and the Sannyasin. Besides a further provision is made for the abnormal times of distress by laying down the Apad-



dharma. In fact, there springs up an elaborate classification of svadharms providing for the duties of each, corresponding to its station in life.

The Bhagvad-Gita emphasises the aspect and importance of Svadharma by declaring :

“ Better one's own Svadharma, though without excellence than the duties of others performed”. (49) It is only by a faithful discharge of one's svadharma that one attains Mukti. Manu lays down :

“ It is a duty to do one's work though low; another's duty should not be undertaken. He is doomed (fallen) who takes to another's duty, when able to discharge his own.” (50)

Kautilya expresses himself with the same emphasis as the authors of Dharmasutras and the Smritis :

“ The observance of one's duty leads to Svarga (heaven) and infinite bliss; when it is violated the world will come to an end owing to a confusion of the Varnas and their duties. ” (51)

The concept of Svadharma has much in common with Bradley's ' My Station and its Duties.' The ideal he works out is one of a life lived in organic membership of a social whole, which yields a position arising from a scheme of duties and relationships. (52) Man must occupy some position and attempt to realise the inwardness of the spiritual environment in which he grows and fulfils the duties attaching to his position.

The principle of svadharma is enunciated in the Bhagvad-Gita on the basis of the three psychic gunas, viz., Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas akin to the Platonic doctrine of the three parts of the Soul—Reason, Spirit and Appetitive (53). Again the individual is called upon to discharge his duties in the spirit of complete dedication. This view of the performance of one's Svadharma leads to the

sublime ideal of a 'Sthitaprajna' and 'Nishkama karma'. In this respect both Bhagvad-Gita and Bradley point to one's station in society and duties attached to it as a path to realisation of one's self.

We are now in a position to form an idea of the nature and end of Law. Our evaluation of the concept of svadharma as determining the specific functions of the individuals, groups and associations enables us to understand the nature of the sovereign principle which was the very *raison d'être* of the organised whole, the State. The history of the concept of Dharma reveals that it is not a simple but a comprehensive scheme of life. The whole universe according to the Hindu thinkers is not a fortuitous concourse of atoms drifting aimlessly through chance. Every thing that comes into existence, does so, by some necessary process and is moulded by some ultimate purpose. The fundamental principle of Dharma is the principle of harmony underlying the whole universe, and that it 'is a search, however elusive to shape the Natural in terms of the Ideal and to deduce the Ideal from the Natural.' The social order planned by the Hindus was one great experiment to achieve this deal.

The conception of law as resulting from this grew in its comprehensiveness. Its scope became so wide as to defy any single definition. "Law proper in fact was conceived by them as a part of a comprehensive scheme of life." (55) It was never completely divorced from the strictly legal portions of the Hindu law. It remained intimately connected with the whole body of normative rules. In this manner, the Varnas and Asramas became an integral part of the scheme of Dharma. The individual must observe his duty according to his station in life. The economic organisations like the guilds and the corporations, too, were brought under the broad scheme of Dharma. The elaborate classification of Dharma, came to be linked up with the doctrine of Svadharma, loyal adherence to which would lead to the goal of human existence, Mukti, the full expression and enrichment of human personality.

## II

Here, then is a clue to our problem. What was the end of the State? What moral purpose did it seek to embody as the supreme institution? According to the Hindu political thought, State and Dharma are very intimately related. The State is not the result of contract, nor is it the handiwork of man. Just as according to Protagoras, the State comes into existence with the intervention of Zeus, so with the Hindu thinkers, the State is the result of the intervention of Brahman. (56) The authority of the king rests upon a divine sanction. The State becomes a moral order divinely sanctioned and held together by the spiritual bonds of Right and Justice—Dharma. In absence of the State, there is no Dharma. People revert back to the state of Matsyanyaya. Under such a condition, the people come under the operation of the law of 'Might is Right', 'the strong preying upon the weak'; men become like herds of cattle without the herdsman (57). It is a negation of the civilised conditions of living. In short, anarchy is the worst possible of state. Righteousness cannot dwell here and the inhabitants devour one another (58).

In a kingless land, no law is known. The only alternative to such a state of lawlessness and anarchy is the politically organised condition of society. The State thus becomes the 'Sine qua non' for the maintenance of the social and moral order. It is a necessary and essential institution for the preservation and promotion of Dharma. So absolute is the necessity for the institution of State as an organised society that the Hindu authors refer to the science of Danda-Niti, as the 'refuge of the whole world'. The duties pertaining to Dharma, Artha and Kama, nay the very Moksha depends upon it. (59)

The end of the State is to maintain Dharma in its empirical aspect of the social organisation. Dharma, as the Law, the fundamental principle underlying the universe, is the operative criticism



of all institutions that constitute the whole polity. In its social aspect, it represents a scheme of life which enabled the realisation of the common good and through it the individual, his ultimate goal of existence. "The State upholds it for its own nature, which helps the State to realise some truth or a part of it within its jurisdiction." (60) There is thus a very close relation that subsists between the State and Dharma. On the one hand, it is Dharma that preserves the State, while on the other, the State is conceived as the "guardian of the whole moral order."

Naturally enough, then, the State in Ancient India embraced the whole field of life, and sought to regulate the life of man both in private and public matters. Its sole end, as visualised by the Hindu thinkers was nothing short of the highest welfare of the individual and humanity. They never betrayed any distrust of State interference and never sought to delimit the sphere of State-activity. If they erred in any direction, it was in their excessive emphasis on the sphere of State-activity, which lead them to the advocacy of governmental paternalism. A reference to the functions of the State, in the Epics and the Arthas'atra would at once reveal the wide range of social, economic and religious obligations which the state had to discharge (61). The sphere of State-activity was not confined to the negative task of 'hindering the hinderances,' but it extended to the ceaseless effort of fostering righteousness' (62). The State exercised its authority over the whole field of social life and actively sought to promote the social, intellectual and economic interests of the people.

At the same time, the Hindu State did not seek to crush the free initiative and spontaneous life of the various associations in society, The State, as the supreme custodian of Dharma did exercise control over these bodies, inquired into the laws of families, guilds and corporations and settled the peculiar laws of each (63). The State by its acceptance to maintain the obligations of the family

Varnas, S'renis, and Ganas, imparted to these customs a legal sanction. The king had the authority to make these bodies confirm to certain definite rules. The king had to maintain a strict vigilance over all corporations and see that the conflicting claims of these groups did not divide the allegiance of the people to the State (64). The State was called upon to safeguard contracts, prevent encroachment of one institution upon another, and resolve the conflicting claims and obligations arising out of their relations. This function, evidently committed it to the task of determining the legitimate sphere of each institution with reference to its respective *svadharma*. The State, thus, did not remain 'a mere external mechanism', but actively entered into a living relation with all these associations. It is indeed true that the various groups, social, religious or vocational enjoyed some power of legislation, but it was purely of the character of subordinate legislation. The numerous associations were authorised to follow their respective '*svadharma*', unhampered and unmolested so long as they did not encroach upon other individuals and groups. The promotion of free, spontaneous life of the various social groups and associations was a part of the '*raison d'être*' of the State. 'Hindu theory favours neither anarchy, nor the unqualified pluralism of discrete and isolated groups'. The nexus or the unifying principle of integration and synthesis was supplied by the State, whose sole function was the preservation and maintenance of *Dharma*. (55)

As law was to Pindar the 'King' and to Herodotus the 'Master', *Dharma* was to the Hindu thinkers 'the King of Kings', the sovereign principle. The State as an embodiment of the 'idea'-force, holding together the complex hierarchy of groups became the ultimate source of pervading adjustments. As such, it set the perspective for other institutions in society, by adjusting, reconciling and synthesizing the conflicting claims and obligations of various associations by reference to the general scheme of values implicit in the sovereign principle of *Dharma*. Thus *Dharma* determined the concept of



State-Sovereignty. It became the sanction for and justification of the Sovereignty of the State.

The King as the representative of the State was credited with a vast complex of powers for the maintenance of the necessary conditions for the realisation of Dharma. He was the sole embodiment of the coercive power of the State. He has to secure protection for the people, meaning in its broadest sense, the necessary external conditions for the fulfilment of the svadharma of the various varnas and corporations, each following its prescribed dharma. The State as the operative criticism of all institutions was necessarily an embodiment of the coercive force of the whole Community. But as Guizot has observed, "force is not the principle underlying the State. Its 'primum mobile' above force, and the part which it plays, there hovers a moral cause which decides the totality of things." (66) Force, thus did not constitute the basis of the Hindu State. "Danda was a means to an end—the promotion of Dharma." "Danda and Dharma are the two poles of the State, the two faces of the political Janus, the one looking to the failures, the other to the triumphs. If Danda is the authority of the State, Dharma is the ideal." (67) In order to understand the correct significance of Danda, it should not be divorced from Dharma, which is its end. It is true that a great importance has been attached to Danda and has been too often glorified, by the Hindu thinkers, but, this excessive emphasis is to be understood in the light of the view of human nature, that lies at the back of the doctrine of Matsyanyaya. But nowhere, has it been conceived as the very essence of the State, though it is its essential attribute. It was therefore a means, an instrument at the command of the State, whereby it secured the conformity of men to their respective stations and duties. "By the terrible use of the engine of sovereignty he (the king), should maintain the subjects, each in his proper duty;" And "so himself being dutiful the king should appoint the subjects to their own duties." (68)



In the King, as the sustainer of the whole complex of institutions, concentrated the supreme authority of the State. He represented the determinate superior in the State, who embodied the principle of sovereignty in himself. This, however, need not be confused, with the traditional view of sovereignty which is often equated with supreme coercive power. That as we have seen, is a mere means to an end. The sovereign authority is to be exercised for a certain end, and that end was no other than the maintenance of Dharma. He was charged with the heavy responsibility of sustaining that whole complex of institutions of the caste and orders, each within the limits of its own Svadharma (69). He was thus the guardian of the whole social order, and had to secure the harmonious functioning of the various groups and institutions. "It is the eternal duty of kings to prevent a confusion of duties, in respect of the different orders." (70)

This Hindu conception of kingship, bears a striking resemblance to the conception of monarchy in the political theories of the Middle Ages. The core of political thought, of both the Hindu thinkers and the writers of the Middle Ages, lies in their conception of a single universal society, living under one principle of life, which is expounded in the last resort by a single authority. The principle is divine, the authority is a divine representative.(71) This intimate relation between the single supreme authority represented by the king and the sovereign principle of life—Dharma, finds expression in the Mahabharata. "The King is created for protecting Dharma (which) takes shelter of kings". "The king and Dharma are reciprocally protective." The onerous duties attached to the institution of kingship, were of such an important character, that it almost leads to an identification of the king with Dharma, and to the very apotheosis of kingship.

This may be illustrated from a few quotations that we give below: The Rajadharmanusasana Parva emphasises this relation in these terms:

"The King is made like the very self of Dharma. To advance Dharma to the best of ability is the duty of the king. When Dharma is increased, the people increase and when Dharma disappears, the people also go down. It is never good to let Dharma down. Evils are removed through the powers of Dharma...for Dharma was created for the birth and growth of beings. Therefore for the good of the people the King ought to protect Dharma. He is truly king in whom Dharma is present.

In the section LXVIII, the epic adds, that

"the world which depends upon agriculture and trade is protected by the dutiful king." (72)

Manu's statements are more pointed :

"A king must protect the Universe; for when the living beings were scattered about, in mutual fear in a state of kinglessness, the Lord created the king for the protection of the creation"...The man who in folly hates the king will surely perish. ...Let no man transgress the commands of the King...Let no man transgress the commands of the King...For the king's sake the Supreme Being created His own son, Danda, from Brahma's glory—Danda—of Dharma." (73)

Sukra makes the King, "The very maker of the age":

"The King is the cause of setting on foot, of the customs, usages and movements and hence is the cause or maker of time." (74) The Epic and the Manu Samhita, attach the same importance to kingship.

"Through the behaviour of kings, the four Yugas—Satya, Treta, Dvapara, and Kali—take their birth. The king is the very likeness of the Yuga." (75)

This exalted idea of the institution of kingship, is to be under-



stood in the light of the conception of the king's Svadharma, as embodying a code of duties which the King must observe. For a just discharge of the heavy responsibilities entrusted to him, the King was to be thoroughly educated and trained in the art of government. The high degree of knowledge, skill and attainment, he was expected to possess, may be seen from elaborate scheme of education prescribed for a prince. The Ideal Hindu King was, certainly to be the Philosopher-king of Plato. He was to be well-versed in the knowledge of the Trayi, Anvikshaki, Varta and Danda-niti. Besides these, he must be acquainted with Itihasa, which included a number of other topics besides Dharmasastra and the Arthasastra. He had further to acquire proficiency in the military art, which again included various other minor branches, within its comprehensive scope. Such was the code of training, which equipped the king for carrying out the enormous duties. (76) Again how completely, he had to dedicate himself to the affairs of the State, becomes evident, from a glance at the Royal time-table. (77) As a part of his Svadharma, he had various other duties both personal and public. His personal duties however need not detain us here.

The ideal of his public duty is more important for our purpose. Kautilya emphasises the Svadharma of the king, as his imperative duty. The reward thereof is the realisation of the "Summum bonum". Naturally enough then, the king who fulfils his Svadharma, by keeping the people in the path of Dharma—"never allowing them to swerve from their own duties,—attains, too, the region of bli-s" (78). In fact this leads to the kingly idealization, which identifies the good of the king with the happiness of the subjects.

"In the happiness of the people lies his happiness; in their welfare his welfare; whatever pleases himself he shall not consider as good, but whatever pleases his subjects, he shall consider good". (79) In fact, with this ideal of kingship, the Hindu thinkers arrived at a proposition, that a 'just ruler' and the 'king' are naturally



convertible terms, and that a 'bad' king was a verbal contradiction. (80) It is this idea that the Mahabharata gives as: "That king who does not protect the kingdom is truly a thief. That king who after giving assurances of protection, does not from rapacity, fulfil them—that ruler of sinful soul—takes upon himself the sins of all his subjects and ultimately sinks into hell". (81) Sukra, from the same point of view, emphasises the idea of the "Satvika King" as the only true king. While, the "rajasika" king, gets the condition of lower animals or immovable things after death and the "Tamasika" gets hell after death. The only true sovereign, according to the Hindu ideal, then, is the personification of the sovereignty of Right-Law—essentially reasonable, enlightened, just and impartial, and superior to all individual wills, and which in virtue of this title has a right to govern them. The exercise of sovereignty, is thus fundamentally a moral function. It is this conception of the king as the personification of the sovereignty of Right, that makes the Hindu thinkers, exalt the position of the king as the very image of god on earth. The sovereign authority derives its very nature from the sovereign Law of Dharma.

The conception of legal sovereignty, therefore, is essentially related to the moral idea which forms its very basis and "raison d'être". The moral principle is the principle of Dharma, the operative criticism that runs through the society as a whole, the fundamental principle underlying the whole moral and physical universe. The State itself is subject to this Law, which is the absolute sovereign. The sovereign of the king is Dharma. But this does not imply in the least, as some of our scholars are led to believe, that the sovereignty of the king was 'limited' or 'constitutional'. The position of the king in the organization of the Hindu State, was rather that of an absolute king. As the supreme authority in the State, a vast complex of powers was concentrated in him. He was the Supreme Executive, the Supreme Judge, the final Court of Appeal in the

State. The various parts of the government machinery, the Sabha or Samiti, the later Mantri-Parisad, and the Purohit could hardly constitute, 'legal' or 'constitutional' checks on his authority. In fact, all authority originated from him as the embodiment of the sovereign principle of the State. (82) The only checks that could operate, were of the character of the internal limits to the exercise of sovereignty arising from the nature of the sovereign power itself. But these are no 'constitutional' checks as operating from outside, on the king's authority. Again, the spiritual penalties for default imposed upon the king, may operate as moral checks on the exercise of his authority, but they can hardly be equated with the legal 'limitations.' (83) In the legal sense, the king was the ultimate sovereign, recognising no external limitations on his authority. The inner limitations, which arose from the Law itself, therefore, are never inconsistent with the exercise of the sovereign powers by the king. However, under a theory of a decentralised state the monarch though legally absolute could hardly be autocratic like the despotic or dictatorial regimes of ancient and modern times.

Again, in the sphere of law, the State as the embodiment of the sovereign principle of Dharma, represented the ultimate authority. The function of the sovereign in the Hindu State, was not to create laws, "ex nihilo", but to exercise this sovereign function, by being the mouthpiece of final and authoritative pronouncements of the rules of conduct, which are to be called laws. It is true that a vast body of rules, originating from numerous sources, regulated the life of the family, castes, guilds and corporations. (84) But at the same time, it should be noted that these rules derive their validity and sanction, from the fact, that the State set its imprimature of legal force, by recognising them as such, and accepting to maintain those obligations. In a strictly jural sense, no legal obligations could be enforced except those recognised by the State. The supreme duty of the king being the maintenance of the Svadharma, of the



various individuals, groups and associations, the sovereign authority was thus definitely related to the prevailing notions of right and wrong, as determined by the ultimate principle of Dharma. This ultimate principle of integration was represented by the State, which was founded on this very principle. It alone could authoritatively state custom; and the king, as representing the authority of the State, exercised this sovereign prerogative of choice, to pronounce what is law and what is not law, as between the contending groups and interests. He thus represented the supreme unified legal authority embracing the whole community. The law proper, knew no higher authority than the king, and no interpretation except that of the royal judges. It is true that the legislative function of the sovereign was largely limited in Ancient India. But this is not a limitation on the sovereignty of the State. Here again, the province of law is to be explained by the static nature of the law in early times. However this legislative function was not beyond the purview of the State.(85) Both Manu and Yajnavalkya, certainly recognise, the legislative authority of the King. We may, therefore, conclude, that even in the sphere of law, the authority of the king was final because he was the supreme upholder of Dharma, the Sovereign Principle.

To conclude, then, we have examined in this article the nature of the sovereign Principle and the conception of sovereignty as resulting from it. The end of the State is to maintain Dharma. In its absolute sense, Dharma, is the supreme principle sustaining and governing the whole universe. The moral life of man, here is to be lived in obedience to the self-same divine order of Dharma. The ultimate end of existence is the realisation of this Dharma... often equated with Brahman—the achievement of Moksha or deliverance. In the empirical life, this absolute principle is equated with the principle of Svadharma, in accordance to which the individual must pass through the ethical discipline, prescribed for his station in life.



Here, then emerges the conception of State-Sovereignty. The Sovereignty of the State is founded on the idea, that it is the guardian of the whole moral order of Dharma. Dharma is the basis of the State; and the State exists in order to sustain and enforce this law in full vigour. In fact, Dharma is the very '*raison d'être*' of the State.

The supreme function of sovereignty is to protect the people, and provide the necessary conditions for the fulfilment of the Svadharma of the various classes and orders. This sovereign function, therefore, necessarily involved the right to coerce. The supreme authority in the State, the King, whom we may in the Austinian sense call "the determinate superior", is the embodiment of the sole coercive authority of the State. The State, represented by the King, is sovereign, in the strictly legal sense, both internally and externally. But, as we have pointed out, this conception of sovereignty is definitely linked up with the moral idea, which determines his will and inspires his acts. The sanction behind his authority is the sanction of Dharma. It is founded on the assertion, that the ultimate moving-force which inspires political action is a spiritual force.

The idea of State-sovereignty so conceived, in its fuller sense is not a political mechanism using force, but a general organization and synthesis of life, which includes and co-relates all other organizations. It is an institution of institutions, embracing the whole field of life. In one sense, it is the operative criticism running through the whole organization, adjusting and co-ordinating, in the light of the central conception of Dharma, the institutions which it contains, and reducing them by such criticism to an ordered and graded system. All other institutions, groups and associations as the partial expressions, of the aspects of Dharma, are thus definitely brought under the sovereign authority of the State. It may again, be viewed as the driving-wheel supplying the motive power to the system—as

a 'force invigorating by a constant authoritative suggestion and a vigilance over the duties of every member and every institution'. We hold that such a conception of sovereignty which lies at the core of the Hindu political thought, certainly contains, elements of permanent value and significance.

The sovereignty of the State, as Dr. Bosanquet would put it, is a feature inherent in the genuine whole with its complex of social institutions, which make up the web of the social world. It is, by its very definition, the ideality of all parts of the Community, trade and religious corporations, being the very stuff out of which the State is made. The conception of the Sovereign State is not incompatible with the recognition of the manifold activities of man in his diverse relationships. Each group may live its free spontaneous life, but it must be within the limits of its existence as a group. As Figgis insists, it should foster loyalty to the great 'Society of Societies', which we call the State. The Hindus, as we have seen, worked out a remarkable theory of a decentralised State consistent with the adequate role of the State as a synthesising force maintaining a just equipoise, balance and harmony in the working of the whole. The State according to them was never an absolute Leviathan of the Western tradition, which ignored the individual, nay even crushed his personality, but it was an organised whole which made possible for him a fuller realisation of life. It was a means to an end, never an end in itself. The true State must gather up and synthesize every interest within itself. It is sovereign in as much as it has the power of creating one in which all are. The State must objectify the totality of social purposes. A purely legal conception of sovereignty would fail to explain the psychological and moral basis on which authority ultimately rests. It is only when we view it, as the Hindu thinkers did, as an expression or an embodiment of 'a moral purpose' or what Green calls a 'general will', that we may come to realise the true value of the theory of Sovereignty.

## REFERENCES

- (1) Hetherington and Muirhead, 'Social Purpose', P. 90.
- (2) Aristotle, Politics, l. i. (3) Barker, Political Thought from Spencer to To-day, P. 63. (4) Santi-Parva, Sec XV; see my article, 'Was Hindu State Pluralistic?' 'The Indian Journal of Political Science,' Vol. III. No. 3.
- (5) P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, Vol I; Jolly, Hindu Law and Custom, P. vii. (6) Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, P. 79. (7) Rig-veda, BK. I, Hymn 24; BK. IV, Hymn 23. (8) Cf: Bryce, 'Studies in History and Jurisprudence' Vol II, P. 115. (9) Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Pp. 73-74; (10) Rig-Veda, BK. 1. 2. (11) Cf: Ragozin, Vedic India, 'The Concept of Rta'; (12) Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, P. 77 (13) Keith, 'Religion and Philosophy of the Veda,' Vol. I, P. 247; Rig-veda BK. X, 10. (14) Rig Veda, BK. VII, 104; BK. V. 85 (15) Pal. 'The Hindu Philosophy of Law, P. 102, (16) Keith, 'Religion and Philosophy of the Veda,' P. 249. (17) Rig-Veda, BK I, hymns 41, 68. (18) Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 1-4-44.
- (19) Ibid, 1-5-11. (20) Cf: Bryce, "Studies in History and Jurisprudence."

### XI The Law of Nature," P. 117.

"For as in the Universe at large the general tendency of things and that which makes their harmony is thought of not merely as a fact, but also as a principle or pervading force, not merely as the sum total of the phenomena, but also as a power ruling the phenomena, so when a similar canon is applied by analogy to man this power is founded in Reason. And, the recognition of reason as the harmonizing principle in man causes Nature, the force which gives to all things their shape and character, to be conceived of as an intelligent force moulding phenomena upon settled lines to definite ends."



- (21) Brihadaranyaka Upanishads. 1. 4-11-15.  
 (22) 'Central Concept of Buddhism,' P. 73-75.  
 (23) Samyutta Nikaya (P. T. S.) Vol. V., P. 389-90.  
 (24) Buddhism, P. 35 (H. U. L.)  
 (25) Keith 'Religion and Philosophy of the Veda', P. 550.  
 (26) Santi Parva, CLXVII. 3-5-10 and 24.  
 (27) Santi Parva CLXVII, 7, 8.  
 (28) Ibid, CLXVII 28; 35, 37.
- (29) Manu, 11, 224. (30) Dr. N. A. Thoothi, 'The Vaishnavas of Gujarat' P. 40. (31) Refer, 'Apno Dharma' by Dr. A. B. Dhruva, Ed. by Prof. R. V. Pathak. 'Purushartha', P. 48-55. (32) Dr. N. A. Thoothi, 'The Vaishnavas of Gujarat' P. 53. Also refer 'Apno Dharma' P. 41-47.
- (33) S'anti Parva, 11-15. Manu, VI, 89. (34) 'Hindn Social Institutions' by P. H. Valavalkar, P. 86.  
 (35) Cf : Prof. James Seth, "Ethical Principles", P. 260.  
 (36) Aldous Huxley, 'Ends and Means,' P. 3-4.
- (37) N. K. Dutt, 'The Origin and Growth of Caste in India, P. 3. Manu, X. 12, Yaj. i, 90-94; Senart, Caste in India, Vol I. P. 60-63; 68-69. (38) The Inequality of Man and other Essays, P. 23. (39) N. K. Dutt, 'Origin and Growth of Caste in India, Vol I, P. 60-63; 68-69. (49). Manu, 1. 88; X. 1-5; Vas. I. 14. S'anti-Parva LX. 8-29; (41) Manu, VI. 92; Yaj. V. 122; Santi Parva LX. 7. Refer, S. K. Maitra 'The Ethics of the Hindus.' P. 20-25. (42) Manu, X 81-89; Yaj iii, 32-39. (14) Vana-parva, 180-26; (44) Bhagvad-Gita, ii. 45; xiv. 5. (46) Hindu Social Institutions, P. 342. (47) Roscoe Pound, 'Interpretations of Legal History', P. 5. (48) V. A. Thoothi, The Vaishnavas of Gujarat, P. 55. (49) Bhagvad-Gita, xviii, 47. (50) Manu, X. 27. (61) Arthasastra, Bk. i. Ch. 3. (52) Ethical Studies, "My Station and its Duties." (53) Barker, "Greek Political Theory", P.

Plato constructs his ideal State on the basis of the Pythagoreans. One of their doctrines was the doctrine of the three classes, lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, and lovers of wealth; this doctrine implied a correlative doctrine of the three vital aspects of the human soul; viz., Rational, Spiritual and the Appetitive. Applied to the theory of the State, it means specialisation of functions and mutual interdependence.

- (54) "The Vashnavas of Gujarat", P. 63. (55) Sen Gupta, Sources of Law and Society in Ancient India, P. 36.
- (56) Cf: Barker, 'Greek Political Theory'; P. 62.
- (57) Refer Santi-Parva, LXVIII, 13-31; LXVII, 16-17.
- (58) Santi Parva LXVII. 3. (59) Santi-Parva. LVI. 3-5. Arthasastra, BK. I. CH. 2. (60) J. N. C. Ganguly, Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. II. P. 575.
- (61) Refer, Banerjee, Public Administration in Ancient India, P. 79. Bandopadhyaya, N. C. 'Kautilya', P. 59. (62) Beni Prasad, 'The State in Ancient India,' P. 98. (63) Manu, VIII. 41. (64) Refer Yaj. I. 361, Narad, X. 2-3; 5-6; Arthasastra, Bk. II, Ch VII; Bk. III. Ch. XIV; Bk. IX. Ch. I. (65) Cf: My article, 'Was the Hindu State Pluralistic?' The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. iii No. 3. (66) Guizot, 'History of Civilisation in Europe', P. 163. (67) J. N. C. Ganguly, 'The Indian Historical Quarterly' Vol. II. 822. (68) Sukra-Niti. I. 50-51; Manu, VIII. 335.
- (69) S'anti Parva LX. 18. (70) Santi Parva, LVII. 15.
- (71) Refer, Barker's Introduction to "Some Great Mediaval Thinkers", P. 15; also Gierke, "Political Theories of the Middle Ages", P. 30-37, However it should be pointed out that in the Middle Ages, the idea of Monarchy was moulded by the struggle between the Church and the State which is strikingly absent in the Hindu Political thought.
- (72) Rajdharmanusasana, LXVIII. 90 and 68.

- (73) Manu, VII-3-4. (74) Sukra Ch. I 43-44. (75) Rajdharamanusasana 91, Manu, IX. 301. (76) Refer, Kautilya, Polity, P. 70.-74. (77) Manu, VIII, 14. 16; Yaj. I. 327-33; Arthasastra, Bk. I Ch XIX. (78) Arthasastra Bk. i, Ch. III also Cf : Santi-Parva Sec. XVIII.
- (79) Arthasastra Bk. I. Ch XIX. (80) Refer K. V. R. Aiyanger in the Sir Asutosh Memorial Volume, P. 178, Part I.
- (81) Guizot, History of Civilisation, P. 163. (82) Santi Parva XC 4-6, 10-16, XCII. 6-19. Beni Prasad, The State in Ancient India, P. 138. 159; Fick, Social Organisation, P. 99; Arthasastra Bk. III, Ch. I. Ch. III; Bandopadhyaya P. 74. Narad I. 40; Yaj. I. 7; Manu VII. 13. (83) Cf : G. Sarkar's Hindu Law of Adoption, P. 78 K. V. R. Aiyanger, Sir Asutosh Memorial Volume, P. 180.
- (84) Manu. I. 118; 11-6-18; VIII. 341.
- (85) Refer Manu VIII. 335; Rajadharmanusasana 61; Apad-Dharma Parva 143; Narada I. 2; XVII. 24. Brihaspati 11-27; Sukra Niti, Ch. I. 27-28; 50-51.

## SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

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IT need not be supposed that language began with the human origins in the evolution of the animal world! Special investigations among the sub-human primates-baboons, chimpanzees, orangutan and other apes—indicate that the beginnings of language and of speech were prehuman. These animals make a variety of sounds and gestures, relative to a variety of situations—the vocal expressions of a variety of emotions by ejaculations, moaning, groaning, roaring, weeping, humming, and gestures like the facial grimaces etc. These sound-utterances, in particular, have been distinguishable and



List of Errors in Dr. Valavalkar's article on  
"SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE"

- P. 102, l. 19, *Read* Valavalkar *instead of* Valvalkar  
 „ l. 23, *Insert* a long dash *after* "primates"
- P. 103, l. 7, *Read* "past" *instead of* past  
 „ l. 8, „ "future" „ „ future  
 „ l. 21, *Insert* a long dash *after* theory,  
 „ l. 24, *Read* "rustling" of leaves *instead of* "rustling" of birds.  
 „ l. 26, „ the act „ „ its act.  
 „ l. 28, „ Ed. by „ „ Rd., by
- P. 104, l. 7, „ says that „ „ says the  
 „ l. 22, „ the reasons „ „ reasons.  
 „ l. 22, „ vocal sounds  
 originally came „ „ vocal sounds came.
- P. 105, l. 9, „ limbs, namely, *instead of* limbs; which is.  
 „ l. 18, „ babble-luck „ „ abble-luck.  
 „ l. 31, „ U. S. Office of „ „ lb. 5 office or
- P. 106, l. 3, *Insert* comma *after* individuals.  
 „ l. 7. *Read* communication for that particular group.  
*instead of* communication.  
 „ l. 16, *Read* And, Thorndike himself, *instead of* Even  
 Thorndike,  
 „ l. 27, „ and each one of these „ „ and these.  
 „ l. 28, *Drop* each
- P. 107 l. 14, *Read* different *instead of* different  
 „ l. 15, „ see if any light „ „ see light  
 „ l. 16, „ language : „ „ language.  
 „ l. 31, „ *Our* „ „ *Onr*

P. 108, l. 9,	„	minutes	„	„	minuies
„ l. 12,	„	from childhood	„	„	from the childhood
„ l. 19,	„	slightest	„	„	smallest
P. 109, l. 9,	„	A mere "yes"	„	„	"yes"
„ ll. 10-11	„	from agreement at one end to resentment at the other. <sup>11</sup>	<i>instead of</i> from agreement.		
„ l. 15,	„	tonal quality,	<i>instead of</i> tonal quality;—		
„ Footnote,	„	quoted by Britt in :	<i>instead of</i> quoted by Britton.		
P. 110, l. 8,	<i>Read</i>	as follows	„	<i>instead of</i>	as followed :
„ l. 11,	„	emotionally,firm	„	„	emotionally firm,
„ l. 16,	„	palate	„	„	plate.
„ l. 18,	„	maintenance of life	„	„	maintenance of their life
„ Footnote 12,	„	Thouless	„	„	Thonless
P.111, Footnote 14,	„	D. Mccarthy	„	„	D. Mc charthy.
P. 115, l. 10,	„	Declaration	„	„	declaration.
P. 116, l. 29,	„	embedded	„	„	embeded

analyzable in terms of means used for communicating messages or intentions.<sup>1</sup>

Yet, it may be safely asserted that the animal language—sounds, gestures or whatever other form that language may take—does not extend beyond mere communication of the immediately present situation, intention or condition. The privilege of being able to use language as a means to communicate the present as well as the past and the future intentions or situations belongs to the human being, of all animals. Indeed, he can further claim the ability to communicate situations which actually never belonged and may never belong in future to any part of space or time—purely imaginary situations, as in fiction, stories, not to speak of open “bluffs” and “lies”! This peculiar feature of human language of communication between past, present and future events, gives it the special capability of accumulating the customs, traditions, culture, thought and ideas, of transferring them from man to man and from generation to generation and from one part of the world to another.

Several theories have been put forward regarding the origins of human speech.

The German philosopher Herder proposed the *Onomatopoeic* theory,—nicknamed by Max-Muller the “*bow-wow*” theory—according to which words of human speech arose in imitation of the characteristic sounds of nature or of animals. For instance: the *bow-wow* of dogs; *mew* of cats; “*twitter*” of birds; “*rustling*” of birds; *splash* of water; *hiss* of escaping steam or of a snake; etc. The imitated word became either a symbol for the object or its act.

1. Alverdes, F.: “The Behaviour of Mammalian Herds and Packs,” in **A Hand. book of Social Psychology**, Ed. by C. Murchison, Yerkes, R. M. & Yerkes, A. W.: “Social Behaviour in Supra-human Primates.” *ibid* Esper, E. A.: “Language”, *ibid* Kellogg, W. N. & Kellogg, L. A. **The Ape and the Child**. Zuckerman, S.: **The Social life of Monkeys and Apes**.



According to the *Interjectional* or the *pooh-pooh* theory, words originated with interjections, with the instinctive utterances which are the sudden vocal reactions evoked on experiencing intense sensations or feelings, like pleasure, pain, grief, surprise, dread, etc. For instance : *Oh ! Ah ! Pshaw ! Whew !* etc.

The *Pathognomic*, also called the *Nativistic* or the *Natural Ringing* theory, and nicknamed the *ding-dong* theory says the words arose originally in expression of sense in harmony with the sounds ( not imitations of sounds, as in *pooh pooh* theory). For instance : *zig-zag; buzz; etc.*

The *yo-he-ho* theory suggests that words originated in rhythmic vocalizations in tune with the natural phonetic accompaniments of the acts performed in groups, as for instance, in rowing or pulling loads or on festive occasions or in fighting e.g., words like *heae; haul; hack; ta-ra-ra-boom-de-ay; etc.* This theory lays stress on the cooperative or the social nature and conduct of human being.

None of these theories seems to give a satisfactory and complete account of *all* speech and language. Though, however, each one of them gives some explanation of the origins and development of some of the words and sounds used by human speech. And, of course, even though each of them tries to explain away some vocal sounds, none explains reasons why and how vocal sounds came to be used at all, and how they attained their present highly symbolic value.

Sir Richard Paget puts forward a theory<sup>2</sup> to explain the reasons why and how vocal sounds first came to be used by man. His theory is a *gesture-theory* of language, which has been called the *ta-ta* theory : According to it, the earliest means of communication consisted of gestures of the various limbs,—of hands, arms, head,

2. Paget, R. : **Humans Speech.**

eyes etc. But, man must have soon found out that there were occasions when these limbs, especially the hands, were engaged in doing some work (cutting wood, or attacking enemy), while at the same time he felt the need also of communicating with his fellow man near about. At such a juncture, man must have discovered that the voice, aided by the gesture-movement of the tongue similar to those of the hands or arms, could do the job, while the hand or the arm is engaged. Besides, he must have also discovered the disability of the gestures of other limbs; which is that they are not useful for communication in the dark, or at a distance out of sight. This must have led to the substitution of vocal language in the place of pure gesture language. Yet, the vocal language was not completely independent of the gestures; for instance, while saying *ta-ta*, the tongue made the same gesture as the hand would make with the same purpose, but instead of the hand wagging, it was the tongue that was wagging!

The psychologist Thorndike has recently proposed a new theory, the *abble-luck* theory: He objects that all the previous theories of language have minimized the value of words as symbols in guiding one's own behaviour, even before they are useful for communication!<sup>3</sup> Human beings live in groups; and a group lives together reasonably continuously, having common environmental objects, making many hand movements, prattling, etc. A person living in such a group would have a memory image or idea of persons, objects and acts. Now, if *by chance*, a certain sound became somehow associated with experiencing a certain object or act and having an idea of that object or act, the person would have a beginning of a language. Thorndike believes that it is highly probable that such associative connections would be first made by an intelligent individual or

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3. Thorndike, E. L.: *Science*, 98, 1943 (As reported in the *Psychology Newsletter* No. 14, published by the Ib. 5 office of War Information. The original Number of *Science* is not available here for first-hand study by the writer.)

individuals in a group. But so far, the connected sounds might have been used by these individuals for their personal guidance, not so much for communication to others. However, other individuals on observing such persons of better brains making use of specific sounds in connection with specific objects, acts or events, may follow them in repeating those sounds for the same things, and thus, the sounds may become the language of communication. The force of the need for cooperative behaviour also aids to accelerate this process of language formation.

This theory of Thorndike also, like the *bow-wow*, the *ding-dong*, the *pooh-pooh*, and the *yo-he-he* theories which he criticizes, does not seem to give a satisfactory and complete account of the origin of *all* language and words. Besides, that verbal symbols should possess a primary value for self-guidance than as means for communication to others does not appear to be an adequate interpretation of language-behaviour. Even Thorndike, with all this explanation of self-guidance, assumes the necessity of a group-life *prior* to the use of sounds or words with some meaning.

However, there is no harm in accepting all these theories together as due explanations of the origin and nature of whatever part of language each one of them can afford. Particularly, the *Onomatopoeic* theory, discredited by Max Müller in derisive language, does afford a plausible explanation of the origin of an immensely large number of words than may appear at first sight. So many sounds and words characteristic of phenomena, of creatures or of their actions, so many nouns (denoting objects) and verbs (denoting actions), have originated in echoic imitations; and these echoic words have further been so fertile each as to give rise to numerous other derivations. Jespersen gives several illustrations of such words, especially in the English language.<sup>4</sup> The American anthropologist, Franz Boas, points out that such formation of new words

4. Jespersen, O. : *Language*-Ch. XX, "Sound Symbolism", pp. 397-411.



by sound imitation is "a very live process" even amongst the primitive dialects of today—that of the Chinook, an American Indian language spoken at the mouth of the Columbia River (e.g., *he-he* to laugh; *ho-ko* to cough; *hunn* to smell; etc.), and also in many Bantu dialects of South Africa.<sup>5</sup>

And yet, though we may be quite conscious of the fact that speech is probably the greatest achievement of Man, "the one thing that raised him from the level of the beast, that made him little lower than the angels,"<sup>6</sup> we have at the same time also to admit that its origins remain a complete mystery to most of us, and a baffling mystery even to the great struggling specialists of the subject.

Let us therefore try to understand this phenomena of "language" from different other aspects rather than from the side of its primitive origins, and see light is possible in this way into the problem of language.

According to the particular sense-organ directly involved in its reception, language may be said to be chiefly of two types: Eye-Language and Ear-Language.

Eye-Language, again, may be of various sorts—of gestures, pictures, graphic representations, the written and printed language, flag-signalling, and so forth. Movements of arms, legs, facial grimaces and distortions like those in a frown or a smile, finger-movements, etc., may be used to convey what is in one's mind to another. Gesture-language is not only found current among the sub-human and the primitive man; it is also current, in some form or other, in the most civilized people of today. Its particular expression and implication are determined by the culture and tradition of the specific group to which one belongs. Thus, to the European, raising

5. Boas, F.: *General Anthropology*, P. 132.

6. James A. Lloyd: *Our Spoken Language*.

the right arm and nearly touching the forehead by the fingers is supposed to express one's respectful greetings to another on meeting him; but the same action, in the Hindu's view, is supposed to express his regret and sorrow when some piece of bad luck has befallen to him; he expresses greetings to another by joining both the palms and raising them up. Among the Andaman Islanders, two friends or relatives meeting each other after a long separation, greet each other by sitting down one on the lap of the other, with their arms around each other's necks, weeping and wailing for a few minutes.<sup>7</sup> Again, the Westerner finds it natural to stand up in the presence of a superior to show respect as he is trained to do so by his custom from the childhood; but the Fijians and Tongans sit down under similar circumstances.<sup>8</sup> The inhabitants of the Friendly Islands take off their clothes as a mark of respect<sup>9</sup>. Japanese children are taught to smile as a social duty in the same way as they are taught to bow or prostrate themselves. The Europeans and Americans deride the Japanese smile as insincere; but the Japanese, on their part, are much surprised that the Europeans and Americans should so clearly indicate, on their faces, without even the smallest attempt to hide, the irritations within their minds ! They feel that the Europeans and Americans are sadly lacking good manners !<sup>10</sup>

Ear-language consists principally of vocal expressions of speech, though the sounds of drums, horns, etc., used by the primitive, of the bugle, or of the bell in the college or the church, is also a kind of ear-language. In speech, we no doubt use words as symbols to convey meaning; but speech is more than mere word forms. The use of a variety of intonations and accentuations may put different meanings on the same verbal symbol or group of symbols. These intonations and accentuations, or "melodies" of speech, not only serve as a device to convey the emotional attitudes, the joy, the eagerness, the indifference, the sarcasm, the contempt, the willingness,

7, 8, 9, 10, Klineberg. O ; *Race Differences*, pp. 283-87

the unwillingness, the anger, the friendly feeling, the confidence, etc. of the speaker to the listener; but, they further serve as a device to put even incompatible and contradictory meanings upon the same words or sentences, such as no dictionary can possibly give them! And, such implications of these verbal symbols cannot be properly represented by the eye-language itself!

Thus, such simple words like "yes" and "no" may be made to possess quite different meanings according to the manner in which they are uttered. "Yes" does not mean the same thing as "y-e-e-s!" In fact, it may be used to express so many shades of meaning, from agreement.<sup>11</sup> A sentence like the following:

"The study of Mathematics is not supposed to communicate a knowledge of many useful facts,"—may be made to imply, when spoken out, by emphasizing the word *supposed*, with proper tonal quality;—that it actually does so, although it is not supposed to do so; by accentuating the word *many*—that it does so but only in few cases; by accentuating the word *useful*,—that, on the contrary, it communicates a knowledge of many useless facts; by accentuating the word *Mathematics* and indicating a little surprise in the tone,—that mathematics, of all subjects, if any, must doubtless be able to communicate useful knowledge; and this last meaning is exactly the *opposite* of what the words of the sentence, as simply printed or written, would convey! In Marāthi, for instance, the word *shāhanā* may imply its dictionary meaning *wise*, or its opposite *fool* (which latter will never be found in the dictionary!), depending upon the accentuation of the speaker.

Though accentuation and intonation go a long way in thus giving an emotional colour to the words or sentences and consequently altering their plain significance they are not the only device for the task. Certain words themselves, though originally possessing

11, Judd, C. *The Psychology of Social Institution* quoted by Britten *The Social Psychology of Modern Life*.



plain meaning, come to be used with emotional significance in every language. The plain straightforward meaning of a word may be called its "objective" meaning, as contrasted with its "emotional" meaning. The words *spirit* and *mentality* objectively mean the same thing; but the former is used with approval, the latter with contempt. The *spirit* of our political party is contrasted with the *mentality* of the opponents' party. And, the word *firm*, it is said, can be declined as followed: I am *firm*, thou art *obstinate*, he is *pig-headed*. Though all these three words possess the same objective meaning, i.e., following one's own course of action and refusing to be influenced by other people's opinions, yet, emotionally *firm*, implies a strong approval, *obstinate* implies a mild disapproval, *pig-headed* implies a strong disapproval!<sup>12</sup>

The organs which play their part in producing voice or speech are the lungs, the diaphragm, the larynx, the throat, the mouth, the tongue, the plate, the teeth, the lips, the nose, and the abdominal muscles. Now, most animals possess these organs, and their primary function is maintenance of their life. However, it is only in man that they co-operate in producing speech, with all its tonal qualities. For this special purpose, the larynx is particularly evolved in a peculiar way in the human being. Indeed, Dr. Negus, an authority on the mechanism of speech, feels confident enough to assert: "There is no doubt in my mind that many of the steps by which man evolved can be traced accurately from the evidence of the larynx...In the larynx, an organ has been evolved particularly by arboreal animals to subserve the functions of locomotion, prehension, suspension, hugging, and so on...and, by the various modifications brought in, an instrument has been provided, capable of use for sound production in a highly efficient form."<sup>13</sup>

All these organs help to give the spoken words their meanings

12. Thonless, R. H. : *Straight and Crooked Thinking*.

13. Negus, E. V. : *The Mechanism of the Larynx*.

through intonations in such a way, that even though it may be possible to represent the ear-language by symbols of the eye-language, (written words) yet the peculiar implications due to tonal quality are hard and sometimes impossible to be thus represented. The comma, the apostrophe, the mark of interrogation, of exclamation—one, two, or three—, italicizing in the midst of roman characters, etc., are devices used to represent such implications; but with a partial success.

The impulse to produce vocal sound seems to be due to the movements of the larynx. The tongue by its muscular movements further aids the sounds by controlling their differentiations in a variety of ways. However, the tongue itself is not directly responsible for producing sounds. Yet, the movement of the tongue during the production of words is so easily and directly noticeable, that its importance was the first to be realized by man. And hence it is that the word "tongue" has come to signify "language" itself.

It would be interesting to examine how the speech trick dawns first upon the human infant. The child, on birth, cries, whimpers, whines, as also it makes several movements of hands, arms, legs, face, etc. The birth-cry and some movements of the arms and legs are in fact the first responses of the new-born infant. But the birth-cry is just a reflex action without any emotional or intellectual meaning attached to it. It is due to the air being rapidly drawn out through the vocal chords, and therefore supplies the blood with fresh oxygen.<sup>14</sup>

However, all such sounds and body-movements of the infant are on the level of reflex action; it is not yet *aware* or conscious of these as its own. As it grows, it gradually becomes aware of its

14. Blanton, S. & Blanton, M. G. "Child Guidance"—quoted by D. Mc Charthy, "Language Development", in *A handbook of Child Psychology*, Ed. by C. Murchison.

noises and movements as *its* own; it comes to know that *it* can stop the noises, and can produce them again. By and by, it utters more regulated sounds, babbles, prattles, seems to be able to control the noises, and seems to be *aware* also of the ability to control them. It even takes delight in producing different sounds and hearing them—like *a-a-a-a-a*, *o-i-i-i-y-e*, or *m-m-ma-ma*, or *b-b-ba-ba*, *d-d-da-da*, etc. The adults near about, especially the mother, join it in repeating the same baby bounds, and the child responds again. The first definite words of the human child in any language seem to be some such words like *māmā*, *bābā*, or *pāpā*, or *oiye*, or similar ones with some variations in these groupings of vowels and consonents, because they are the easiest to pronounce. However, for the child itself, these “words” do not possess any meaning. It does not associate any particular ideas or objects with any particular words, to begin with. They are just empty utterances for it. The specific meanings put upon them in the different languages are derived by the child from the adult human attendants around it. They initiate the child to understand specific objects and specific ideas by certain words, by actually tutoring it and also by the example of their own behaviour which the child imitates.

Thus, whenever the child utters the sounds *m-m-ma-ma* or *o-i-y-e*, a particular person may be pointed out to her, her mother, with whom the child thereafter associates the sound. The sound itself may be repeated by the adults again and again to the child so as to enable it to know the sound clearly as a definite “word”: like, *māmā*, or *oiyee* or *āiyee*.

It is therefore possible, by constant repetition of a suitable response, to make the child ascribe any particular meaning upon any particular word. J. B. Watson trained a child to mean and understand “milk-bottle” by the sound *da-da*. Whenever it uttered *da-da*, he simply gave it the milk-bottle.<sup>15</sup> In this way, it is possi-

15. *Behaviourism*, Ch. X,



ble to make a child understand the words "*idiotic scoundrel*" to mean something very commendable, by offering it nice sweets and patting it on the back followed by saying: *You idiotic scoundrel!*" on every occasion; or, to make it understand the words "*nice baby*" to mean something very hateful and abominable by punishing it and at the same time addressing it: "*You nice baby!*" A child of four, whenever she was teased by other grown-up children in the house, used to hear from her grand-mother these words: "Oh, oh, don't tease her!" So, whenever anybody started teasing her, she would herself exclaim: "Oh, Oh, don't tease *her*!" Another child, a little grown-up one, would never refer to herself as "*ten-years old*," but would insist upon the use of the expression "*ten years young*" about herself.<sup>16</sup>

Words, then, do not possess, by themselves, any meanings. As we have already noticed above, the same word may not only be used to mean a variety of implications, but even inconsistent implications. The child learns the meanings of words after the manner in which they are already understood to mean by those who are around it. It, therefore, learns or *acquires* the "mother-tongue" of the adults around it. And it could as well acquire or learn any other language with the same "naturalness" with which it learns this mother-tongue. That words by themselves are empty noises is also apparent from the fact that children often make games of improvising "new" language, as a "code" language, to be understood by members of their own particular 'fraternity' only, when they want to conceal their speech-communications from other children or from their elders! Much of the symbolic value and meaning attached to the language is derived by the child from the adults. And, the adults, on their part, have accepted the symbolic value and meaning as conventionally adopted by the community to which they belong.

However, these adult tutors of the child in the secret of using

16. Ency-Brit.

words and language are themselves often far from possessing clear understanding of the meanings of many words. Large part of their own vocabulary consists of words which are vaguely understood, of words which are little understood, and also of words which are never understood by them at all ! How many of us, for instance, can give precise significance and meaning of such words, which are too frequently used in our conversation and writing, "God", "Life", "Freedom", "Morality", "Justice", "Truth", "Race", "Labour", "Capital", "Equality", "Conscience", "Consciousness", "Mind", "Matter", "Libido", "repression", etc. ? Few would be able to state the clear and complete connotations of these, and fewer still would agree with each other. And yet, we use these and several other similar words with an apparent confidence that the speaker as well as the listener are fully conversant with their meanings. Some of us are even fond of using some of these words like "libido", "repression", "equality", "relativity", "communism", to serve as an index in the eyes of others of their acquaintance of current developments in science and social doctrine, without, of course, having tried seriously to understand precisely what they really stand for ! This is true not only of the common man but also of many of the great writers and speakers, including, sometimes, the scientists. It may, therefore, not be surprising to find that controversies based on assertions or statements between such writers or scientists are ultimately discovered to have been due to different interpretations put upon the same words or expressions by the controversialists.

Besides, the significance and interpretation of words depends to a very large extent upon the circumstances, the social setting, the emotional background, the position and status, the psychology, of the speaker and the listener. Consider the following quotation from E. Browder's *What is Communism* ( p. 21 ) :

"Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of [certain] ends, it is the right of the people...to institute a new government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing

its powers in such forms, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness...When a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce [the masses] under absolute despotism it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government and to provide new guards for their future security."

Now, to some people, these assertions would sound like dangerous and "revolutionary" doctrine, chiefly because they are supposed to have come from the mouth of a communist. But when it is disclosed that these statements are a part of the declaration of Independence of America years ago, the attitude of the same people will change towards the same passage!<sup>17</sup>

Language is a most potent and powerful socializing force. It has been fittingly termed as "The fundamental institution."<sup>18</sup> "It is difficult to see adequately the function of language," observes E. Sapir, "because it is so deeply rooted in the whole of human behaviour that it may be suspected that there is little in the functional side of our conscious behaviour in which language does not play a part."<sup>19</sup> A common language is instrumental in creating a "consciousness of kind," a fellow-feeling and also a fellow-thinking amongst men that speak it. Some have therefore gone to the length of suggesting that there should be a "universal language" common to all, which would then easily foster fellow-feeling in humanity, and would dissolve most of the conflicts and wars amongst men and men, for these are at bottom based on linguistic differences. However, this is taking an extremely optimistic and exaggerated view of the potentialities of language. For, we can notice that there are differences and conflicts even amongst peoples possessing the same common language. At the same time, there is no doubt a good bit of truth underlying this suggestion. A common language does act as a bond of solidarity.

17. From Britt, S. H. : *Social Psychology of Modern Life*.

18. Judd, C. H. : *The Psychology of Social Institutions*, Ch. X.

19. *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.



Every small social group within the large community—like the club, the college, the family,—has also its own peculiar language, so to speak. Certain special meanings or connotations put upon certain words become current amongst the members of the small group; and these are generally understood by members of the respective groups only. There is, for instance, a particular language which is commonly understood by and is peculiar to the “underworld” in America. Thus, an ordinary criminal like the pick-pocket is called by them a “short-story-writer”; while a burglar and a house-breaker are “novelists.” And, a man is not “murdered” in their language, but is “knocked off”, or “is taken for a ride,” or “is put on the spot.”<sup>20</sup> Similarly, in a family, there would be certain terms or expressions which may possess peculiar meanings such as are understood by members of that family but may not be followed by strangers.

The whole process of the child's acquisition of the “mother-tongue” is indeed a process of its progressive socialization. During this period of learning the language, it is being gradually acquainted with the system of verbal symbols which are commonly and conventionally accepted by the society to possess certain meanings. The parents and the family are the first agents on behalf of the society to perform the function of socialization of the child. Language not only brings us in contact with the thoughts, ideas and ideologies and also the ways of thinking of people around, but also of people separated by wide distances in space as well as in time, of preceding and succeeding generations. Customs, traditions and culture are transmitted through its instrumentality. It also effects intellectual communication between persons belonging to various nationalities, religions, sects, etc. The cultural heritage of a society is embeded in its language. Its knowledge and experience are also embodied in the language. The particular words and expressions indicate the knowledge and experience of several persons of several generations.

20. Britt S. H, Social Psychology of Modern Life,

The vocabulary of a language is in some respects an index of the general intellectual achievement of the people speaking that language.

Language thus helps the individual to gather together and visualize for himself all the collective experience of his community. On the other hand, it also creates new experience for him, moulds it and discovers it for him. We call certain things by certain names and adjectives because our society does so; and by and by, we feel and seem to find for ourselves that they are what we have been calling them. And this very often acts as an obstacle in the way of man's vision and impartial thinking, by clouding it by preconceived notions about things as embodied in the language.

The main function of language is of course mental communication of thoughts, ideas, desires, feelings, intentions, of facts and of situations. But, strangely enough, language is also used as an instrument to conceal these away successfully from another's knowledge. It may be used just to side-track, or to put on the wrong scent, another person as to one's own real intentions.

Besides, it may also be used when there is nothing in particular to communicate. There seems to be some pleasure attendant upon talking itself as an exercise! Children talk to themselves, while resting or playing, even meaningless words. And the adult civilized human being sometimes seems to talk to others just for the sake of talking! How often, in a circle of friends, or at the tea-table, or when two of us happen to meet in the streets, we just talk out things at random, about the weather, about things of which we know the other party is already aware, etc., without any special purpose of communicating anything in particular? Indeed, being able to use language in talking in this manner is considered to be an essential part of the "cultural equipment" of a "civilized" man!

## RELATION OF HISTORY & SOCIOLOGY

By

PROF. S. V. PUNTAMBEKAR

How are history and social sciences related to one another? Is their province and approach one or different? Is one dependent on the other? What is the nature of history and of social sciences?

History has been described and interpreted differently. Some writers like St. Augustine and Bossuet regard history as the manifestation of God's will, as a divine mystery, as a theodicy. Some like Seeley and Freeman make it a study of politics. Some like Carlyle consider it as biography of great men. Some like Lord Acton interpret it in terms of ethics, like Hegel and Croce as movement of reason or freedom, or as the manifestation of the Absolute reality, like Marx in terms of economics, and like Freud in terms of sex psychology. Some others interpret it in terms of sociology, geography, technology and ethnology. Von Ranke makes it merely a correct account of what has happened peculiarly.

Lord Acton remarked in his famous inaugural lecture on history in 1895: "Politics and history are interwoven, but are not commensurate. Ours is a domain that reaches farther than the affairs of the State. It is our function to keep in view and to command the movement of ideas which are not effect but the cause of public events." He also states that the first of human concerns is religion, the second is liberty, and their fortunes are intertwined. His dominant theme is the advance of mankind towards liberty—the divine right of free men. "The emancipation of conscience from authority is the main content of modern history."

History may be defined as the study of the facts of the whole human life in all its complexity, or of all the manifestations of man's



intellectual, emotional and material life in time and place in the past. It is a study of events, their inter-connection, causation, course and consequence, and then it is a synthesis of a complex whole of such events or facts. Thus there have been two types of historians, one who collects, records and correlates the facts of history, and the other who tries to go further and to find out the laws or science, values or philosophy of history. The province and function of the first is narrow and is purely to record correctly events after scrutinising their chronological sequence and place-value. That of the other is wider and is mainly interpretative, dealing with causation, connection, course and consequence of events.

Sociology deals with the whole web of social relationships which depend on the nature of individuals in their relations (1) to one another, (2) to the community, and (3) to the outer environment. Every social event must be traced to its source in the vital and psychical forces of individuals as moulded by the complex interaction which constitute the life of the community in contact with the outer environment. Sociology does not offer the description of a definite society at a definite moment or period, but the composite image of an universe of societies resembling one another in the rudimentary character of their organisation. It gives a synthetic view of a type of humanity. Its aim is to propound a hypothesis of a form or type of society tested by analytical and comparative methods. It does not give history of any particular society. It takes the historian to certain selected societies which it has studied as types or forms of societies and there offers him his models and forms. It does not indulge in understanding the wanderings of racial groups, the part played by individuals and by contingent factors of all kinds. It is a comparative study of forms, institutions and elements of societies. It only illumines history but does not trespass on the latter's province nor does it embrace it.

Sociology is the study of social interactions and interrelations, their conditions and consequences according to Prof. Barnes. These

are of infinite complexity and variety. Sociology however studies such social relationships as have been embodied or defined or organised in recognised forms and institutions. Thus it becomes a science of social institutions, that is, forms and modes of social relationships. It attempts to interpret organised social life as a concrete whole. The functions of sociology as stated by Barnes are :—

- (1) It seeks to elaborate a social morphology, that is, a classification of the types and forms of social relationships.
- (2) It tries to determine the relations between the different factors and aspects of social life, that is, between the economic, the political, the moral, the religious, the intellectual and social elements.
- (3) It endeavours to disentangle the fundamental conditions of social change and persistence, whether these be biological, psychological, or distinctly sociological and to relate its empirical generalisations to the more ultimate laws of life and mind. It must however be noted here that no science is concerned with values of life. So also Sociology as a science is not. It is social philosophy which deals with values, with truth of validity of ends of social life. Sociology may however deal with beliefs relating to values which may have caused efficacy in determining or influencing social change.

If we accept the materialist philosophy in the interpretation of human life where mind is regarded as matter then a science of society as well as of history can be created because matter obeys fixed laws of change and manifestation. But if we are idealistic in our interpretation of human life, where mind is not identified with matter, but is regarded as an independent entity and as a driving factor, then a science of society as well of history is not possible, because the mind factor is not as yet fully known and is not a stable or constant element. If we take both mind and matter as independent but allied forces in the interpretation of human life, then some facts which are common and general and mostly results

of material elements can be studied and organised as a science of society and history, but those facts which are unique and particular and results of mental inspiration or aspirations cannot be studied scientifically but only philosophically, that is, idealistically interpreted and valued.

History and sociology are no doubt very closely related. History gives material to sociology and ethnology, and sociology would give to history the causation of human events, the general course of human evolution, and the knowledge of human nature. Therefore any theory and methodology of history would require the help of sociology. The province of sociology and history is the same, but their task and approach are different. If we treat history as a science, then it will merge in or become subordinate to sociology. If we make it a philosophy, then it will be independent and distinct. If human thought and activity are considered the result of the process of nature, then history can become a science. But if thought is considered, according to the idealist school, the presupposition of the process of nature, it follows that history, in which thought is the characteristic and guiding force, belongs to a different order of ideas from the kingdom of nature and demands a different interpretation. But still a philosophy of history has to stand the test of historical inquiry in relation to the results achieved by other sciences or by metaphysics. History has, therefore, two aspects—one sociological, the other philosophical—which must be synthesised. We can therefore state the problem as follows:—

- (1) Is history included in the scheme of social sciences and is it merely a subsidiary to it?
- (2) Is history independent and wider than social sciences, and does sociology merely help in understanding the meaning of some of its events?
- (3) Are history and sociology, though a little different and distinct, mutually correlated and complementary to each other?



(4) Are they both totally different in their outlook and approach ?

If the course of human life can be entirely explained on the general lines of a system, then the place of history within the framework of such a system is subordinate to sociology. But if the course of human life cannot be fully explained in this way, and if it is unpredictable, unrepeatable, non-recurrent in a number of facts and aspects, history cannot be made a subordinate branch of sociology, but will be an independent branch of study.

Those, who consider sociology to be primary and history to be a subordinate study and not independent or distinct, view history as merely concerned with record and scrutiny, collation and chronology of facts. Their causation, connection, course, and consequence, their forms and interrelations are to be studied and formulated by sociology. History does merely the lower spade work and helps the higher constructive work of sociology in building up a science of human life. There are no important social facts or factors which sociology will not take note of. There are no other facts or factors besides sociological which work in history. Sociology tries to find out those forces or factors which lie behind historical facts and situations, processes and fluctuations. Thus history is denied the role of an independent intellectual discipline. It cannot be a social science by itself nor a social philosophy. It cannot find out the forces and laws behind human phenomena, their causation, connection, course and consequence, their revolutions and reformations, their great personalities and ideologies. All this can be done by sociology. The most striking fact of these sociological historians is the prevalence of a subjective attitude and the pursuance of the a' priori method on the part of the writer, in order to utilize the alleged facts of social development, to substantiate some special doctrine of his school, for example, Marx's dialectics of materialism interprets social development and all historical facts according to it. No one looks upon the development of society in an objective manner, with the avowed intention of discovering just what the nature and stages of this process have been.

The theory of a unilinear social evolution—that all people have passed through a sequence of stages more or less in the same order is wrong and not justified historically. Many features of social life, forms of property, methods of reckoning descent, the development of art, material culture and religion, could not, either taken singly or in combination, be pressed into any scheme of chronological sequences and consequences. The singularity and complexity of cultural phenomena are incompatible with the view of uniformity in social development. By contact of peoples and culture and by borrowing and appropriating alien ideas, new leaps can be made and old bonds can be broken by a people without passing through the intermediate stages. To visualise one law of causation, connection, course and consequence is utterly unhistorical, and not even sociological. Marx subordinates history to his dialectical law and ideas of materialistic sociology which are based on a rigid connection of dialectical materialism. This leads to his propounding of a universal law in sociology and history which leaves no scope for the study of the unique, the individual and the unrepeatable in history. His sociology leads to the ignoring of the individual and to the emphasizing of the socio-economic element. The progress of man and his social life, if it is partly conditioned by circumstances and environment beyond man's control, depends more and in an increasing measure on things which are within his own power—his initiative, inventiveness, his leadership. Sociology of this Marxian type is a philosophy and not a science. It is based on a priori laws of immanence and transcendence. Historians cannot give up the local and casual for the universal and causal, because they alone express and build up the universal and causal.

Those, who consider history as wider and sociology as narrower, view that all historical facts and factors are not likely to be correctly or even at all interpreted by sociology. Therefore they consider sociology as subordinate and not primary. Sociology can help in interpreting only some common and recurrent social facts, not

unique and 'non-recurrent' social facts of which historical records are full. If history is subordinated to sociology all such facts will have to be ignored. These facts cannot be covered by sociology. Sociology can only deal with the social element in history, while historical synthesis is all-inclusive. According to these thinkers there are three sorts of factors in the historical process. They are according to Henri Berr (1) contingency, (2) necessity, and (3) inner logic. The factor of contingency includes chance events, the role of the individual as individual, temporary collective moods, ethnic and geographical conditions. The factor of necessity includes the same fundamental institutions which are found everywhere. The factor of inner logic means the fundamental tendency in all life to maintain and develop itself. Historical synthesis will cover all the modes (possibilities, contingencies and necessities) and progress of human life in society. Sociology is only partial. It must restrict itself to the social elements only. It cannot cover the intellectual, aesthetic, or religious activities of man, but only the economic and juridico-political ones. Mental development is human but not strictly social. Historical synthesis takes account of the role of the creative and inventive individuals and also brings together the contingency, the necessary institution and the inner drive expressed in wants, needs and reflective volition which constitutes the logic of historical evolution. Prof. Henri Berr makes history the more inclusive of two disciplines. Some however criticise Berr's views saying that his distinction between the generally human and the distinctly social rests on a doubtful hypothesis.

Some others think that history and sociology are interdependent and complementary and their province is common but their task is separate. Sociology according to them deals with facts in abstract, that is, without reference to any particular space or time. It seeks to ascertain the general conditions of social life and change. History is concrete and deals with particular events. The study of institutions and the study of events are closely related. We cannot understand



institutions without taking into consideration the events from which they start and which accompany the changes they undergo. Thus the sociologist is primarily concerned with the discovery of general laws or tendencies of social life, while the historian is concerned with the interpretation of concrete or individual occurrences. With the help of both, history and sociology, it will be our task to find out the relation between our knowledge of particular or individual facts and our knowledge of laws based on common or general facts, and to understand correctly the standards of valuation in historical and sociological interpretation. History deals with individual occurrences or rather complexes of occurrences and their actual sequences. Sociology tries to discover laws or tendencies in the general occurrences, and their causes, courses and consequences. History and sociology in the last resort are applied psychology and deal with human nature supposedly constant, but a human nature that undergoes changes in the course of human development. The causes which affect the varying expression of human nature are to be found in material conditions which are not themselves of a psychological character and cannot be studied by the methods of psychologists.

One of the most important ways in which sociology can aid historical synthesis is in the differentiation of types of society and stages of civilisation. According to Prof. Ogburn it substitutes for the superficial chronology of history, based on the progression of dates, the dynamic concepts and processes of cultural evolution. Though the historian distinguishes between stages and eras of civilisation, the sociological point of view stresses the gradual nature of social transformation, emphasizes the continuity of history and warns against the validity of catastrophic or cataclysmic theories of social or cultural change. Sociological historian tries to discover all the elements entering and growing out of this significant process of social change and to estimate their relative importance. Thus though history and sociology deal with the whole subject matter,

history is more comprehensive and descriptive and includes both the unique and constant, and sociology is more synthetic and scientific and includes only the constant and common.

Those who emphasize the contrast or antithesis between the individual and universal regard history as concerned with unique, unrepeatable, individual wholes which cannot be studied by methods of abstraction, comparison or generalisation employed in social sciences. They consider the province of history and sociology as totally different. The German writer Troeltsch takes this view. According to him sociology in its most general and formal aspect deals with the nature and laws of social relationships as such, irrespective of their content. These social relationships are found embodied in a specific manner in each of the great spheres of culture such as religion, art, state etc. Societies may be studied as concrete entities, and a comparative study of their life, and the phases or stages of their development may be made. The historian may suggest interpretations to him but cannot do his proper work. Troeltsch regards history as dealing with the concrete and intuitive representation of individual wholes. These are not capable of interpretation in terms of separable elements in interaction. The individual is unique, original and unrepeatable, a sort of emergent not deducible from the nature of its elements in composition.

History can deal with collective entities such as classes, peoples, epochs and events like the Renaissance, Reformation, Revolution or anything that can be grasped as a whole by the historian. Each such whole, such as the Israelite people, the Hellenic culture, is a new formation whose nature cannot be explained by reference to psychology, the influence of environment or heredity or the like, but can only be intuitively appreciated. Each such whole has its own being, nature, character or essence; its own sense, mind, tendency or meaning and its own worth or unity which the historian must intuitively grasp. To understand a period is to look at it from the

mankind. With the mass or collectivity, with reasoning and generalisation, with broad synthesis and a comprehensive reconstruction of the evolution of society and civilisation the sociologist alone is concerned. Thus sociology would be irrelevant for the historian and would have little or nothing in common with history. History would be concerned with unique facts, situations and individuals in history and not with the repetitions, forces and processes which constitute the object of sociological investigation in studying the problems of social evolution. History is concerned with tracing the unique evolution of man in his activities as a social being. Therefore history cannot repeat itself and there cannot be historical laws. If we are interested in finding what past social facts have in common, and in the way in which social facts repeat themselves, if our purpose is to form generalisations or laws concerning social activities, it is not the historical method, but the logical method of natural sciences. We select facts not for their individuality or for the importance of their individuality for a complex whole, but for what each fact has in common with others, and the synthesis is not a complex unique whole, but a generalisation in which no trace of the individuality of the past social fact remains. The result is sociology and not history. The historian is interested in quality, individuality and uniqueness. The sociologist in quantity, generalisation, and repetition. History deals with 'facts of succession,' sociology with 'facts of repetition.'

The critics of this view say that only in superficial externals is any historical complex unique. In the so-called unique situations the laws and patterns of behaviour followed by men and society are in no sense unique. Only that the historian is more descriptive than the sociologist and is more interested in the individual and the concrete. The gulf which separates the sociological or interpretative historian from the historical or descriptive sociologist is not a wide one. Whether history should be chiefly concerned with the individual and literary narration, and sociology with the collectivity or scientific generalisation is not as yet a settled point.



Professor Ginsberg does not accept the view that the ultimate object of science is not the knowledge of the concrete individual but the framing of general laws. According to him generality and individuality are not mutually exclusive. It is in and through particulars that we discern the universal. Again historians and sociologists cannot exclude from their studies all reference to values. In so far as beliefs in values are possibly agents which influence human behaviour, their efficacy in relation to other factors involved in the historical process forms a legitimate and necessary part of historical synthesis and sociological generalisation. Historians cannot avoid judgments in valuation either in the selection of their data or in estimating the relative importance of the varying processes he investigates.

The view that history and sociology differ in the kind of knowledge they seek to attain does not appear to be well substantiated. The knowledge of the particular and the knowledge of the universal are inseparably intertwined. The difference between history and sociology is one merely of emphasis. The primary interest of the one is the discovery of general laws and that of the other is the reconstruction of the way in which events have actually occurred and succeeded each other. They are not concerned with the truth or validity of value-judgments. We need not argue that sociology should absorb history or history absorb sociology, nor that history and sociology are independent. We must use them both for the acquisition of knowledge concerning man, his character, type and evolution, and concerning his society, its types, nature and evolution. The study of sociology is necessary for the interpretation of historical events, but not periods. Its scientific method and comparative viewpoint is useful. Historians cannot adequately or accurately assemble or interpret the facts of history without the aid of sociology or give more attention to intellectual, social and economic history. It is necessary for a historian to understand the principles of human association and group

behaviour in general, and the genesis, nature, operation and relation of social institutions.

Sociology insists that however much must be allowed for individual initiative, human progress has been more sharply conditioned by its social setting than by any other cause operating on the life of man. It seeks to catalogue, estimate and analyse the complex influences upon social life and processes which are exerted by material and psychological, by social and individual factors. It gathers up, describes and analyses the significance of geographical, biological, psychological and economic forces as they operate to affect human group behaviour and to produce the mutations of social systems. History only records them. Sociology gives an all embracing view of the social processes. It furnishes the historian with his knowledge of the laws and principles of social behaviour and social change as tentatively formulated. History can provide sociology with invaluable genetic and comparative data. Thus there is an essential interdependence between history and sociology. They both work in the same field and have to a large extent the same aim—the study of human and social types and their evolution. The sociologist needs scientific history and its historical method. The scientific historian has need of interpretative sociology and its social hypothesis. Without some knowledge of the principles of social organisation and evolution he can scarcely obtain a proper perspective of his facts, nor can he rightly interpret his facts or explain the causes of social changes without references to such principles. Only their manner of approach to the data of social genesis is different. In tracing human development the historian quite properly concerns himself primarily with the flow of events, attempting chiefly to recover all apparently relevant facts and to make the record of human achievement as complete and reliable as possible. While he may legitimately be concerned with cause and effect in this inter-play of factors and processes and can aspire to a comprehensive synthesis, historian's first aim is to gather the concrete and descriptive material. The sociologist as such does

not concern himself to any particular degree with the search for and accumulation of concrete information as a historian does. Taking his data from history the sociologist concentrates much of his attention upon the repetitions in historical development, upon the constant elements in history and upon deducing therefrom the laws of historical causation as revealed by the study of cause and effect in the concrete materials of historical development.

Professor Park says: "Both history and sociology are concerned with the life of man as man. History however seeks to reproduce and interpret concrete events as they actually occurred in time and space. Sociology, on the other hand, seeks to arrive at natural laws and generalisations in regard to human nature and society, irrespective of time and space." Prof. Giddings says: "The individual or personal element is not repeated. Whatever is repeated can be studied by scientific methods. Accordingly the constant element in history has been made the subject matter of various social sciences, e. g., comparative religion and folk-lore, comparative politics and economics, comparative jurisprudence and constitutional law."

The historian has seldom attempted to dissociate the constant elements in history from the unique, the individual and the personal. On the contrary he has very properly tried to grasp history in its concrete entirety, and in recording the life of any people or age, to make clear the vital connection between things that are universal and those that are peculiar or distinguishing. On the strictly scientific side his work may have suffered by such comprehensiveness, but on the descriptive and narrative side and in human interest it has gained. The sociologist confines his studies to those universal or constant portions of ever repeated history that admit of examination by scientific methods. His field is less broad and at the same time less detailed and less concrete than that of the historian. Sociology in its relation to history may accurately be described as a study of the constant elements in history. To the extent that a historian is scientific he is a sociologist. Interpretation and generalisation form the



ultimate ends and goal of historical science, otherwise concrete facts of history would have no value.

Is historical course of events governed by any determinism or destiny, possibilism or contingency? Is there any law traceable or is any freedom visible in it? Can it be interpreted monistically or pluralistically? In order to understand these questions we must find out the character of man, the environment in which he works, their mutual influence, the role of contingency and coincidence, and the means of our knowledge. There is no normal man. There is a potential man, in a perpetual flow or flux. He is a composite being. There is being and becoming in him and the environment. Then what is the character of events or facts of history? They may be products of only material forces actuating and influencing man, or they may be products of mental forces actuating and influencing man to act in material environment.

The naturalist or materialist school imports the methods of the physical sciences into history. The Crocean or idealist school attacks their method of undue generalisation and systematisation after the fashion of traditional sociologists. Their method does not serve to explain causally all what follows. To the Crocean school history is the endless and objectless world-process being known only by thought. Its knowledge in all its tissues of variety is also philosophy. History is the very intellectual vision of the "murmur of living," of "the stir of existence," of "the soul of the world." This process, every moment of which issues from all previous moments and is related in its entire contemporary extent, is something at every moment unique and is incapable of repetition without difference. Therefore there can be, from the nature of the facts or material, no science of history. The changing, unique and unrepeatable cannot be reduced to a form or formula. History is essentially a "content" full of the unique joy of things non-recurrent. The historical method has to consider the content, the unique and changing objects of experience. Sociological method has to consider the form, the abiding

universals—similarity and recurrence—amidst dissimilarity and chaotic variety. History is concerned with the whole gamut of human experience. It is impossible to establish a law of the unique or to consider a schematic science of the unrepeatable. History is to know life, what is unrepeatable in fact and unseizable by the abstractions of science which is repeatable for thought. To the idealist school history is either the march of reason or freedom. The Hegelian school sees in the historical flood a current, in the current a drive, in the drive a logic. Hegelians first take the logical idea and then descend to explain facts. History is a process to an end. It declares the purpose of reason or God. The idealistic school does not necessarily save the value of individuality in accepting the purpose of reason, any more than the natural school. It presents experience as a standardless flux. Its love of the changing and the moment is a great obstruction to the finding of values in the absolute.

According to Prof. Bury, if human development can be entirely explained on the general lines of a system such as Saint Simon's or Comte's or Spencer's then the conclusion would be that the place of history within the framework of such a system is subordinate to sociology and anthropology. There is no separate or independent province for it. But on an idealistic interpretation of knowledge, it is otherwise. History then assumes a different meaning from that of a higher zoology and is not merely a continuation of the process of evolution in nature. If thought is not the result, but the pre-supposition, of the process of nature, it follows that history in which thought is the characteristic and guiding force, belongs to a different order of ideas from the kingdom of nature and demands a different interpretation. Here philosophy of history comes in. It means the investigation of rational principles which, it is assumed, are disclosed in the historical process due to the cooperation and interaction of human minds under terrestrial conditions. If the philosophy of history is not illusory, history means a disclosure of spiritual reality in the

fullest way in which it is cognisable to us in these particular conditions. And on the other hand the possibility of an interpretation of history as a movement of reason disclosing its nature in terrestrial circumstances seems the only hypothesis on which the postulate of "history for its own sake" can be justified as valid.

But the radical defect of all these philosophical reconstructions of history according to Prof. Bury is that the framework is always made a' priori, with the help of a superficial induction. The principles of development are superimposed upon the phenomena instead of being given by the phenomena, and the authors of the scheme, have no thorough or penetrative knowledge of the facts which they undertake to explain. Bossuet, Hegel and Marx are splendid failures. They are marked by an insufficient knowledge of facts and details, and in imposing their a' priori framework they are mercilessly procrustean. It is the modern period which has suffered most through Hegel's and Marx's attempt to screw history into their iron-beds. Their schemes imply that the modern period represents the completion of historical development and is part of the last act in the drama of the human spirit or society. This implication is preposterous from what we know about the future that man has indefinite time in front of him. It is absurd to suppose that in the course of that time new phases of thought will not be realised, though it is quite impossible for us to determine them. There is no such thing as finality within the measurable distance. The authors of the numerous attempts to present a philosophical construction of history which appeared during the 19th century assume naively that their own interpretations are final and that the ideas which are within the horizon of their minds are the ultimate ideas to be sighted by man. It is strange how this childish delusion, this spell of the present, has blinded these profound thinkers.

Our synthesis and interpretation can only have a relative value. The still latent ideas which must emerge in the process of the further development of man will introduce new and higher controlling con-



ceptions for the interpretation of the past. All that philosophy can do is to assure us that historical experience is a disclosure of the inner nature of spiritual reality. This disclosure is furnished by history and history alone.

Therefore Prof. Bury condemns philosophers or sociologists such as Hegel or Comte or Marx for having constructed iron-beds for historical facts into which they force living victims and for founding systems based on a priori conception without inductive value. He allows a proper place to the role of the individual in historical development. The great man is not only an accident but an unforeseen and extremely disturbing accident. It is by eliminating the role of prominent men that sociology can be founded. But the course of history has been constantly shaped and modified by the wills of individuals which are by no means always the expression of the collective will, and the appearance of such personalities is not a necessary outcome of the conditions and cannot be deduced from them. Nor is there any proof that if such and such an individual had not been born, some one else would have arisen to do what he did. Hence it may be stated that the action of the individual wills is a determining and disturbing factor, too significant and effective to allow history to be grasped by sociological formulae. Historical developments do not proceed in a right line without the choice of diverging. Again and again several roads are open to it, of which it chooses one. Why? Because of the individual.

The role of the individual, the play of the contingent, the force of ideas and ideals, the influence of contact of cultures and races, geographical catastrophes, all contribute to sudden and out of the way changes in history which sociological historian will not be able to fit in his scheme of history. The possibilities are many in the situation and the one which develops is not the inevitable one.

In conclusion, the answer to the question what the position of history is in relation to sociology depends on our view of the fundamental philosophical question at issue between idealism and

naturalism. If we are believers in naturalism then all history has its sole theoretical value in the function of providing material for the investigation of sociological laws. It must accept a subordinate position which Comte assigns it. But if we are idealists, if we hold that thought is a presupposition of physical existence and not a function of matter then history as a disclosure of the evolution of thought has an independent realm of its own and demands a distinct interpretation to prepare for which is the aim of historical research.

The course of history seems also to be marked at every stage by contingencies some of greater and some of smaller imports. In some cases they produce a situation to which the antecedent situation does not logically lead. In others they determine the form and means of the realisation of a logical tendency. No sociological formula can explain these accidents and occurrences in the course of history. Therefore we cannot subordinate history to sociology.

## THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION

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THE purpose of this paper is to examine the argument that has sometime been put forward in defence of the combination of the executive and judicial functions in India, that "there is no real distinction in kind between the action taken before and after the trial. The police officer is exercising a sort of judicial capacity when he decides whose story he shall believe and which of two clues he shall follow up; the magistrate exercises a similar capacity when he believes or disbelieves the witnesses who appear before him on the bench."\*<sup>1</sup>

It may at once be conceded that first it is not always possible in actual practice to effect a clear separation of the administrative and the judicial functions, and say which is which. Both seem to hinge into each other. In some cases, an officer who is primarily an administrator performs functions which must by all standards be called judicial: in others judges perform a large mass of purely administrative functions. Complete and clear-cut separation of functions has never been possible in the history of the world, although separation of functions has always been preached as the only sure safeguard for individual liberty. Secondly, apart from the question whether judicial and administrative functions can or cannot be separated, the substance of the two functions is broadly identical. The elements that constitute the judicial process are broadly speaking the same that constitute the administrative process. The administrator in making his administrative decisions often performs quite the same functions as are performed by a judge in making his judicial decision: he finds facts, he interprets the law, he applies the law to the facts, he makes a decision.

But to admit all this is not to admit that the administrative



and the judicial functions are identical, or that their union in the hand of one officer or their separation is not a material fact. For the kind of similarity, stated above, that exists between the administrative and the judicial functions will, on close examination, be found to exist in practically all types of functions where the procedure is selective and is governed by certain stated rules. The teaching function, for instance, when the teacher is subject to a set University Syllabus, is not different in its procedure from the administrative or the judicial function. The teacher also must think of all the bearings of his subject, then study the University Syllabus, then apply the syllabus to the subject in hand, and ultimately teach according to what he conceives to be the scope of his teaching. Does not, then, the teaching function comprise all the elements that constitute the judicial or the administrative function? And yet, are not the two functions absolutely different in their character?

It will be clear that the difference between the administrative and the judicial function is not a difference of procedure, it is purely a difference of the purpose that underlies the two functions. The difference depends upon the kind of action taken, and not upon the kind of mental process involved in deciding whether and how to take it. This difference is, perhaps, not very pronounced when the administrative function is concerned with the administration of social services, like public health, education etc. for in such cases, even the judicial function tends to become, in a large measure, political,\*<sup>2</sup> its essence being to give a logical form to the purposes declared by the state, in the same way as the administrative function. But when we come to the sphere of law enforcement, or the administrative function of police, the difference between the judicial and the administrative function becomes very pronounced indeed, although it is exactly here that the confusion is most misleading.

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The fact that some sort of administrative adjudication is necessary in this sphere as preparatory to a governmental act creates a

specious resemblance between the exercise of police power and the exercise of judicial power. But between the adjudicative functions of criminal administrative officials and the judicial functions of the courts, there are certain very clear differences.

Firstly, although administrative action involves a sort of judicial procedure, unlike adjudication by a court it is not usually a separate and distinct process. It is not the isolated function of an independent agency existing and acting solely to perform it, but it is a mere moment in a larger process, which is the carrying on of the business of government. It is performed primarily in aid of that business. Its purpose, in theory, is to inform administrative officers what to do, rather than to determine the individual rights which will be affected by their resulting action or the failure to act.

Secondly, administrative determinations, even though judicial in the eyes of meticulous philosophers, are usually of very minor consequence compared to the judicial decision of the courts. When the policeman before making an arrest satisfies himself as to the identity and guilt of the person upon whom he intends to lay his hands, his action, even if judicial, cannot be considered of the same importance as the action of the court in investigating and pronouncing upon the guilt or innocence of an accused.

Thirdly, the judicial adjunct of administrative function is exercised automatically and compulsorily; and its consequence is effective only in the future; while the judicial function of the court comes into play only on the voluntary request of a contentious individual, and it is concerned with past behaviour. To put it in other words, administrative action is positive, while judicial action is merely revisory and therefore negative. "Administration achieves public security by preventive measures. Hence it is often arbitrary...Law, on the other hand, operates by redress or punishment rather than by prevention. It formulates general principles of action and visits infractions of these rules with penalties. It does not supervise action.

It leaves individuals free to act, but imposes pain on those who do not act in accordance with the rules prescribed. It is impersonal."\*<sup>5</sup>

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We have already said that the difference between administrative and judicial functions depends upon the kind of action taken and not upon the kind of mental process involved in deciding whether and how to take it. The difference is primarily in the purpose which each has in performing its action. But the point we desire to make is that the purpose that underlies an action cannot help influencing the mental process that is involved in deciding upon it. Even though the factors constituting that mental process may in all cases be the same, the emphasis of the various factors is bound to be different according as the purpose of the function is administrative or judicial. The administrator wishes primarily to execute the law, to carry out a function, to accomplish a definite result under the law. The judge, on the other hand, is interested in no other function than that of securing fair play between contentious individuals, or of controlling the administration for the purpose of keeping it within the bounds of legality and seeing that it does not injure the rights of the citizens. This difference in the purposes underlying the two functions has created an undeniable difference in the mental attitude of the administrator and the lawyer and in the technique of the two functions of administration and law.

The difference is particularly pronounced when administration is concerned with the repression and investigation of crime. The distinctive importance of the exercise of police power as compared with the other administrative powers of government lies in this, that the efficacious police function consists in seeking to forestall the advent of danger rather than merely to avert its consequences. The criminal procedure of all countries, therefore, gives to the police specifically, what are called, 'preventive powers', that is to say, a far larger limit of discretionary authority than is conceded



to the other administrative officials; while the function of the judiciary, here even more than elsewhere, is properly and definitely limited to determining, in cases and controversies that come before it, whether any rule has been violated. The preventive powers of the police are of three kinds. (1) It may issue precautionary regulations. (2) It may issue administrative orders. These powers are normally given to other administrative agencies also. But the police may (3) summarily execute its orders: it is authorised to take action even without notifying the person involved that action is contemplated.

This power of summary administrative action without notice and without an opportunity to the other party to be heard, is indeed, a very significant attribute of the power of the police; and it is justified on the plea that it is the only ready safeguard against the invasion of public security and individual safety at the hands of mischief-mongers. But it helps to cause a great divergence between the mental outlook of the administrator and the mental outlook of the judge. This divergence has been analysed in relation to the preventive sections of the Criminal Procedure Code in India by Mr. G. F. Arnold thus:

“What are known as the preventive or bad livelihood sections of the Criminal Procedure Code are framed in the exclusive interest of society to the complete disregard of its obligations to the individual. Under these sections, men are called on to give security for good behaviour, and if they fail to do so are imprisoned, in most cases with hard labour, not because they have committed any offence but for fear lest they should do so if they remained at large. It is not pretended, so far as we know, that this punishment has a reformatory effect on them; indeed, as it is the so-called habitual criminals who are chiefly treated in this way, it would be somewhat of a farce if such a contention were made. Nor can it be said to be retributive in character, because they are convicted of no offence

before their imprisonment, or if it is termed retributive on the ground that it is a punishment for past convictions, then the man is avowedly punished twice for the same offence, which is against the law. We do not think it will be denied that many magistrates have an aversion to the employment of these sections and that the pressure for their use comes almost entirely from the side of the police who regard themselves as responsible for the safety of persons and property under the law'.\*<sup>4</sup>

It would thus be clear that since the police is responsible, above everything else, for the maintenance of order and suppression of crime, the motive of the policeman may not always be the just punishment of offenders, but it may very often be the suppression of whosoever looks to him, in his judgment, a possible offender. The policeman is even apt to pursue crime and criminals, suspected character and shady situation, in a way that the pursuit itself might become the worst of crimes against law. The police officer does, of course, 'exercise a sort of judicial capacity' in the process of investigation, when he decides whose story he shall believe and which of the two clues he shall follow up. But in most cases, he might start with a prejudice, and his adjudicative function is liable to be exercised merely in the furtherance of that prejudice. At every step, he is apt to come into personal clash with people: these clashes and the vital reactions resulting from them would necessarily colour his procedure and his function. From all these personal clashes and reactions the judge will naturally be free, and consequently his line of approach would be more cool, more impartial, and more 'just'.

In short, administrative methods of enforcement, more especially when applied in the field of police regulation, have a strong tendency to cause considerations of policy to become controlling to the exclusion of all individual rights. To entrust an administrative agency, as the District officer essentially is, with the determination of indivi-

dual rights and interests is bound to make those rights and interests more flexible and more responsive to uncertain factors of discretion than when these rights and interests are left to be defined by the more rigid process of a free court applying more or less permanent rules of law.

Especially in the case of a subject country, where administration is largely under foreign control, as it is in India today, the divergence between the mental attitude of the administrator and the mental attitude of the judge is likely to become all the more intensified. In truth, in such a system of government, "the executive and the judicial mind are at enmity."<sup>5</sup> And since any subjection of individual rights to administrative discretion in such a state can only mean helping the perpetuation of foreign domination, this supplies a clear and doubtless case where not only a clear distinction but, so far as possible a veritable separation of the two functions must be made. In such a situation, the principal motive of the administration must be the suppression, right or wrong, of all political agitation; so that it is only by means of the application of a body of supposedly definite and permanent law alone (uninfluenced by considerations of political expediency), such as the traditional system of adjudication by courts supplies that healthy individual and social growth can be assured.

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## KHWAJA MIR 'DARD'

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FOUR poets are generally regarded as having polished and refined the Urdu language—Ján Jánán, Saudá, Meer, and Dard. This is not to say that there are no archaisms in their work; many expressions used by them are now obsolete; several grammatical formations employed by them seem strange now; and some words have a significance they no longer have. But these four poets succeeded in standardising the literary form of Urdu. It had not departed very far from the spirit of the country; it still retained a fair admixture of Hindi words; indigenous words had not then been rigidly excluded. This 'purge' was to follow: Ghálib, Átish, and Násikh were in the main responsible for making Urdu approximate closely to Persian and eliminating from it almost all indigenous words save pronouns, adverbs and verb formations. If Urdu had developed as an Indian language and an Indian literature, it would have become more generally acceptable to the masses and not remained the concern of only those living in the cities and connected with the courts. But that is another story.

Dard was born in 1133 A. H. and died in 1199 A. H. He was thus one of the earlier Urdu poets. Khwájá Meer—to call him by his real name—was the son of Khwájá Násir, whose father had come to India from Bokhara, but he himself was born in India. Dard lived his early years as a young man of excellent means and took his fill of life. But while only twenty-eight he gave up his way of ease and took up the religious life. He had begun his literary career at a very early age and kept it up till the end. Music had a great patron in him and twice a month there were musical gatherings at

his house. He was the author of several works, including a Persian *Diwān*, and some dealing with theological subjects. The Persian *Diwān* is a collection of Ghazals, Rubāis, and Mukhamas. It is with his Urdu *Diwān* that this article is concerned.

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In his *Tazkirah* Meer Taqi "Meer" pays a very handsome tribute to the commanding position held by Dard among his contemporaries, and it is well known that Meer Hasan also owed a great deal to his influence. He says that Dard was responsible for breathing life into the dead bones of Urdu and establishing sound canons of literary taste. There were several disciples of his who have a prominent place among early poets, e. g., Asar, Qāyām, Fīrāq, Nisār, Ālam. It is remarkable what a high ideal he had for poetry and how assiduously he strove to make it pure. In some prose passages he claims that he had never used verse for the purpose of personal attack or calumny, and that even in the pieces dealing with the theme of love the meaning of convention must not be attached to them. It must be admitted, however, that the softer emotions and the sentiment of love inspire some of his best lines. There is hardly any frivolity in his work, but wine and the tavern figure plentifully in it. Philosophy, life beyond death, the eternal verities, occupy his attention for the most part and critics have, generally, classed him among those who write of divine rather than physical and material love.

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A word may be said of his language. Urdu was born in India and in the initial stages of its growth it employed numerous words and idioms of Indian origin. The earlier poets employed many Indian metres. But soon all that was altered and Urdu became a branch of Persian. Indian words were rigidly excluded and Indian metres completely abandoned. Dard came at a period of transition and one finds in his poems many words that are now "forbidden". One

may be permitted to speculate if the present gulf between Urdu and Hindi need have become so wide if this separatist tendency had been curbed at the start. If the origin of Urdu is to be traced to the desire to evolve a language for use in India one may indeed wonder why it should have been necessary to fill it with words of foreign origin and to ban the use of indigenous ones. But what one cannot help noticing is the presence in the works of Meer and of Dard of many Hindi words that Urdu poets have now no use for. Here are some lines in which they appear :

- (1) Gar che woh khurshed-roo *nit* hai mere sáme.
- (2) *Jag* men ákar idhar udhar dekhá.
- (3) *Jag* men Koi na *tuk* hansá hogá.
- (4) Hogaye ánkhon hi men do do *bachan*.
- (5) Agar áyiná dar chár áyiná pahne na ho *Sanmukh*.
- (6) Ham hī is wahshat sará se nahīn *udás*.
- (7) Woh hi roná hai *nit* wohī gham hai.
- (8) Gul agar *sanmukh* ho báaze kuchh kahkar gaye.
- (9) Dil pai áfat *nidán* hai pyáre.
- (10) *Nipat* mast hai booye nargis chaman men.
- (11) Merá to jī wohin rahtá hai *nit* jahán tu hai.
- (12) Na marte hain na nīnd áti na woh soorat *bisarti* hai.
- (13) Jalná hi *saddá* hai mujhko *nit* hai khapná.
- (14) Moond ánk *saddá* kab tayeen *ṭáliyegá*.
- (15) Áp kuchh ji men na *bharmáyigá*.
- (16) Shama'e haram bhī de hai máthe pai apne *tika*.
- (17) Tál ki gintī se báhar jis tarah *roopak* men *sam*.
- (18) *Pareekhá*, Dard, kuchh mat rakh taraqqī aur tanazzul ká.
- (19) Ai Dard, samajh *sohaj* na in ánkhon ka bahná.
- (20) Yih *Sandesá* suná diyá kis ne.
- (21) Gulgir, munh *pasar* na tū shama'a kī taraf.
- (22) Yih bhī ik *bankpan* ká báná hai.
- (23) Woh dukht-e-raz kī *chhalli* phire hai jahán ko.



(24) Koī bhī shakhs is kā mārā huā na *panapā*.

(25) Din rāt mujhe ajab tarah *beete* hain.

In a number of verses Dard has, like his other contemporaries, employed expression and phrases that have ceased to be current and have now an archaic flavour. A few of them seem still to be so graphic that it is a pity they were abandoned. One of the most noticeable facts is the frequent absence of "ne", which is a source of considerable worry to natives of other provinces; e. g., in the following couplet there is no "ne" in the first line:

"Kahā jab main terā bosā to jinseqand hai, pyāre,

Lagā tab kahne par "Qande mukarrar ho nahīn saktā."

Nor in the second line of this verse:

"Hāl sun sun merā lagā kahne,

Main sunā kuchh na, kyā kahā tū ne"?

The following expression has a unique flavour:

"Us kī bāten mujh se kyā puchho ho tum?

Muddaten guzreen ki dekhā bhī nahīn."

Or

"Dil bhi terā hī dhang seekhā hai,

Ān men kuch hai, ān men kuchh hai".

Or

"Log kahte hain āshiqī jis ko,

*Main jo dekhā bari museebat hai*".

Some other older forms are to be found in the following lines:

(1) "Parwarish gham kī tere *vahān tayeen* to kī, dekhā."

(2) "*Kabhoo kabhoo* zikr āyā bhī".

(3) "Ki jisko *kisoo* ne *kabhoo* wā na dekhā"

(4) "Ai sāqi *bhare le hai*",

(5) "Tū *kab tayeen* mujh sāth meri jān milegā?

Aisā bhi *kabhoo* hogā ki phir ān milegā?

(6) "Āp to thin hi par is kā bhi kiyā khānā kharāh,"

Dard apne sāth ānken dil ko bhi le *dūbiyān*.

- (7) "Gunahgáron men samjhá *kariyo* apni begunáhī ko.  
 (8) "Lag *chaliyo* sab se yūn too-pai jī mat *lagàyi*.  
 (9) "Jon sadá niklá hi *jà hai*, khānae zanjeer se."

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The ghazal is primarily a poetic medium for the expression of the sentiment of love. When a Sufi poet speaks of love the presumption is that the love of God is his theme and all the symbols and images familiar to students of Persian and Urdu are to be interpreted in a mystic and not literal sense. Whether Dard intended his lines to be so understood it is impossible to say. But we have all the phases depicted—the waywardness of the beloved, the prayers of the lover, the longing, the despair, the trembling hope, fear of refusal, jealousy of the rival, the long nights of separation, the insufferable loneliness, the prospect of union on the Day of Judgment, the fatal glance from the eye...

1. Ján se ho gaye badan Khálī,  
Jis taraf tū ne ánkḥ bhar dekhá.
2. Ham na kahte the, munḥ na charḥ uske,  
Dard, kuchḥ ishḳ ká mazá páyá?
3. Kitne bandon ko ján se khoyá,  
Kuchḥ Khudá ká bhi tū ne ḍar na kiyá
4. Azeeyat, museebat, malámat, baláyen—  
Tere ishḳ men ham ne kyá kyá na dekhá.
5. Dard, ham usko to samjháenge, par,  
Apne tayeen áp bhi samjháyigá.
6. Apni ánkḥon use main dekhoon,  
Aisá bhi abhoo Khudá Karegá?
7. Paighám-e-yás bhej na mujḥ beqarár tak,  
Hoon neem ján, so bhi tere intazár tak.
8. Un ne kiyá thá yád mujhe bhoor kar kahīn.  
Patá nahīn hun tab se main apni khabar kahīn.
9. Zálím jafá jo cháhe so kar mujḥ pai tu-wale

- Pachhtawe phir tū āp hī-aisā na kar kahīn.
10. Phirte ho saj banāye tū apni jidhar tidhar,  
Lag jāwe dekhiyo na kisīkī nazar kahīn.
  11. Usko sikhāyi yih jāfā tū ne,  
Kyā kiyā ai merī wafā tū ne ?
  12. Ham na kahte the hujo mat a'ashiq,  
Pāi, dil, apnī kuchh sazā tū ne ?
  13. In dinon kuchh ājab hai merā hāl,  
Dekhtā kuchh hūn, dhyān men kuchh hai.

Again, on wine and repentance, preacher and tavern, there are several verses characterised by freshness and charm. Once more, is it the juice of the grape or heavenly nectar ? Is the exaltation physical or spiritual ? Let the verses answer.

1. Sāqī ! keedhar hai kashtī-e-may ?  
Ab ke khewe men pār hain ham.
2. Ātashemay se jo Sāqī ne ise bharkāyā  
Zāhid-e-khushq huā khūb hī tar pāni men.
3. Donon jāhān kī na rahī phir khabar use,  
Do pyāle terī ānkhon ne jis ko pilā diye.
4. Sāqiya ! yān lag rahā hai chal chālāo,  
Jab talak bas chal sake sāghar chale.
5. Lā gulābī de mujhe Sāqī ki yān majlis hī  
Khāli ho jāye hai paimāne ke bharte bharte.

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But Dard is at his best when he turns into verse some deep thought, some profound reflection on life and death, some truth which is revealed to him in a flash and which he transmutes into memorable words. Naturally he is influenced by the teachings of Islam and there is nothing in his verses which the most orthodox Muslim will object to, but equally there is hardly anything to which the followers of other faiths will find it difficult to subscribe. That of course is the supreme test of a great poet and artist—whether he



transcends his age and his country and his environments and becomes Everyman. In the verses that follow one finds God's universality and all-pervadingness stressed; God's country has innumerable spring seasons; everything is in essence divine, though the appearances may be diverse. In another verse he states how thin is the dividing line between tears and laughter. No traveller has ever returned to the earth to tell us of the life beyond death. The ways of the Lord are inscrutable and it was vain to seek to explain them. Those flowers which once were the garden's pride droop and fade and wither unnoticed. One man's meat is another man's poison: the dawn smiles, but the dew sheds tears. Life is a short waking and death is a long quiet sleep—but to some, alas, it is a sleep disturbed by dreams and hopes and thoughts of the Day of Judgment. The flowers are pleasant enough, but the thorns are there all the time. Death has no terrors for those who have renounced everything; what can it take away from them? Everybody wends his way towards death; the procession is long and unending; but no one knows the nature of the destination. God has no power to turn away anyone from His mansion; for where is that spot where God is not? So many wise persons spend years in search of God; but is there any place where He is not? One talks of separation and of union; one undertakes long journeys in quest of the goal; one spends weary days and nights and toils hard and is footsore and dispirited; but all the time the journey's end is within one's own self. We take life so seriously, but as life dwindles, we discover that it was no better than a dream, no better than an empty tale. It all seems very simple and elementary. There is no parade of learning. No theological text is quoted. But surely the very essence of all religions is here, if religion be but another name for morality tinged with emotion.

- (1) Baste hain tere hī sāye men sab Shaikh-o-Barahman;  
 Ábád hai tujh se hī to ghar dair-o-haram ká.

- (2) Wái nádāni ki waqt-e-marg sábit hu  
Khwáb thá jo kuchh ki dekhá jo suná afsáná thá.
- (3) Jag men ákar idhar udhar dekhá,  
Too hi áyá nazar jidhar dekhá,
- (4) Jag men koi na tuk hansá hogá,  
Ki na hanse men ro diyá hogá.
- (5) Duniyá men kaun kaun na ek bár, ho gayá,  
Par munh phir is taraf na kiyá usne jo gayá.
- (6) Tujhī ko jo yán jalwá-farmá na dekhá;  
Barábar hai duniyá ko dekhá na dekhá.
- (7) Shaboroz, ai Dard, dar pai ho uske,  
Kisoo ne jise yán na samjhá na dekhá.
- (8) Jaltá hai ab pará khas-o-kháshák men milá,  
Woh gul ki ik umr chaman ká chirágh thá.
- (9) Kuchh láye na the ki kho gaye ham  
The áp hī ek, so, gaye ham.
- (10) Hastī ne to tuk jagá diyá thá,  
Phir khulte hi ánkḥ so gaye ham.
- (11) Na samjhá, Dard, ham ne bhed yán ki shádi o gham ká,  
Sahar kḥandán hai kyon, rotī hai kis ko yád kar shabnam.
- (12) Balá hai nashaye duniyá, kī ta qayámat, áh,  
Sab ahleqabr isi ká kḥumar rakhte hain.
- (13) Gul ab to mile hai hans ke lekin,  
Bulbul, yih chubhenge khár dil men.
- (14) Bágh-e-jahán ke gul hain yá khár hain to ham hain,  
Gar yár hain to ham hain, aghyár hain to ham hain.
- (15) Maut ! kyá áke faqiron se tujhe lená hai ?  
Marne se áge hi yih log to mar játe hain.
- (16) Ah ! ma'alum nahin, sáth se apne shaboroz,  
Log játe hain chale, so yih kidhar játe hain.
- (17) Mujhe dar se tu apne tále hai, yih batá mujhe tu  
kahán nahin ?

Koi aur bhī haigá tere siwá ? tū agar nahin, to  
jahán nahin.

- (18) Dhoonde hai tujhe tamám a'lam,  
Har chand ki tū kahán nahīn hai.
- (19) Dard, kuchh ma'alum hai, yih log sab,  
Kis taraf se áye the keedhar chale ?
- (20) Na poochho kuchh hamáre hijr kī aur wasl ki báten  
Chale the dhoondne jis ko so wo hi áp ho baiṭhe.
- (21) Ik 'umr guzar gayī samajhte,  
Máalum kiya na main ne, 'Kyá hūn'.
- (22) Is zeest ká etbár kyá hai ?  
Koi dam men yih zindgī hawá hai.

Some verses have the epigrammatic touch, summing up in brief and terse form either a witty sally or a pregnant truth. A few are remarkable merely for their verbal ingenuity or smartness.

- (1) Be tarah kuchh ulajh gayá thá dil,  
Bewafáyi ne terī suljháiyá.
- (2) Dushmanī men suná na howegá.  
Jo hamen dostī ne dikhláiyá.
- (3) Tar dámani pai, Sheikh, hamári na jáyio,  
Dáman nichor den to farishte wazoo karen.
- (4) Kám mardon ke jo hain so wahi kar játe hain,  
Ján se apni jo koi ki guzar játe hain.
- (5) Ba'ad marne ke mere hogi mere roneki qadr,  
Tab kahaegá keejá logon se, "Woh barsáten kahán" ?
- (6) Koi samjhe kyon ki yih mudda'a ki paheli ká sá hai yih májrá,  
Kahá main "tujhe nahīn cháh kyá" ? lagá kahne muh  
seki "hán, nahin".
- (7) Sooraton men khoob hongī, Sheikh, go hoore-bahisht  
Par kahán yih shokhiyán, yih taur, yih mahbubiyán !
- (8) Qásid se kaho phir khabar ūdhar hi ko le jáye,  
Yán bekhабари á gayi jab tak khabar áwe.
- (9) Qásid ! nahin yih kám terá, ráh le-



Is ká payám dil áe siwá kaun lá sake ?

- (10) Tamanná hai terí, agar hai tamanná,  
Teri árzoo hai, agar árzoo hai.
- (11) Dard ! Woh gulbadan magar tujh ko nazar pará kahin  
Áj tū is qadar, batá, kis liye bággh bággh hai ?
- (12) Log kahte hain 'a' shiqi jis ko,  
Main jo dekhá. bari museebat hai.
- (13) Áye the is majme men, qasd kar ke, door se,  
Ham tamáshe ke liye, áp hi tamáshá ho gaye.
- (14) Jitnī barhti hai, utni ghaṭti hai,  
Zindgi áp hi áp kaṭti hai.
- (15) Jo gayá kokche men uske, na phirá eedhar ko,  
Ai sabá ! játi to hai, jáyiyo darte darte.
- (16) Bazi badi thi usne meri chashme tar ke sáth-  
Ákhir to hár hár ke barsát rah gayi.

Finally there are lines in which the poet justifies his takhallus of "Dard", poignant, tender, tinged with pathos. There is nothing maudlin or effeminate in his melancholy. It is it a genuine reflection of his temperament. It is an expression of the certainty of sorrow in store. For him the year wakes year to sorrow. "Eternal Passion ! Eternal Pain !"

- (1) Yárab ! yih dil hai yá koi mehmán seráii hai ?  
Gham rah gayá kabhoo, kabhoo áram rah gayá.
- (2) Agar yon hi yih dil satátá rahegá,  
To ik din merá jī hī játá rahegá.
- (3) Main játá hoon dil ko tere pás chhore,  
Meri yád tujhko dilátá rahegá.
- (4) Qafas men koi tum se hai, hamsafeero,  
Khabar gul ki ham ko sunátá rahegá.
- (5) Hál mujh ghamzadá ká jis tis ne  
Jab suná hogá ro diyá hogá.
- (6) Mere nálon pai koi duniyá men,  
Bin kiye ah kam rahá hogá.

- (7) Tum ne to ek din bhi na eedhar guzar kiyā,  
Ham ne hī is jahān se ākhir safar kiyā.
- (8) Hans qabr pai merī khil khilā kar,  
Yih phool charhā kabhi to ākar.
- (9) Saiyād ! ab rihāi se kyā mujh aseer ko ?  
Phir kisko zindgi ki tawakko bahār tak ?
- (10) Mātam kadāye jahān men jon abr,  
Apne tayeen āp ro gaye ham.
- (11) Chaman men subah yih kahtī thī ho kar chashmetar  
shabnam,  
Bahār-e-bāgh to yun hī rahī lekin kidhar shabnam ?
- (12) Ham bhī falak se karte kisoo cheez kī talab,  
Dhoondā par apne dil men to kuchh chāh hī nahin.
- (13) Ham tūjh se kis hawas ki, falak, justjoo karen ?  
Dil hī nahīn rahā haī jo kuchh ārzoo karen.
- (14) Muddat talak jahān men hanste phirā kiye,  
Jī men hai kḥūb royiye ab baiṭh kar kahin.
- (15) Ai hijr ! koī shab nahin jis ko sahar nahīn,  
Par subah hoti āj to āti nazar nahīn.
- (16) Sabā, jaṭa hoon giriyaṅ main chaman se,  
Gulon ko bāgh men rakhiyo tu khandān.
- (17) Jis ke bin dekhe na neend āti hamen,  
khuāb men bhī dekhte usko nahin.
- (18) Dil merā dukhā diyā kis ne ?  
So gayā thā, jagā diyā kis ne ?
- (19) Tuk khabar le ki har ghari ham ko,  
Āb jūdāyi bahut satātī hai.
- (20) Khwāb-e-adam se chaunke the ham tere wāste,  
Ākhir ko jag jag ke nachar so gaye.

When we rise from a perusal of his works, the total impression left on us is that of a singularly even-balanced soul, one who in the midst of the travails and disappointments of life saw steadily beyond the immediate present and could comfort himself with what was to come, one who longed for a better world and did not consider his hope to be a breath, a tinkling of the camel-bell,

## A CONSTRUCTION IN HUMAN RELATIONSHIP : ERNST TOLLER'S LETTERS TO TESSA<sup>1</sup>.

BY  
BHARATI SARABHAI

ERNST TOLLER's letters to Tessa open a question which has never been closed, the relationship between a man of his stature and a woman. Tessa we can piece together, mosaic-like, from these letters to her; we have no other data. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with calling her up before us as a woman; or else, better still, as woman. As for Toller, he is just Toller; that is, a man of definite recognisable proportions, striking out, it is true, towards the still indetermined and infinitely potential future but a man, none the less, definable enough; a man of outstanding talents; perhaps a man of genius. A man, further, whose destiny in youth and in early manhood at least ( for we see him no further in the *Letters* ) is to work for a revolution of the people and to spend long years in prison. For our purpose here, we may count as naught the days of counter revolution that are to see a great deal of all he believed in, hoped and laboured and suffered for, obscured. For these days are not yet; only their penumbral shadow grows upon him. He is still far from the hour when finally " out of joint " with his time he will take his life with his own hand, in a place not of his people, thus to close his chronicle at last mutely, even dumbly, disdaining the gift that was his, the gift of the written word, which could put his lonely self across so many countries and continents. Indeed we do well to roll back his life as it unfolded in his more famous and frustrated years, and go back to where everything has come to a

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1. Letters From Prison : Ernst Toller



standstill in the closed-in prison cell. Only three books before us but from them a portrait emerges, remarkably satisfying. The fragment of autobiography, the Letters from Prison and the Plays provide comment, confirmation and amplification around each other. They all arise from his life, so unity is here. The man representatively revealed in his actions is described and commented upon by the man looking back with a certain detachment on the time when he was a German. He is also the man of the Letters, with his bodily movement pitifully limited but imaging on the blank negation of prison life, his before and after, and stretching out to the utmost significance whatever of life squeezes through the cell window. And it is the same man dramatising himself, externalising his inner and outer conflicts as a social being, in the Plays.

But what of the woman? What do we know of her, the Dark Lady of these Letters? The facts at our disposal give us the most favoured conditions for venturing a whole portrait based on a single ground: his letters to her. Our portrait may very well turn out to be an "idea-erection", a non-mathematical construction in psychology. Let us see where this fantasy will carry us.

There are no letters from Tessa. Like man's experience of inarticulate nature, we have only his testimony to their relationship. That is the only testament. And even these letters were written with the sieve of the censor ever before his eyes ("What a burden letter-writing becomes in here! One dances on words as on a tight-rope." ).

We do not know how old she is, of what family or country. We would not recognise her if she were to pass us in the street. Is she married? Has she children? Is she interested in work? Is she an artist? She remains to us Tessa. She seems always to be sojourning in sunny lands, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, places with winged names and beckoning him who writes to join her. Very rarely he needs to say he misses her and what she means to him. We know

that the places where she is become the promised land, one of his promised lands, land of lake and cathedral, never to be realised in this life perhaps but aglow with sun-lit soaring spaces, to think of which relieves his weariness. "I am so happy that you can travel in the lands of my longing. Lands of Life—Colours—Abundance—Warmth—Sun—Blue skies—The songs of the women..."

He sometimes dreams in the 'companionable' evenings when "with the light step of a dream, our quiet hour approaches... Tonight I was with you in the Certosa of Pavia... And suddenly the three of us were sitting in a Gondola, gliding by night through Venice... Need I tell you that I went through the day a rich man? .. Since I have had your letter, I have heard music. Everyone who speaks to me sings... You are with me and I am with you. Here is wealth which often seems to me something that I cannot grasp... Only for a time I want to be close to you, so that that the cloak of fatigue which wraps me now will fall from me. For I *am* tired."

And sometimes to know what can make you whole again, and to know that you can be made whole again, is to become whole.

He lives in these other worlds only in fantasy, by proxy as it were. He feels and knows himself to be compelled by another destiny. "How grateful I am that you came to me with your child... Still, I belong to other circles, and many a design crumbles in the reality. For you might be true, be what you call *good*. I am bound and know: the way is marked for me, marked by destiny. And because I know, I am free—in spite of all!... What are deeds, what are proofs between two who know they are close to one another? That is the test: to feel that the one divines the other and esteems him, even when he takes his obscurest way and says to himself: he cannot but take it... Loneliness is. There is no bridge from man to man."

Toller writes to her constantly; refers to her his mind and heart and tortured spirit. Other women are mentioned in the

autobiography but in the *Letters* she seems to fill his background uniquely. It is enough. We are satisfied.

It is educative to find how often the man in prison turns to her, the man further isolated by the qualities of his genius, his devotion to a cause. For to love a cause, to love a people and make them your cause, is to love God. It is to be alone. It is to be very lonely at times. Every man holds up to himself one or more concrete idols, in his hand or in his heart, in homestead or temple place. But how many are there who hold an idea, a concept in the centre of their life? Will not his fellow men draw back from one who clutches at no puppet in the palm of his hand to play with and gaze upon and make his own?

The majority of the *Letters from Prison* are written to her. He can write to her his abstract analysis of the problems which face man, the group-man, the family-man, the artist-man; of how these discoveries are worked out in his plays and in the actual decisions of his life. He discusses her advice on the way he should develop. And he writes of the daily scene: the miracle, high up in the wall on the bars of his window, of swallow visitors, father mother baby birds and all; the back alley with girls moving, swinging their sides; changes in the sky-mood, seasonal responses, visitations of memory, fragments of life seen from the window, goblins of indiscipline clamouring for shape, . . . and behind is the sombre shadow of real people, a comrade left to die by himself in the night, the not-to-be-got-away-from jailors and prisoners, punishments and letters, illnesses and death. In seeming detachment his soul perched on the cell can "clap its hands and sing". At other times, how rarely and in how few words, the profoundest overwhelming nostalgia breaks through his restraint; premonition black and unrelieved spreads over all world and the spirit! Indeed the man in all his heightened awareness of experience is built up here.

And one thinks in awe—brave woman, mature confident woman



she must be to stride with Toller. Rich she must be to witness the drama, the aloneness of Toller. And one brushes aside the first question, the natural question, is she, too, a woman like other women? Does she live rooted in a secret source, her emotional life with human objects of love eternally stretched out, a vast ramified symphony, behind her day to day actions and practical decisions? Even if she is that—and we cannot doubt she must be that—she must be that and more. And one feels suddenly sorry for pretty dimpled women, women with minds which have never grown up to the problems mature men and women face in contact with the world of people and affairs. For woman as woman, the charmer, the fascinator, the bewitcher, and not even Toller is exempt from sharing this appeal, the lowest common factor which draws the sexes together—even woman as the presiding genius of the home, the mother of children, even she finds herself suddenly irrelevant over long stretches of time. And what women would suffer limbo with resignation? What happens to her 'when the march' of ideas, august architectonic shapes,

*"The prophetic soul*

*Of the wide world dreaming on things to come."*

begin their majestic unfolding in the little head of the man who lies beside her? What when the vital spirit in man, his restless energy, the "conscience" in him, turns round recoiling from pleasure—and what woman would be associated with pleasure and with nothing else? She then finds herself, not opposed, but just left aside, just not in the context. And she realises, with no little shock, that the graces of life, even their crown, the most lovely object, the most love-evoking and love-giving object, is and must be pushed aside when it ceases to be strictly relevant. It must fit into the larger context or in that moment turn to nothingness. For life is a wider term than personal relationships.

And like all shocks, it has to be turned to good account. Loveliness

ceases to be the one desirable end, the supreme desideratum. It seems to sit in a prison of its own making, committed to limitations it has itself forged and chosen. In moments of dramatic illumination, it is made poignantly aware of what it misses, even in its own legitimate kingdom.

Pārvatī, the daughter of the King of mountains, must have had to acknowledge this when not Spring in all his array, and not even the god of Passion, could give her what she desired. Poet Kālidāsa, the poet before Rabindranath, says,

.....निनिन्द रूपं हृदयेन पार्वती प्रियेषु सौभाग्यफला हि चाहता ॥

इयेष सा कर्तुमवन्ध्यरूपतां समाधिमास्थाय तपोभिरात्मनः ।

अवाप्यते वा कथमन्यथा द्वयं तथाविधं प्रेम पतिश्च तादृशः ॥

*Pārvatī then cursed her beauty with all her heart. Loveliness has its fruit in the great good fortune of being loved by the loved one. She wished to free from barrenness her surpassingly lovely form And so she practised the hard penance of the virgin. How else could she have hoped for love such as his, for a husband such as he ?*

For Shankara is not a king of men; he is a god in penance, a *yogi* in meditation.

And centuries after Kālidāsa, Poet Rabindranāth also knows this. His Chitrāngadā is more mature with a rich and complex personality. We would recognise in her the new woman of today. She is trained to the government of men. She belongs to the world of statesmanship and war. But even she is painfully aware of this unresolved territory between the pure woman and the citizen of the world, all along the subtle windings of her quest of the hero Arjuna and his quest of her.

Chitrā never deludes herself. Even in the high tide of infatuation, her clarity is remarkable. When she puts on the irresistible dress of beauty, she knows it as a raiment, a guise she has borrowed. She knows the merciful deception cannot last; it cannot outlast her-

self. She uses it, first to gain her object, to hold it in the hollow of her palm. Then, after enduring the spell of enchantment, with a sigh of relief she welcomes and prepares for the great moment when she can cast off from herself the heartless demon of appearance which has her in such a deadly clasp. Her grappling with this giantess she thought to make friends with, even to identify herself with, is an undertone which the melody of ecstatic love cannot quite shake off or drown. And finally she casts her away, standing denuded, just her self, so that essence may meet essence.

And the man also suffers retribution. When a man is attracted by the shining raiment, he must have it driven home to him some time that the person continually eludes him. Again and again Arjuna says, What are you? Who are you? Even when I have you, I do not seem to have you. I do not seem to know you ever enough... Toller also asks: "Whom shall I discover? Whom shall I re-discover? Who art thou and who am I? To what purpose have you lived, and to what I?"

Chitrā knows it is not herself that Arjuna knows. And no wonder. For she had asked for the form of beauty, "for all the dainty playthings of fugitive youth," as one would ask for a mail of armour. Just as every armour presented to the heroes of old had its point of vulnerability, just as every triumphant warrior had his Achilles' heel, so also Chitrā. She had the mortification of knowing in the moment of heart's desire that she was desirable in this garment, this new assumed one, and not in that old one, hers by proud heritage. And what she believed to be her self remained covered from him in both the forms, so what matter if the false took turns with the real? The gift that was given her for one day and night, and extended to one whole cycle of seasons by the grace of Kāma-deva, may to some man or woman be granted for the space of a whole life. One can be born with the mask of beauty. But then the Law which shapes us sees to it, in the fairness of its allotment, that if the mask has to have potency, it must remain a mask. A



face changes; but not a mask. A face is shot thorough, with ripples of shade and colour, by personality in flux, but not a mask. A face is distorted by pain and ugliness of feeling, by smallness and frustration of being, but not so a mask. And if you find you can no more tolerate a mask on those conditions, you strip it off, the lights of the proscenium go out and the charm, too, ceases its work.

Subtly indeed Poet Rabindranāth suggests that the physical and mental charms of individuals are relatively superficial to their personality; that this youthful seasonal charm which everyone knows, is an interlude in the lifetime of man, as one day-and-night beauty given to Chitrā is in the love of Chitrā and Arjuna. The symbol of a heaven-granted boon of superlative short-timed fascination, is the poet's way of showing up the common fact of everyday life. In life no one has to sit in penance for youth. Youth comes to every man and woman and its duration is no less conditioned than was Chitrā's beauty.

There is some finality about acknowledging the mystery of personality; none about claiming to know and possess each inch of the photographic person. And it is not enough to understand another human being; it is also our human need to be understood in like fashion. Thus Chitrā had a compelling need to be known by Arjuna.

So to come back, Chitrā knows it is not her self that Arjuna knows. And it is not the Arjuna of her aspiration that falls at the feet of her flowering body, its miraculous spring, giving up on sudden impulse his ascetic vow of penance. Both are attracted to each other in moments of excitement, states which are a distraction from their deliberate purposes in life and both fall from their normal stature, even as they rise in ecstasy.

"O my hero, pay not your homage to the false," cries Chitrā, but she cannot turn back now from the intensity she has herself chosen. The remarkable fact is Chitrā does this deliberately, know-

ing it is only this that will hold him. If she had time, "Had I but the time needed, I could win his heart by slow degrees, and ask no help of the gods. I would stand by his side as a comrade, drive the fierce horses of his war-chariot, keep guard at night at the entrance of his tent and help him in all the great duties of Kshatriya.. But it is the labour of a life-time to make one's true self known and honoured. Therefore I have come to thy door, thou world-vanquishing Love, and thou, Vasanta, youthful Lord of the Seasons."

Chitrá is deliberate, even self-conscious. He, the man, is more unconscious, driven by instinct and innocent of this cunning play. From the garish glare of day, from the world of many men and work, he longs to withdraw, for a while to drown himself in the darkness of oblivion, "the wine of pleasure in the cup of this beautiful body." And so he gladly forgets himself. She can never forget herself. In fact, she never 'loses' herself and that is why he never has the satisfaction of finding her. The Chitrá of the play is the critical spirit of the witness, both 'in it' and 'out of it': like the soul in the Upanisads, which is at once two lover birds in the closeness of a tree, one sitting on a branch looking on, while the other one is absorbed as he sips honey and poison, eating of the fruit of experience.

When the spell of passion is over, Arjuna feels a growing unrest. He does not yet know its nature and its cause, whereas she knows about it, has been anticipating this and guiding their course together to its appointed end. For she knows; now is the time for auspicious revelation.

For now it is Arjuna himself who says, "You seem to me like a goddess hidden within a golden image. I cannot touch you, I cannot pay you my dues in return for your priceless gifts. Thus my love is incomplete..... Illusion is the first appearance of Truth..... I grope for that ultimate *you*, that bare simplicity of truth."

And yet who will blame them?

How adorable is a child! Who would not agree? But a child is a child. All grown-ups lead a life which is isolated from it, except perhaps a rare mother or a real teacher.

How simple it is when we are *moved*—when we are! A creeper in flower, drops shaken from a tree after rain has stopped, green leaves on white clouds—what immediate impressions they register! How they overwhelm us, the well-known lineaments of a face, the adequateness of a gesture, a movement in repose. We may philosophise, as we do, that form is to change and perish; that it does not belong to the category of undying substance. And yet the particular look, the particular trick, the impulsive caress known and surprising—and the constant renewal goes on. We are born and we are born again.

These are lovely, love-evoking and love-giving. But to hold fast, to endure, to abide for constant reference and remain deep-rooted at time of storm, deed and death . . . that is another matter, another summum bonum.

Was Tessa all this? We do not know.

Whether she was anything more or not, we may safely assert the guess that she was a woman. And that is why we never cease to wonder at the simplicity with which miracles are worked. For even a man of stature requires a woman to be a woman, a complete woman, simply woman, even a simple woman; the human being who with all the variations of the individual, the class, the race, will still remain unmistakably woman; the same through the long winding ages, changing civilisations; recognisable to all men in all countries. And a woman is not only as she was created but as she is desired in the heart and imagination of man.

But the man of stature also claims the individual in her which is not covered by her sex characteristics. He calls out from her the comrade, the sharer, the co-planner, the searching spirit which is the same in man or woman. (At one place, Toller writes to Tessa,



"You are the only person accepting my point of view, who puts things in order and makes them smooth for me, who advises me and directs my literary and personal affairs to a good end.") And this side of a woman, hardly recognised in her till recent times, must become so natural to the new woman, that she must not remain conscious of it. Nor must she make others conscious of it. We only parade aggressively that of which we are not quite sure, that which is external to our selves.

That is why Rabindranāth has given quite a new interpretation to the legendary old story of Chitrā and Arjuna. What princess of old, when her love was rejected, would have said, "I am not the woman who nourishes her despair in lonely silence, feeding it with nightly tears and covering it with the daily patient smile, a widow from her birth." ? What heroine of the older classics, in the moment of being abandoned by her lover, would have said, "I am Chitrā. No goddess to be worshipped, nor yet the object of common pity to be brushed aside like a moth with indifference. If you deign to keep me by your side in the path of danger and daring, if you allow me to share the great duties of your life, then you will know my true self."

And this independent invincible spirit of the human being must be in integral harmony with the other side of her, the essentially feminine and womanly qualities of her. A whole woman must emerge, she who can be woman and man in one. She who can be herself. The villagers say of Chitrā, "she is our father and mother in one."

And Arjuna says of her, "They say that in valour she is a man, and a woman in tenderness", so that Chitrā retorts, "But have you grown so weary of woman's beauty that you seek in her for a man's strength ?"

Was Tessa all this ? We do not know.

Was Tessa thus in Toller's dream? Does she bear the impress of Toller's genius? And did he, conscious or unconscious to himself, mould her?

For five years they did not meet but nourishment can be drawn and be given without meeting.

How often we see that human beings, without quite knowing it themselves, are the immediate inspirers of those they contact. Paradoxical as it is, impersonal values, larger causes, come home through personality. A man by simply living his own life may make real to us our obscured perceptions. Devotion to a man or woman can make *gūrūs* of them; father, mother, teacher, friend, child can all become *gūrūs*. The Mother of Maxim Gorki's novel is 'made' by her son. To be with the loved one in high places of loneliness, sacrifice and danger becomes a strong incentive to action. And this is nothing to be ashamed of. Even the 'modern woman' will do well to find her self, her derided pushed-aside elemental self, by uncovering this fount of inspiration within her. It is stronger than she knows or guesses. Let her rely on its spontaneous urge. But let her also try and progressively get beyond the human stepping stone, the human "occasion", thus to free herself more and ever more and so to raise herself above the vicissitudes of change. Let her not be fear-bound even by the prospect of losing him.

Let us come back. Was Tessa inspired by Toller?

At one point Toller gives her away. He shows appreciation of her desire to associate with his workers. This is almost the only allusion to her collaboration in the cause which was so near to him.

Sometimes one wonders, was Tessa a pagan spirit? Was she a 'natural' young woman, by which we mean, was she unusual, distinct from the average, seeing how the modifications of civilised life make the true norm rare to meet with? This is how Toller sees her in his mind's eye:

"How I long then for the spring of the Ticino, for the Ticino

sun! If I could be down there, I believe I would live as you do: never read a book, blink in the sunshine and be rich in the feeling 'that I had the earth under me and the sky above.' . . . Your letter came: its first words were, 'I am sitting on a wall in the church square bathed in the brilliant sunshine.' . . . I felt so strongly the beauty, the winged quality, the unrestricted note of your days by the sea in Venice. Shall I be able to give myself, to lose myself as you can? Will I ever be free again from that burden of knowledge which weighs upon me?"

Did Tessa enjoy a privileged position in society, a position, like most other such endowments, vicariously enjoyed? How much does she know of the world that he desires so passionately to change? His present setting and hers seem to lift them apart, but even here it is interesting to observe how deep are the workings of class affinities and of common social opportunities, even in those who have striven all their adult life to get away from the prepossessions encouraged by a social system they wish to see radically changed.

Can you imagine such a woman—such a girl? She may or may not be Tessa, but has she, can she have, this young creature of our speculation, germs of growth in her which will raise her under his sunshine, to the stature required by a man like Toller?

You may smile incredulously, shake your head at this young creature, but I hear the man of stature answering, Why not? I do not deny the world of youth. Why do I never fail to recognise it, to greet it? Perhaps because of my own mindless childhood which still lives in me. Perhaps I remember my young mother like that. Gone are those days but she nourished me. That thoughtless old world garden nurtured and caressed me and I saw youth mirrored in its many forms there. A world past now, anachronistic in its emphasis, flickers to life again for all of us at some unbidden moment.

Fortunate the young man and the young woman, weaned from the soft life at the right time, awakened by a knocking from the



loved one, the teacher. Fortunate to hear the knocking at the right time, even if the knocking be a subtle cloak of farewell; even if the knocking is a shock to bring the young out of their enchantment. Let him who is loved teach them now, pretending to disdain them. Let him criticise coldly and aloofly their way of life, but let him wake them up.

But let him also say to himself, Ah, but it is young, young. Because it is young, it is still possible not to judge. It is growing. It is mouldable. I shall see to it that it does not form into a mould that will break itself rather than take a new and better shape for a new and better world to come. Because it is young, its imagination has to be impressed. It will then mount the chariot that is still to come. Give unto me these soft shining faces. All through their life let them remember this moment of initiation. And I also love them for what they are; whether they be, or not be, children of destiny.—

Let the knocking go on. Even if the knocking is no stranger and has proceeded again and again, an interlude to enchanted passages of ecstasy. Like drops of rain, like drops of rain, let it drench once and for all the hardness of the heart, in one moment and for all time—and all is well, all will be well.

If the young untaught, the just initiated, do not wish him now to smile knowingly, to distrust their change as pure sentiment, let them for a time withdraw from him. Wise in their instinct they will go away. The period of initiation is always dark. Let them invoke him in secret, drawing upon that unending reservoir. In space and time, let them not be contingent. The greater the magic of the reservoir, the less need to be manifested, each to each.

So will they learn the perfect union of dignity with ecstasy in their moments of coming together and drawing apart.

## EDUCATION ON A SYNTHETIC PLAN

BY

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THE life of the world today seems to be completely unhinged. What is this great discord in our civilization due to? It will not be easy to give a convincing reply to this. Economic, political, social, racial and many other factors are at the root of this chaos; but all of them ultimately are dependent upon man who in the last analysis is the author of all these troubles. Has the quality of man, then, deteriorated? The answer is bound to be in the negative. Man has, as a matter of fact, risen much above the primitive animal in him, and his qualities of head and heart are perhaps finer than they ever were in the past. And yet the greatest tragedy of our times is that the same good and noble individual under the impulse of a herd instinct does not hesitate to excel the barbarity and vandalism ever known in the past. Imperialism, Fascism, Nazism and many other isms are given as the source of these troubles, but all such causes have been possible because there is something wrong with man himself in his relation to other human beings. This brings us to the question of his education, and we come nearer to the solution of our problem. That education is often exploited by ruling cliques in almost all the countries of the world to the complete detriment of the rest of mankind is now a well-acknowledged fact, and most of our ills are due to it; but it is not yet fully realized that this has been possible because there is something wrong at the very root of our education. Are not most of our troubles due to our inability to see a thing in its wholeness? Would those two knights have ever quarreled if they had seen the other side of the shield?

Our scheme of education, it will be seen, is so planned as to make it difficult to have this wholeness of view. This will be apparent to us if we closely examine the basis of our existing curricula. When we talk of a curriculum we think in terms of so many subjects that it should cover. Thinking of a curriculum in terms of subjects is as we shall see, fraught with grave danger to a healthy and harmonious growth of our pupils. Our method of approach in such a system is artificial and disintegrated. It uses knowledge in terms of unrelated quantitative units. This has resulted in a mechanical method of teaching in our schools where one subject-teacher goes on with his subject in the class, unmindful of what his other colleagues are doing, as also of the surrounding life.

This condition has implicit in it a belief in the infallibility and finality of the contents handled, resulting in a desire to advocate and maintain a static order of society. It is due partly to this also, that the world through centuries, has often claimed the blood of those torch-bearers of progress who had the courage to doubt the infallibility and finality of the then existing scheme of things. That this educational scheme wherein the transfer of contents to the educand is the essence, results in hardly anything better than a reproduction of a copy, can be seen from the manufacture, especially in the West, to quote Tagore, of 'neatly compressed bales of humanity' in a standardized pattern with a regimentation of mind and body so complete that 'even the Creator will find it difficult to recognise this human product as a thing of spirit and a creature made in His Own Divine Image.'

Attempts have been made to modify the existing method of teaching by recognizing the principle of correlation which now is an accepted fact of New Education. It indeed is an improvement on the old system, but it does not take us far enough; for the fundamental character of the subjects essentially remains



the same. They are a set of systematized knowledge, unrelated to life, and touching it only at tangents. This could be diagrammatically shown by drawing a circle L. as representing the life of the child and placing around it the points G. H. D. M. S. etc. as representing geography, history, drawing, music and so on, from which various tangents may be drawn to the circle L. It will be seen that these tangents touch it at different points, coming as it were from a void, shooting away again into a void, leaving hardly any noticeable trace in their wake. This is what actually happens in the minds of the pupils when they are made to learn contents such as the rules of grammar or mathematics whose purpose is not known to them. They create a sort of vacuum in their minds. This generally happens where subjects are taught in an unrelated manner; but where they are correlated they touch at one or many common tangents. That means that a system of correlation by combining two or more subjects imports a greater meaning and clarity in their contents, though they yet remain considerably detached from life.

A further analysis of this method of teaching through subjects will convince us that it is unnatural, for it is in the scheme of nature that the child's education should be perceptual, travelling gradually from the concrete to the abstract, whereas the subjects generally deal with things in their conceptual terms which have no meaning for the child beyond cramming. This difference has behind it the long story of how rising out of natural and social conditions educational contents gradually became detached from life, creating many complex problems for a world itself becoming more complex.

The education of the primitive man was mainly perceptual. It consisted in his acquaintance with a thing with the purpose of getting mastery over it for his physical needs. Gradually, as his knowledge began to grow and the art of living became more of a social intercourse, the things began to acquire ever-increasing conceptual contents also. A hunted deer which for the primitive

man was an object of satisfying his hunger, began to satisfy his other impulses also by becoming an object of barter. It acquired a new meaning for him and he began to value it in terms of things he needed. This meaning was but a means to an end, but the journey from the means to the ends became so complicated, so long and so tortuous that the ends began to be gradually lost sight of and the means became ends in themselves. Thus instead of the things themselves we have often their abstractions only which for a growing child have hardly any meaning. The child lives in a sensuous world and is often unable to grasp the meaning of a thing in parts. It must see it as a whole. Teaching through subjects or even through a carefully planned method of a correlation of subjects has failed to secure this condition. How this condition is to be created is our problem. It is a problem of education all over the world. In the words of Herbert Martin: "To see things and yet to see them whole is a primary purpose of education. Things seen fragmentarily become different when seen as wholes. Wholeness of view and appreciation is synonymous with integrating moral personality. The world's need to see things steadily and in the light of the whole was never so urgent as now. Civilization depends upon such synthetic understanding."

How is this synthetic understanding to be achieved? Mahatma Gandhiji has answered that question by his new approach to education as suggested in the Wardha Scheme. No scheme of education that aims at the development of the personality of the child as a whole can afford to deviate from the principle suggested by Gandhiji, which described in educational terms is a synthetic method of education.

This method takes its stand on the first-hand experiences of the child and not on the contents deemed desirable for it. Contents, in this scheme are incidental, though not to be neglected. Wardha Scheme is often compared with what is commonly known as the Project Method. But it differs from it as much as the experience

derived from a contact with a real thing differs from that derived from a contact with a make-belief object. This method, then, is quite the reverse of the method of teaching through subjects. This could diagrammatically be shown by the concentric movement from the centre of a circle representing the life of the child, of a radius E representing experiences through ever expanding circles G. H. S. M. D. etc. representing Geography, History, Science and so on. It will thus be seen that in a synthetic plan subjects do not have a pre-conditioned existence as in the case of our existing method. They are, in other words, so many diverse experiences through which the educand passes in its adjustment to life as viewed in terms of physical and social environments. These experiences have in them a living throb, and growth, expansion and multiplication being some of the prime impulses of life, we find that these experiences are all endowed with these attributes of the living, and hence the process of education through a synthetic method assumes the form of an ever-increasing, ever-growing, ever-multiplying movement in the ocean of the life of the educand where the smallest ripple caused by an experience goes on pressing towards its outer rim, swelling and multiplying into waves after waves, setting the entire ocean to an ecstatic rhythm of being. This is the new approach to education as Gandhiji would have it. It is a cyclic movement in growth, starting with the small circle of the self and reaching the wonderful grand cycle of the universe through ever-expanding cycles of family, school, village, nation and humanity. Taking our stand, then, on the Wardha Scheme, as contemplated by Gandhiji we shall see that the curriculum for a synthetic system shall have to be differently planned. The old method of planning will have to be unlearned, and we shall have to visualize the new curriculum in terms of the experiences the child is likely to derive through its activities, some of which will be centred round a basic craft in a given physical and social environment.

Every event, every situation, and every object, therefore, with



which the child is in one way or the other connected, has a meaning and purpose for it, and it must be the function of the teacher to create conditions which secure a satisfactory realization of this aim. The problem of new education, it will be seen, is thus a problem of creating a community of right type of teachers.

The synthetic method, it should be fully realized, has its own difficulties--and they are not small ones. It is fraught with the danger of many useless, unimportant and clumsy details being stuffed round an object, defeating thereby the very purpose of the scheme. It involves frequent repetitions, necessitating thereby a high level of talent in the art of presentation. It is lengthy and takes a long time. The possibility of meandering is ever present in it. The range of knowledge the teacher will be expected to possess is so extensive, and his skill in some basic craft so fine, that hardly any one of the existing teachers will be deemed worthy of this new job. These and such other difficulties seem at the first approach so formidable as to lead one to abandon the scheme as a utopian dream; but if it is worked out systematically, carefully and with a faith in its intrinsic soundness, there is no reason to feel that the scheme will not succeed, and will not be able to rebuild a new and happy world wherein curiosity and not passive acceptance, reason and not prejudice, intelligence and not tradition, co-operation and not competition shall determine the course of life.

It will thus be seen that the problem of education on a synthetic plan will in the beginning be perceptual in at least the first or second year of our school course. It will be in the nature of a preliminary contact with objects whose multifarious uses and social values may gradually reveal themselves to the pupils. At this preliminary stage not a deep, penetrating and far-reaching analysis, but the process itself is all-important. This process involves, as the child moves from the known to the unknown, from objects to ideas, a continuous chain of themes which come into its life and get fixed in its conscious and subconscious self through observation, experi-

mentation and verification, influencing thereby its progress towards a clear realization of its function in life, in terms of its relations to persons, sub-human life, and things in its own expanding world. Hence the framing of the curriculum for a synthetic plan would amount to selecting suitable themes with newer and more complex perceptual and conceptual contents satisfying a physical, sociological, and situational need. The Report of Dr. Zakir Hussein Committee which has been the greatest and perhaps the only conscious effort in our country to reorganize teaching on a synthetic plan lacks in this all-important detail inasmuch as it also has erred into thinking of a curriculum in terms of subjects. As experience has shown this has often given occasion to making teaching artificial and superficial as it often leads to absurdities in the name of correlation. The contents of knowledge that a child should acquire cannot be predetermined in all their details. How much a child should know at the end of a particular course can certainly be decided, but details, as most of them are related to the child's activities, cannot be determined a priori. An experiment can be conducted in a given area, and its results may gradually be incorporated into a new kind of syllabus which will be in the nature of definite themes. This syllabus will certainly be a kind of guide for schools in similar areas. In this way our syllabus for schools in rural areas will perhaps materially differ from that for schools in urban areas. This will mean that before this plan is made universal a multitude of schools in different areas shall have to be started which will be under the guidance of capable teachers who will have an implicit faith in this scheme. In the absence of such a scheme which would necessitate state aid on a large scale, the approach next best to this scheme would be that a large number of devoted teachers with an abiding faith in the new plan should sit together and jointly work out a few object lessons, illustrative of the method of teaching. Unless this is done the scheme is bound to meet with a stubborn refusal at the hands both of the teacher and society.

## MELODRAMA AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY

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In comparison with Tragedy Melodrama is a narrower term and can very well be grouped under it. As the word implies, "Melodrama" is properly a dramatic mixture of music and action but in which there is no singing. This implication has now undergone many changes. At present melodrama means a play of sensational incidents and situations wherein exaggerated appeal is made to the conventional sentiments rather than on play of character, and in which the dramatic personae follow conventional types, e. g. a villain, a hero wrongfully charged with crime, a heroine tormented with suffering and misery, and similar other characters that excite our emotions. The melodramatic play unravels the kidnapping of the heroine, her being saved under the most extraordinary circumstances, pistol shots (possibly bombs also), combats and pugilistic encounters etc. etc. In a melodrama the spectacular events about the crisis become more important than character interest and may even force the characters to do unnatural things.

Such plays first became popular in France in the beginning of the 19th Century. To-day, in fact, we feel ourselves living in a world of melodrama. Every cinema house is full with stunt-kings and giant heroes to thrill us with their adventures under the most extraordinary circumstances. Still, in literature, as well as in life, the life of a melodrama is very limited. Even though works of old playwrights may be preserved for the sake of antiquity, their dramatic value in comparison with the greatness of the plays of Shakespeare is ostensibly much less. The reason is, in the first place, a melodrama lacks singleness of purpose. Secondly, accidents and coincid-



ences act in such a manner that we are unable to form a full judgment of their nature. We feel as if they are all acting under abnormal conditions to supply excitement to the audience instead of character-study. The melodrama lacks the psychological element which is the permanent vitality of the play. And lastly, there is no well-defined course of the development of action as in tragedy. One of a discerning attitude sees through its farrago of sensational horrors and finds himself bothered in the extreme with its details. The feeling of Katharsis or an emotional purge which both satisfies and mentally refreshes us in a great tragedy is totally absent here. The general feeling in seeing a melodrama is of extreme excitement throughout the play and consequent depression of spirits on account of undue nervous activity.

Melodrama is for excitement as tragedy is for the elevation or regeneration of our moral self.

Tragedy represents an important event or a series of events in the life of some person or persons in which the action is serious, complete and significant, the catastrophe melancholy though logical, and the diction elevated. The object of tragedy, as Aristotle would have it, is to arouse "pity and terror". The old notion of tragedy as lapsing into adversity from prosperity has this general truth in it that the tragedy of every nation had about it an element of pain and misery. Two questions suggest themselves here: (1) Whether "pity and terror" are the emotions which a dramatist should seek to produce in a tragedy, and (2) if tragedy thus deals with misery what pleasure do we derive from it?

Terror assuredly is frequently called forth by a great tragedy although that is not the chief emotion in an audience; but as to pity we feel a little doubtful. Tragedy, after all, is not a thing of tears. Pathos stands upon a lower plane of dramatic art, just as sentimentalism is lower than a genuine humanitarian spirit. Pathos is closely concerned with pity and neither the one nor the other is

generally indulged in by the great dramatists as the main tragic motive. There is no call for "sympathetic tears" on behalf of Othello or Coriolanus precisely because they are much above it by virtue of their strong and magnificent personality. We do not weep for Cordelia because she has a hardness in her nature that forbids our tears. And so are Ibsen's disillusioned Nora and the Doctor in "The Enemy of the People". We are struck by the firmness and hardness of Orestes, of Oedipus or Medea of Sophocles or of Nan in "The Tragedy of Nan." There is always something stern and majestic about the highest tragic art.

"The Spanish Tragedy" of Thomas Kyd is an instance of a powerful melodrama. The spirit of revenge reigns supreme in it. The murders of Horatio and Serberine—the servant—and the death of Pedringano on the scaffold, all take place on the open stage. The wailings of Hieronimo and Isabella and her suicide are highly sensational. The tragedy closes with the final scene of complete excitement wherein the villains are murdered and Bellimperia stabs herself. Hieronimo, whose mission of life is now over, hangs himself with a rope. In this play there is no character-study as we find in a great tragedy like "Othello", "Hamlet" or "Macbeth." Hieronimo, inspite of his being the principal character, is to us only a disconsolate and mad father (of Horatio), and wants to wreak revenge on the murderers of his son. Bellimperia is simply a woman who is in love with the murdered Horatio and who dies in the attempt of taking revenge on her brother and Balthazar both who killed her lover. Her real personality remains unknown. The reason is, more stress is laid on dramatic situations rather than on character-study. Imagine the catastrophe in "Hamlet" which is full of horror and excitement. Here we do not feel that disgust and loathing which we do in "The Spanish Tragedy" because the end is brought about in a logical manner. Nothing appears curious, startling or uncalled for. The feeling of Katharsis is experienced because there is that intellectual

satisfaction derived out of the expected turn of events. In a great tragedy the villains are not villains but persons possessing intelligence and a heart to discriminate between good and evil, but whose motives are misdirected as a result of some weakness in them. In "Othello" both Othello and Iago are important characters, but both have some weakness in their nature. Othello is overcredulous whereas Iago is malicious and vindictive. But for these defects the tragedy would not have taken place at all. The "vaulting ambition" of Macbeth, the rashness of thoughtless Lear, the supreme inaction in the nature of Hamlet and the dominating egoism of Coriolanus are at the root of their ruin; and this is the moral that is conveyed through these tragedies to the world. Unlike the melodrama tragedy makes us think about the deeper problems of life and therein lies the permanent value of such great works.

Apart from melodrama this distinction of Tragedy and Comedy is absent in the Sanskrit Drama. It is a mixed composition representing the various dramatic elements (Rasas) woven together but ultimately aiming at harmony in the end which soothes and purifies the mind of the spectator thus revealing the moral lesson suggested by the play. The tragic catastrophe being prohibited by the canons of Nāṭyashāstra the death of either the hero or heroine is never to take place on the stage nor is to be announced therefrom. The 'Urubhanga' of Bhāsa and 'Mr̥chakatika' of Sūdraka are exceptions to this.

Even the best tragedies are not immune from some sensational elements, but such elements do not control them. They simply serve to enhance the action of the tragedy. The scene between the mother and the son in "Hamlet", the entry of enraged Laertes into the presence of Claudius and Gertrude, the scene of turmoil in the graveyard and the final scene — all these serve the same purpose. The entry of the police officers in the "Tragedy of Nan" has also to serve the same purpose.



"The Duchess of Malfi" is a drama of grief and horrors. The theme is persecuted virtue. There is a question of vengeance accomplished, as in "The Spanish Tragedy", by strange means. The victim, the Duchess, is driven to madness and death by her brothers. The melodramatic expedients increasingly employed in every succeeding scenes are endless. The tragedy is full of Shakespearean reminiscences. The Duchess recalls us of Desdemona, and Cariola, her woman, of Emilia in 'Othello'. Bosola, the monster, the tool of the two brothers, is modelled on Iago. But how small and insignificant they all look in comparison with Shakespeare's full-fledged living characters? The reason is, they are unconvincing and less lifelike. They symbolize only the predominant sentiment with a view to excite the emotions. The action of the characters is controlled by one particular passion. This is why the catastrophe does not sound logical and natural like the Shakespearean catastrophe and as such fails to be pleasant in our memory.

Pathos is found in various proportions in all tragedies. Shakespeare felt the necessity of pathos both as a species of relief from too high tension and as a contrast to the genuine tragic sternness. After the misery and horror of Lear's wandering on the storm-swept heath, after Gloucester's eyes have been torn out, the scenes which follow immediately are essentially the pathetic. Lear awakes to discover Cordelia bending over him in love and kindness, blind Gloucester is led away tenderly by Edgar, Lady Macbeth is tortured with permanent feeling of blood on her hand, Ophelia is mad and 'speaks much of her father', Desdemona heightens the sense of the impending tragedy by her haunting 'Willow Song', the Doctor who will have nothing to do with the society in 'The Enemy of the People'—all these are pathetic. In a true tragedy, the vastness of the theme presupposes an emotion, richer, profounder, stronger than is provided in the sentimental play of tears. In our own age most of our dramatists seem incapable of creating

real tragedy because they lack the requisite grandeur of temper and aim – the two chief elements in a great tragedy.

In melodrama this element of pathos occupies a permanent place. "Arden of Feversham" can neither be called in the real sense a tragedy nor a melodrama. It is a crude form of a realistic drama of bloodshed and knavery. Still we feel pity for Arden when he is mercilessly butchered by Alice and Mosbie. In the "Duchess of Malfi" our feeling of pity is sustained throughout because the play is constantly working upon our emotions. The same is the case with "The Spanish Tragedy." Hieronimo is the very picture of pathos throughout most part of the play. But in all these we do not experience a distinctly aesthetic satisfaction, to purify and clarify them by passing them through the medium of true art.

In a great tragedy the sense of pity and fear does not remain applicable to this or that individual. It becomes a general pity and fear for the suffering humanity as a whole. The ordinary man in his normal state has no philosophy of life. He pities intemperately, he fears needlessly; he is filled with indignation. His fears for himself will often be irrational and chaotic because he imagines vaguely that good and evil fortunes in life are matters of chance or caprice. He himself may at any moment be struck down without cause or justice. The truly great tragedy help & to purify all these inner conflicts and gives a rational account of things. By revealing the justice as well as the universal character of the inexorable Moral Law, it induces the chaotic emotions to move no longer at their own sweet will but in a sober, reasoned and orderly manner. The result will be our harmony with the scheme of things around us.

Other elements which go to evolve the spirit of tragedy and which are conspicuous by their absence in a melodrama, are the heroic grandeur, the feeling of nobility, the sense of universality and the poetic effect of tragedy. We enjoy reading or witnessing "Hamlet" which portrays the lofty nobility, honesty and the inborn

goodness of the hero's nature. In "King Lear" Cordelia dies, but in comparison with Cordelia's self, with what she actually is, her death appears as nothing. In fact death never really matters in a great tragedy.

The remarks of Dr. S. K. De in this respect so far as Sanskrit Drama is concerned are illuminating. He says "The Sanskrit Drama does not entirely exclude tragedy; but what it really does is that it excludes the direct representing of death as an incident, and insists on a happy ending. It recognizes some form of tragedy in its pathetic sentiment (Karuna Rasa) and during separation in love (Vipralambha S'rngāra); and tragic interest is almost central in some plays. In the 'Mṛcchakaṭika' and 'S'ākuntala', for instance, the tragedy does not indeed occur at the end, but it occurs in the middle, and in the 'Uttara-rāma-charita', where the tragic interest prevails throughout, it occurs in an intensive form at the beginning of the play."\*

We see any murder with disgust and loathing, much more so when the criminal happens to be a relation of the murdered. But through the artistic touch of the dramatist even murder assumes a dignified shape through being allied with ample motive on the part of the murderer. Shakespeare has chosen his villain heroes, but in every one of them there is depicted a high nobility and emotions sufficient to counterbalance the disgust and loathing that we otherwise experience. Macbeth sins doubly, trebly, but everywhere is keenly alive to the sense of horror of his deed. Othello feels 'the pity of it' and strangles Desdemona. 'A great dramatist is on the side of the noble, on the side of good; he never deserts his mission of creative artistry to descend to preach a moral lesson.'

The sense of universality is the fundamental characteristic of all high tragedy. It is some form of contact with the infinity. Everywhere in high tragedy there is this sense of being raised to loftier heights. One feels that the dramatist has become great as Nature

\* The Indian Theatre : By Dr. R. K. Yajnik p. 261.



hereself, ruthless and inexorable. By their strength and sternness these tragic writers appear as if in union with the vast forces of the physical universe.

Poetic effect has its specific value in diverting our minds for a moment from the gloomy depths of tragedy. Verse in many cases acts as a kind of anesthetic on our senses. The sharp edge of the pain at the crudeness and sordidness of the event is removed by the beauty of language.

To sum up, tragedy is deeper, grander, nobler, more lasting in effect and more serious in its appeal to our intellectual and emotional self than melodrama which is superficial, mainly sensational, lacking in unity of purpose, and certainly on a lower plane of dramatic art. Melodrama supplies a partial picture of a man or woman's nature whereas tragedy gives to us a full picture. Tragedy has a mission to fulfil, melodrama has hardly any or if there is it is the most commonplace one.

## SOME RECENT WORK ON SYNTHETIC COUMARINS

by


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COUMARINS or benzo -  $\alpha$  - pyrones are a class of heterocyclic compounds containing oxygen as a member of the heterocyclic ring fused on a benzene nucleus. Coumarin, the parent substance of this group was first isolated from tonka beans in 1820 and synthesised by W. H. Perkin ( sr ) ( J. 1868, 21, 53,181; 1877,31, 388 ) from salicylaldehyde by his well-known method. Since then, this class of compounds has been the subject of various investigations and considerable amount of research has been published. It has been found that the representatives of this group of compounds occur in vegetable kingdom either in free or combined condition. For example, coumarin, asculetin, scopoletin, daphnetin, fraxetin, umbelliferrone and a vast array of other complex coumarin derivatives have been isolated from a number of plants ( E. Späth, Ber., 1937, 70(A), 83 ) Particularly the plants belonging to the natural orders orchidaceae, leguminoceae, rutaceae, umbellifereae and labiateae are a rich source of naturally occurring coumarins.

The constitution of this class of substances is an interesting point. Coumarin, the sweet-smelling constituent of tonka beans, wood ruff and new mown hay was initially considered to be a benzoic acid derivative but later on, its synthesis by W. H. Perkin (sr) (loc. cit.) established its relation with ortho-hydroxy-cinnamic acid which loses a molecule of water forming a lactone ring. However, different constitutional formulae were suggested from time to time. The Strecker-Fittig-Tiemann formula ( 1867-1877 ) is now universally accepted as it has been found to be in complete

accord with the known reactions of the coumarins. Thus, coumarins and their derivatives are from the point of view of chemical constitution, a group of lactones derived from ortho-hydroxy-cinnamic acids: alternately stated, a coumarin ring-system is formed by the fusion of benzene and 1:2-pyrone rings.

Isomeric with coumarins or 1:2-benzo-pyrones (I) are the chromones or 1:4-benzo-pyrones (II).



Almost all the methods for the synthesis of coumarin derivatives found in literature avail of the possibility of building up the pyrone ring on a suitably substituted benzenoid derivative. A number of methods have been devised by different investigators for obtaining various types of coumarins but the limitations of space prevent their detailed discussion here.

Of the various synthetical methods available, that of Pechmann and Duisberg (Ber., 1883, 16, 2119), which consists in the condensation of a  $\beta$ -ketonic ester with a phenol, is one of the more important and has been most widely used. Numerous workers in the field of coumarin chemistry have studied the Pechmann condensation of phenol with various  $\beta$ -ketonic esters and synthesised several different coumarins. The principal condensing agents which have been hitherto used are concentrated sulphuric acid (Pechmann reaction) and phosphorus pentoxide (Simonis reaction: Ber., 93, 46, 2015), the product being either a coumarin or a chromone or rarely a mixture of both, depending upon the nature of the ester, the phenol and the condensing agent. It is now generally accepted that the more reactive



phenols give coumarins with both the condensing agents; whereas, the less reactive phenols which either do not react or give only poor yields of the coumarins with sulphuric acid, tend to give chromones with phosphorus pentoxide (Chakravarti, J. I. C. S., 1931, 8, 129; 1932, 9, 25, 31 et seq.). Independently of Chakravarti, Robertson working in England also arrived at the same conclusion (J. 1931, 1245, 1877; 1932, 1180, 1681).

A number of other condensing agents like zinc chloride, hydrogen chloride, phosphoric acid, phosphorus oxychloride and sodium ethoxide have also been occasionally used (Naik, Desai and Trivedi, J. I. C. S., 1929, 6, 801; Chakravarti, *ibid*, 1935, 12, 536; Appel, J. 1935, 1031). Recently stannic chloride, ferric chloride and titanium chloride have also been employed (Sethna, M. Sc. thesis, Bom. Univ. 1938; Zeniti and Horiti, J. Pharm. Soc. Japan, 1939, 59, 20). It is found that they do not yield results of any specific interest except phosphorus oxychloride. In all cases, the same coumarins are obtained as with sulphuric acid with some variations in the yields. Phosphorus oxychloride, however, promises to be of interest as it can replace phosphorus pentoxide in some cases (Goodall and Robertson, J. 1939, 426) and it has been found to affect the condensation where sulphuric acid fails. It has also been found to be valuable for the condensation of poly-hydroxy-phenolic ketones with acetoacetic ester (Desai and Hamid, Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 1937, 6, (A), 185), giving 7-hydroxy-6-acyl-coumarin derivatives.

Sethna, Shah and Shah (J. 1938, 228) have recently introduced the use of a new condensing agent, namely anhydrous aluminium chloride, for the condensation of  $\beta$ -ketonic esters with phenols. From the results obtained which are unique in some respects, it has proved to be a valuable reagent. The condensation is generally carried out in presence of a solvent—ether in which aluminium chloride dissolves readily (Shah, Curr. Sc., 1934, 157) or nitroben-


zene where higher temperatures have to be used. Some of the important results are summarised below:

1. Aluminium chloride is of particular value in case of little reactive monohydric phenols. The same coumarins are obtained as with sulphuric acid, in some cases with higher yields. Phenol gives uniformly a yield of 30-40 per cent of 4-methylcoumarin, the recorded yield in literature being 3%. (Sethna, Shah and Shah, Curr. Sc., 1937, 3, 93). *O*-cresol which does not condense using sulphuric acid readily condenses giving 4:8-dimethylcoumarin in good yield (Shah, Ph. D. thesis, Bom. Univ. 1938). In no case, a chromone has been obtained.

2. Methyl  $\beta$ -resorcyate and  $\beta$ -resorcylic acid condense with ethyl acetoacetate and other  $\beta$ -ketonic esters in presence of sulphuric acid giving 7-hydroxy-coumarin-6-carboxylic acid derivatives (Shah et al, J. I. C. S., 1937, 12, 717). The same condensation in presence of aluminium chloride affords mainly 5-hydroxy-coumarin-6-carboxylic acid derivatives from which by hydrolysis and decarboxylation, 5-hydroxy-4-methylcoumarin is readily obtained (Sethna, Shah and Shah, J. 1938, 228; Limaye and Kelkar, Rasayanam, 1936, 45).

3. Resacetophenone does not condense with ethyl acetoacetate in presence of sulphuric acid or sodium ethoxide. However, with aluminium chloride as condensing agent, this condensation readily takes place, the product obtained in high yield being 5-hydroxy-4-methyl-6-acetyl-coumarin (Sethna, Shah and Shah, loc. cit.).

Work on different phenolic esters has been extended by Dr. S. M. Sethna and Dr. R. C. Shah and interesting results obtained. During the course of this work, they also synthesised hitherto unknown 7-hydroxy-4:5-dimethyl coumarin (J. 1938, 1066; J. I. C. S., 1940, 17, 211; J. Univ. Bom., 1940, 9, 104).



The reaction with phenolic ketones has been investigated in several cases by the author and his co-workers, extending it to di- and tri-hydroxy-phenolic ketones and to various 4-acyl-resorcinols. In all cases, 5-hydroxy-6-acyl-coumarin derivatives have been obtained in good yield (Shah and Shah, J. 1938, 1424; Deliwala and Shah, J. 1939, 1250; Proc. Ind. Acad. Sci., 1941, 13 (A), 352; *ibid*, 1943, 17 (A), 7; Chudgar and Shah, J. Univ. Bom., 1942, 11 (iii), 43).

Thus the main points of interest with regard to the use of the new reagent are:

- (i) With less reactive phenols like monohydric phenols, aluminium chloride is a much more efficient agent than sulphuric acid.
- (ii) With phenolic esters and phenolic ketones, it modifies the course of the reaction and 5-hydroxy-coumarin derivatives which are almost inaccessible by hitherto known methods



become easily available. This striking feature of aluminium chloride as a condensing agent in modifying the course of the reaction is noteworthy.

An additional point of interest indirectly connected with the synthesis of coumarins is the role of aluminium chloride in Gattermann reaction. Methyl  $\beta$ -resorcyate does not undergo the Gattermann reaction under its usual customary conditions. But in presence of aluminium chloride dissolved in ether, this reaction smoothly takes place with the formation of methyl 2:4-dihydroxy-3-formylbenzoate, the formyl group entering the usually inaccessible 2-position of the resorcinol nucleus (Shah R. C. and Laiwalla, J. 1939, 1828; H. A. Shah and R. C. Shah, J. 1939, 1832 et seq.). This modified Gattermann reaction has provided an elegant method of synthesising Y-resorcyaldehyde derivatives otherwise difficult to obtain. This reaction is also applicable to poly-hydroxy-phenolic ketones.

The synthesis of these aldehyde esters and ketones—a class of compounds hitherto unknown—opens up various synthetical possibilities, culminating in the synthesis of 5-hydroxy-coumarin (Shah and Shah, J. 1939, 1832).

The two apparently unconnected types of reactions referred to above, viz, condensation of phenolic esters and ketones with  $\beta$ -keto-*nic* esters with aluminium chloride as condensing agent to give 5-hydroxy-coumarin derivatives and the modified Gattermann reaction on phenolic esters and ketones to give 3-formyl derivatives which have been serviceable for the synthesis of 5-hydroxy-coumarin, have a common theoretical basis. Both the phenomena are ultimately due to the reactivity in 2-i. e. Y-position of the resorcinol nucleus. This can be satisfactorily explained on the view that this is due to the stabilisation of one of the Kekule forms on account of chelation between the carbemethoxy or the acetyl group and the ortho hydroxy group (Baker, J. 1934, 1684; Shah and Shah, J. 1938, 1426.

and Nixon, J. 1938, 1426; Shah H. A. and Shah 1938, 142, 163 ).

—acyl-coumarin derivatives now made easily  
Condensation of 4-acyl-resorcinols in presence of  
e are the substances of much potential value for  
es. Their easy accessibility has provided a way  
of several heterocyclic compounds like chromono-  
coumarins and hydroxy-acyl-coumarones as well  
s containing such ring-systems. The synthetical  
omono-and flavono-coumarins has been already  
alised in several cases. The work on coumarino-  
en recently published (Shah, J. Univ. Bom., 1942,  
Moreover, the work on the furano-coumarins has  
carried to completion by Mr. M. C. Chudgar  
Shah ( J. Bom. Univ. 1945. ) Work on the acyl-  
progress and other synthetical possibilities are  
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expresses his sincere thanks to Professor R. C.  
D for his interest and close association in the  
ms.

**in proof:** This article was submitted for publication in 1943.  
Authors have published their results. A complete and exhaustive  
ary of coumarins has appeared in the **Chemical Reviews**  
It contains all the references upto 1944.....N. M. S. ]

